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1. The diversity of social professions in Europe – their historical origins 
and epistemological significance 
 
 
 
 
Social work does not represent the picture of a coherent profession in Europe. While this 
might be interpreted as a lack of professionalisation and therefore as an interim stage which, 
in the course of the unfolding of its own evolutionary potential as a profession and with the 
help of the professional associations promoting its cause, will one day be overcome, these 
historical reflections point towards a different approach. They regard the ‘incomplete 
professionalisation’ not as a negative attribute but instead as a key indicator of the special 
nature of the social profession. The lack of professional autonomy, measured by the criteria 
of other professions, is precisely the attribute which identifies social work as a social 
profession, i.e. as a professional activity that does not strive to distance itself from social 
processes, in the way that medicine and other therapeutic professions, psychology, the legal 
professions and to some extent the teaching profession managed to do, but which derives its 
mandate always from being based in and linked to the way in which society, not a group of 
experts, collectively defines, often in a most contradictory way, criteria of ‘well-being’, 
social integration and hence the conditions under which society can only exist. ‘The social’ 
in social work as this ill-defined, contested and often idealised, often negated vanishing point 
of solidarity in modern societies, attaches itself not only to its title but to its mode of 
operating, or rather, the fact that social work came into existence in a particular historical 
period, that it can be seen very specifically as a product of modernity with very few 
institutional fore-runners in pre-modern times (in contrast to the old established professions) 
points towards the fact that it came about as a result of the necessity of modern societies to 
pay special attention to the creation and maintenance of cohesive bonds under radically 
changed social, political and economic conditions. Modern societies had to ‘reinvent’, to 
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‘imagine’ (Anderson 1983) themselves as integrated wholes whilst experiencing the 
discontinuity of traditional bonds which could no longer be regarded as “natural” and 
“given”. As sociology knows since Durkheim (1988), the basis for solidarity under the 
modern conditions of the division of labour is radically different from that of a traditional 
society. Solidarity in modern societies requires organisation, planning, complex 
communication processes for the establishment of norms and the defence against deviance. 
To address the task of this self-initiated integration a high degree of reflexivity was 
necessary, a change which forms the origin of the discipline of sociology which has as its 
central theme the necessity of modern societies to reflect on the principles and functions of 
social order as constituted not by external, eternal laws but as the products of social 
processes (Lash et al. 1996). It is within this turn towards social reflexivity that social work, 
in all its many different organisational and conceptual varieties, has its origins. Social work 
is one element of the constitution of social order under the conditions of modernity. The 
dominant form of political self-organisation became the nation state which therefore is itself 
not a taken-for-granted form of organisation but a highly contested product of this very 
process of self reflection. Its inherently contradictory nature of the nation as a concept is well 
characterised by Žižek: 
‘On the one hand, “nation” of course designates modern community 
delivered of the traditional “organic” ties, a community in which the 
pre-modern links tying down the individual to a particular estate, 
family, religious group, and so on, are broken – the traditional 
corporate community is replaced by the modern nation-state whose 
constituents are “citizens”: people as abstract individuals, not as 
members of particular estates, and so forth. On the other hand, 
“nation” can never be reduced to a network of purely symbolic ties: 
there is always a kind of “surplus of the Real” that sticks to it – to 
define itself, “national identity” must appeal to the contingent 
materiality of the “common roots”, of “blood and soil” and so on. In 
short, “nation” designates at one and the same time the instance by 
means of reference to which traditional “organic” links are dissolved 
and the “remainder of the pre-modern in modernity”: the form organic 
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substance acquires within the universe of the substanceless Cartesian 
subjectivity’. (Žižek 1991 p20) 
 
In its concrete institutional form the transition from social organisational patterns 
characterised as Gemeinschaft to those representing Gesellschaft (Tönnies 1887) hit upon 
this compromise, fraught with tensions, which in turn required instruments for achieving 
stability and structure. It is therefore important to recognise that the origins of social work 
are not just linked to social transformation processes at the core of the rise of modernity 
associated with reflexivity and the need for new lifeworld forms of solidarity, but even more 
so to political agendas for their systemic stabilisation such as represented by the nation state 
project. As such social work, in all its forms, shares in the fundamental ambiguity of 
modernity in general and is also caught up in the contradictions that constituted the nation 
state, and this regardless whether we are looking at social work as a public or as a non-
governmental activity.  
 
From this follows that as the role of the nation state is changing dramatically under the 
impact of globalisation and the project of modernity itself appears to be in crisis, social work 
is of necessity affected by these contemporary developments and needs to be subjected to a 
fundamental examination of its relationship with society and of its founding principles. It is 
becoming apparent that the existence of ‘the social’ can no longer be taken for granted as a 
shared concern beyond all the ideological splits over its realisation. Instead, one of the 
implicit and explicit tasks in all social work interventions needs to become the constitution 
of the social itself in a manner that is no longer directly linked to the nation state project.  
The initial historical reflections which follow are therefore of immediate and immense 
practical relevance because they explore the possibilities of professional autonomy and for a 
scientifically grounded autonomy for the social professions not for the sake of enhancing 
status and privilege, but for the purpose of grounding these ‘inherited’ activities and 
mandates in a contemporary analysis of the requirements of society and its members. 
 
It is one of the prevailing characteristics of modern societies, particularly in the form of 
nation states, that they have a broken relationship to their own modernity. Sociologically 
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speaking the at times nostalgic, at times blatantly power-driven hankering after pre-modern 
forms of solidarity – and hence of legitimation − is not so much a sign of an incomplete 
process of modernisation as of the often diagnosed ambivalence of modernity itself. 
Modernity is split between on the one hand valuing its emancipatory potential positively as a 
means of overcoming the restraints of dogma and irrationality and on the other hand 
recognising with fear that the emancipation was achieved largely by the instrumental use of 
rationality and hence power which destroys the very basis on which democratic, legitimating 
processes can be built (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947). Seeing social work as located within 
these dynamics means then to analyse its characteristics with regards to both the ‘system’ 
and to the ‘lifeworld’, to express this tension in Habermasian terms (Habermas 1987). In 
other words, social work cannot be understood fully as either a total product of social policy 
and hence of the system, which would prescribe its functions minutely and treat the 
profession merely as an instrument for the implementation of social legislation, or as a 
lifeworld activity with references only to private forms of caring and problem-solving and 
the intention of keeping the grasp of the system over this domain at arm’s length. Social 
work is rooted in both worlds and remains committed to both. At the same time, however, 
this dual dependency by itself could not provide a basis for professionalisation, and it is 
therefore understandable that early social workers, caught up in this ambivalence and 
confronted with the impossibility of building solidarity either by “traditional natural 
processes” of the ‘mechanical’ kind or by means of force and control, which was the modern 
states’ response to social instability, sought to initiate their own process of reflection and 
hence of training (Rauschenbach 1999, Thole 2002). The push for recognised training 
programmes was a means of facilitating the search for a point of view from which both pre-
given types of processes could be assessed critically and an independent response be 
developed without however leaving the social and historical context which provided the 
basis for social work’s mandate. 
 
These considerations will form the basis for the following analysis of the separate yet 
connected effects of developments at the level of social policy, of social movements and of 
training traditions and academic discourses on the presentations of social work in Europe. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Of particular interest will be the inter-sections of these constitutive factors in both their 
historical and their contemporary significance. One fundamental premise is that as social 
work does not seem to ‘fit in’ exclusively with any one of those domains and cannot be 
defined and practised from any one of those three positions alone, this is not to be regarded 
as an historical limitation of the profession which has to be overcome, but on the contrary it 
marks the fundamental attributes of this professional activity and is indeed a characteristic to 
be preserved and to be developed, probably as key indicator of a new type of 
professionalism, but certainly as the horizon of competences that characterise an advanced as 
against a ‘primitive’ state of social work. The intersections between the circles indicate that 
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social work is engaged in and can critically influence the at times contradictory processes 
through which social solidarity has to be achieved under the conditions of modernity.  
 
The intersection between civil society and official state policies, regardless of the type of 
prevailing welfare regime, represents historically the nation state project, the attempt at 
bringing together and coordinating support structures from ‘above’ and ‘below’. 
Conceptually it indicates the balance between horizontal and vertical solidarity, as shall be 
explained in later chapters, an attempt which culminated in the height of the welfare state 
development after World War II and is now being threatened by the process of globalisation. 
Practically, this intersecting domain represents a crucial challenge to social work to maintain 
this tension, not just in its organisational structure poised between a mandate from service 
users and from the state, but also in its interventions where it constantly needs to pay equal 
attention to the right of equality and to that of diversity and individual identity (Figure 2).  
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The intersection between the social policy agenda at the level of the system and of academic 
discourses marks the degree to which social work managed to emancipate itself from the role 
of a ‘handmaiden’ to the state, an independence that was not just motivated by  its 
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professional ambitions, but fostered also, at least tacitly, by the system itself which since the 
days of the Elberfeld scheme required the services of skilled diagnosticians who could fine-
tune the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, not just for the benefit of the individual 
concerned but also for the purpose of arriving at an efficient and legitimate rationale of 
distribution, again a criterion which is of high actuality today. The suspicion that attached 
itself for instance to case work as the archetypical social work method, as to whether its 
implicit individualism ‘accidentally’ served to support the individualism characteristic of 
capitalist market societies or whether it was simply a scientifically derived method 
considered professionally apt despite such political convenience repeats itself in the question 
over the latest methodological concepts around case management and social management 
which also render a professional / methodological and a political reading equally valid 
(Figure 3).  
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Finally, the encounter between lifeworld processes and academic discourses represents not 
just a relict from the early days of the profession and hence a stage of development that has 
been left behind and overcome by the progress of professionalisation. On the contrary, this 
intersection provides a very contemporary challenge to social work as social movements are 
gaining in strength and are increasingly fielding the weight of personal qualities and 
experiences against that of formal academic qualifications. The question of identity, much 
neglected in academic discourses, is thereby posed with renewed strength and this has 
profound methodological implications for social work, not just in relation to a universalist 
conception of social policy (Figure 4).  The turn towards post-modern approaches is an 
expression of the belated articulation of identity as an issue for social work, but overall post-
modern methodological approaches appear to provide an inadequate response as shall be 
argued later. 
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The approach taken here emphasises instead the necessity of sustaining the tensions inherent 
in social work’s multifarious legacy and of turning them into a project for the deliberate 
shaping of the ‘in-between spaces’ in which this profession is located and in which new 
forms of social solidarity need to be developed. These forms of solidarity will be geared 
towards harnessing the social valences of lifeworld bonds whilst critically linking them to 
universal human rights as guaranteed by governmental structures at national and 
international level. This form of social work as reflexive practice is geared towards creating 
the conditions of social citizenship at the level of concrete social interventions with 
individuals and groups and thus towards underpinning the still incomplete construction of 
social citizenship at social policy level. In addition to mediating the relationship between 
civil society processes and state at national level this type of practice will increasingly have 
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to engage with trans-national social policies and with international social movements such as 
they find their expression in the move towards giving the European unification project a 
social dimension. This programme therefore contains the outline of what could be termed 
“critical European social work” in the specific historical context of Europe (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5 
 
This investigation is inspired by a conviction that the closer engagement with historical 
origins of the professional field can lead to a better understanding of the nature of social 
work’s ‘dependent status’ and that this reflection can make a direct contribution to a clearer 
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and more effective strategic positioning of the profession in view of the current re-
structuring of socio-political priorities and hence of the entire re-designing of the ‘social 
sphere’.  
 
Only by sharpening the view of the nature of social work’s ‘dependency’ as a necessary 
feature of a professional activity that is essentially historical and hence hermeneutic in its 
methodology can the nature of social work’s brand of professionalism be properly 
recognised and formed. What is more, the chance of defending it against ideological 
manipulations and giving it an explicit anti-discriminatory practice orientation does not rest 
on a withdrawal from political controversy and on taking refuge in apparent academic 
neutrality. On the contrary it shall be shown that it was precisely this withdrawal to a 
position of neutrality that made the profession vulnerable to ideological misuse. The 
encounter with the history of the European nation state is therefore a basic condition not just 
for a better understanding of the origins and development of the profession, but for the 
development of culturally meaningful yet anti-discriminatory practices. 
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2. Nation state and social work – between incorporation and professional 
emancipation 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, modern nation states are characterised by an inherent 
ambivalence towards the principles upon which to base their internal integration and 
solidarity. Fundamentally it remained unclear whether the modern nation state represents the 
community of people who are already, ‘essentially’, ‘primordially’, and without necessarily 
knowing it, ‘all the same’ by virtue of their ‘roots’ or whether they are first of all different, 
have the right to be different but are held together by a socially negotiated contract which 
forms the band of their unity and identity (Brubaker 1996). The instability resulting from this 
ambivalence ultimately gave social and educational services the chance to assume such an 
important stabilising part in modern societies. Workers in those services became 
automatically involved in the question of collective as well as individual identities even 
though many of them never realised that identity and particularly the stabilisation of 
collective identities played such an important role in their work.  
 
A guiding hypothesis of this chapter, which explores the intersection of social policy and 
academic-professional agendas, is that because social work discourses, until recently, failed 
to problematise the professions’ link to the ‘nation-state building project’ they could not 
develop the actual identity-building mandate independently and accountably. Social workers 
tended to either work with a taken-for-granted view of identity, or ignore the question of 
identity and operate with some abstract notion of ‘people in general’. This analysis by 
contrast sets out to link a particular mode of finding and defining professional autonomy in 
the social professions with the development of anti-discriminatory and anti-racist methods; 
or to express the latter positively: Professional autonomy for the social professions is not a 
matter of perfecting their distance from political processes and to foster personality and 
identity development as purely psychological processes, but to make a positive contribution 
to the social and political conditions under which such processes lead to social solidarity and 
equality in a society. By becoming engaged in the negotiation of non-essentialist, non-racist 
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identities as part of their interventions social workers develop their actual professional 
potential. This form of practice shall be termed “social citizenship as practice” (see chapter 
3). 
 
The professional necessity for developing this perspective and for re-defining the direction 
of professional autonomy towards the engagement with political, citizenship-building 
processes that link the issues and discourses of identity with those of equality is becoming 
blatantly apparent under the conditions of globalisation. One of the effects of the process of 
globalisation is that the nation as a reference point for identity has become questionable 
world wide and especially in the European context, and this despite the simultaneous rise in 
nationalism. The emergence of this polarisation between the dissolution and the tightening of 
national boundaries and characteristics, between the global fusion of cultural boundaries and 
the emphasis on individual life-style choices, and between the higher esteem afforded to 
freedom, liberty and human rights generally and the increase in social control, discrimination 
and racism is an indication of the unstable compromise of ideas that historically make up the 
modern concept of the nation. On the one hand the concept contains a legacy of nationalism 
and imperialism, of inter-nation rivalries which twice in the 20th  century erupted in world 
wars, of intolerance, racism and oppression, of the holocaust and of 'ethnic cleansing'. On the 
other hand the idea of a nation carries notions of democratic self-determination, citizenship 
and civil rights, social solidarity and social protection, and has been an important source of 
inspiration and emancipation in many liberation and human rights movements. It seems that 
the nation state as the modern custodian of the concept of freedom and equality has failed to 
link sufficiently the politics of collective identity creation with processes of the lifeworld 
where individual and collective identities are being negotiated and that the new fora where 
these negotiations take place (at both the sub-national and now increasingly also the 
European and international level) are dominated by ideologies and power manipulation not 
subject to democratic controls. This prevents the question of identity being made the subject 
of critical and informed debate and into this vacuum enter the politics of resentment which 
foster the rise of neo-Nazism and racism as popular movements. 
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The uncertainties over collective identities in the modern world manifest themselves in a 
fundamental paradox (Giddens 1991): on the one hand the traditional barriers between 
classes, cultures and countries begin to dissolve giving way to global connections and 
influences. The 'global village' shares the same fashions, the same tastes in music and visual 
entertainment and communicates via satellites and the internet instantaneously. It also shares 
common ecological concerns, increasingly aware of the intricate links that exist between all 
parts of the life sustaining system. On the other hand life-styles begin to differentiate 
themselves ever more strongly with a high degree of exclusivity so that regions, countries, 
ethnic groupings, sub-cultures and individuals define their identities in a ‘them and us’ 
manner.  
 
The waning of the significance of the nation state goes back to well before the effects of 
globalisation were felt and analysed. The experience of the last World War as a conflict 
unleashed by nationalism had given a strong impetus for the formation of supra-national 
organisations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Common 
Market. Political leaders of the post-war era of Europe were determined to prevent the evil of 
nationalism and national rivalry from plunging the world yet again into the abyss of war, 
although the strategies of the military alliances of the cold war era still utilised the basic 
principles of competition and 'superiority' characteristic of the nation states. Economic 
interests within both the capitalist and the communist block relativised national borders even 
further. This created an expansive territorial interdependence of specialised production sites 
in the former communist states while capitalist market forces equally created economic 
structures that spanned distant territories and for whose operations national borders were 
largely a hindrance (Wallerstein 1991). 
 
However during the same time of post-war economic expansion the nation state concept 
began to proliferate world wide and influence particularly the transformation of former 
colonies into independent states. It fostered notions of self-determination, sovereignty and 
legitimacy linked, as had been the case with the first generation of European nation states, 
with aspirations for competitive national economies and the hegemonic values of a distinct 
national culture. After the collapse of the Soviet Union a similar movement flourished in 
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Central and Eastern Europe renewing the deep ambivalence of the nation state construct and 
leading for the first time after the end of WWII to widespread bloody wars in Europe. 
Nationalism re-emerged at the same time as globalisation began to spread unimpeded by 
bloc mentalities, precipitating the crisis of social solidarity that accompanied the apparent 
victory of market capitalism world-wide.   
 
In terms of a changed public consciousness in the wake of these political and economic 
changes one of the most unsettling effects of globalisation is perhaps caused by media 
technology which causes an 'intensification of consciousness' (Robertson 1992: 8). This 
development allows for instant and close participation in world events in the privacy of 
every living room equipped with a TV screen. The 'virtual participation' in events like wars, 
natural disasters and political dramas in other parts of the world appeals to the conscience of 
the viewer in such a way that solidarity, at least momentarily, extends far beyond national 
and cultural boundaries as demonstrated in the 'Band-Aid' induced surge of help for African 
famine victims or the spontaneous relief actions for Romanian or Chinese orphans. Distant 
events, distant lives suddenly become a matter that can no longer be externalised emotionally 
with accustomed psychological defences that draw reliable dividing lines between 'them' and 
'us'.  
 
 
At the same time globalisation and the expansion of potential responsibilities at supra-state 
level is accompanied by a weakening and re-structuring of the traditional bonds of solidarity 
at sub-nation state level. Beck's diagnosis of an 'unleashed process of modernization [which 
is] overrunning and overcoming its own coordinate system' paints a picture of the 
'detraditionalization' of a class based culture and consciousness, of gender and of family 
roles (Beck 1992: 87). People no longer have stable expectations of the pathways their lives 
and careers will take but share in a range of experiences (unemployment, luxury 
commodities, travel etc.) which seem more randomly allocated across class divisions in the 
'lottery of life' in which individuals have to calculate their own risks. Family obligations, age 
and gender roles, formats of social contacts cannot draw on a clearly discernible pattern any 
longer forcing individuals continuously to make their own choices. The need for such 
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choices and the concentration of gratification on having made successful choices promotes 
narcissistic tendencies which get further exploited by commercial interests in all spheres of 
life, particularly with regard to leisure activities. The results are greater social inequalities 
aggravated by the fact that traditional 'defensive solidarities' in terms of kinship bonds, social 
class or of labour organisations are losing their relevance and their influence (Taylor-Gooby 
2001).  
 
Overwhelmed by the necessity to make constant choices members of modern societies are 
tempted to take refuge in certainties that present themselves as 'factual' (e.g. the biology of 
sex differences, the physiology of ethnicity), or in forms of community that seek to revive 
nostalgic enclaves in the bleak and impersonal industrial social landscape or that seem to 
allow to derive one's identity from 'common roots' like tribes and nations (Taguieff 1990). 
The renewed rise in nationalism and the growing importance of ethnicity as a reference point 
in political discourse are indications of this fundamental ambivalence and the seeming 
attractiveness of such reactive solutions. 
 
These observations point to the intrinsic connection between personal and political processes 
and therefore confirm the necessity for the social professions to reflect on this connection 
and to examine critically their traditional place and role within the nation state, precisely 
because this role can no longer be taken for granted. While the practice consequences for of 
the dissociation from the nation state will be the subject of chapter 8, the following analysis 
will deal first of all with the structural issues of the origins of social work’s links with the 
nation state project.  
 
There appears to be a parallel between the uncertainties confronting individuals in search of 
their personal identities and those that characterise the political arena in defining the limits of 
our collective responsibilities nationally and internationally. In other words, the issues of 
identity and of solidarity reveal their common link in terms of the priority of collective 
identities over individual, self-chosen expressions of identity just when social policies are 
moving in the direction of disconnecting them. The neo-liberal restructuring of the welfare 
state right across Europe (Mishra 1990, Squires 1990, Pierson 1994, Jessop 2000b) has as its 
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aim the dismantling of the welfare consensus forged in the experience of the last world war 
that had been regarded as the completion of the establishment of full citizenship (Marshall 
and Bottomore 1992). The welfare state consensus had meant that despite all differences in 
welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, Leibfried 1992) the state affirmed its role in the 
creation of social solidarity not only as a means of ensuring greater equality but also as a 
source of its own legitimacy and the loyalty of its citizens. Social citizenship completes the 
social contract on which the nation-states are founded to bring the relationship between state 
and citizen into the sphere of everyday “private” concerns over the maintenance of well-
being and a decent standard of living and makes therefore citizenship a tangible element of 
contact and interaction between the public and the private sphere (Flora 1986). The gradual 
withdrawal of the state from these arrangements and the trend towards the privatisation of 
welfare provisions and hence of social risks means in essence that private contracts come to 
replace social contracts and that the principle on which solidarity is grounded generally 
becomes uncertain and unreliable in these social relations. Existing webs of solidarity are 
being fragmented beyond the limits that were so far regarded as politically acceptable as 
guarantees for a tolerable degree of inequality within a welfare system (Taylor-Gooby 2001). 
The state changes its role from providing to activating (Lorenz 2002, Dahme and Wohlfahrt 
2002, Esping-Andersen 2002, Dahme et al. 2003) and this alters the conditions of solidarity 
from collectively-ensured to individually-earned. It also renders welfare more a set of 
obligations primarily held by private institutions such as the family, the community or 
commercial insurance companies (Culpitt 1992). 
 
 
These uncertainties over the specific boundaries of national solidarity and responsibility and 
their underlying principles lead right back to the historical roots of the European nation state 
and the assumptions which guided its development. It will be argued in the following that the 
fundamental flaws and unresolved contradictions of those assumptions, which constructed 
the nation states on an ideology of nationalism infused with racism, are now contributing to 
the fragmentation of solidarity. Central to the instability of the nation state and hence to the 
weakness of the welfare state is this construct’s inability to accommodate cultural, ethnic and 
ultimately also physiological diversity within a framework of social equality and justice. 
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A parallel ambiguity also besets the process of European integration and is building up to an 
irreconcilable set of contradictions on which particularly the expansion project is likely to 
founder. The process of European integration has many similarities to that of the 
development of European nation states that were faced with the task of uniting diverse 
cultural regions and systems of political allegiance, despite (or because of) the caution 
against not declaring the European Union as a de-facto state (Delanty 1995). The 
organisation of social solidarity among the nations of Europe is a central instrument in this 
process, just as it was in the history of nation states and with a similar time lag that makes 
European social policies appear an after-thought to economic policies, but an after-thought 
vital for the legitimation of the project (Leibfried and Pierson 1994). What is at stake (and 
awaits therefore the active participation of those working at the grass-roots of inter-cultural 
social issues) is whether the social policies of the European Union will ultimately reproduce 
the nationalist principles characteristic of national welfare or whether they can draw on the 
lessons of the national experience and square diversity with equality in a newly grounded 
and actively practised form of citizenship (Pieterse 1995). 
 
In these processes two strategies of defining the boundaries of solidarity and identity and 
hence of citizenship are competing, each with its history in nation-state developments and 
each presenting its own sets of problems (Bauman 1995b). One is the pragmatic attempt of 
acknowledging that the appearance of any collective identity is arbitrary to some extent and 
a matter of collective choice. The form of mutual solidarity people or societies choose to 
contract with each other requires no 'substantive' base in their inherent sameness and is in 
that sense indifferent to and independent of their identity. This position accepts that all 
boundaries are historically contingent and arbitrary and treats identity and obligations as a 
matter of pragmatism and convenience. This liberal solution appears to suit a modern mind 
set that values freedom from traditional bonds but its limitations are that solidarity negotiated 
in this ‘unconditional’ way can always be withdrawn, rules can change, obligations, for 
instance in the inter-generational contract over pensions, can be cancelled as political 
alliances shift. The liberal, civic approach seems incapable of accommodating a 
psychological need for continuity, for the 'reality' behind unifying symbols and cultural 
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norms and for collective identities. Its formalism reduces equality to a symbolic claim which 
not only leaves the question of substantive differences and the experienced inequalities 
resulting from them unresolved but actively encourages the competitive, free play of 
interests as constitutive of the formal identity thus established. Solidarity has to be ‘earned’, 
one way or the other, by merit or by shrewdness. 
 
The other, 'essentialist' solution to establishing a common identity concentrates on the 
definition of a 'common core' and searches not for negotiated outer perimeters but for the 
'centre' in which a common identity might be anchored or rather ‘discovered’ as being 
‘given’ (in nature or in lineage) prior to all political negotiation. Concordance with this core 
of essential characteristics decides then over membership to the whole and for those regarded 
as ‘belonging’ solidarity is unconditional. This approach has an appealing simplicity and 
‘naturalness’ about it promising the confirmation of a substantive identity and within it 
equality. Being of the same nation was indeed associated with the aspiration for an end to 
class and regional discrimination and nationalism founded its appeal very much on this 
promise. However, on closer examination all such given 'essentials' turn out to be fictions, 
myths constructed for political ends and belie their appearance of stability and continuity. 
Furthermore, the solidarity of the ‘included’ invariably excludes those lacking in those 
essential characteristics all the more harshly as it affords them no chance of ‘entering’ and of 
ever belonging fully. 
 
As shall be shown, in the development of the European nation states both strategies featured, 
with the latter frequently becoming the dominant influence in the form of nationalism. It is 
important in the assessment of the social function of education and social services that they 
played an important part in the realisation of these strategies and are therefore implicated in 
the transmission of core values concerning the nature of citizenship and the conditions of 
‘belonging’. The concept of the nation contains itself the fundamental and for many fateful 
ambivalence between both approaches to a collective identity (Hroch 1985) and brings with 
it the constant danger of a racist solution to this tension.  
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In tracing the history of the European nation states Hobsbawm (1990) distinguishes between 
a 'revolutionary-democratic' version of the nation which emphasises the form of the contract 
between free and independent citizens as the basis of their rights, associated with the French 
Revolution, and a 'nationalist' version which builds cohesion and integration on a 'common 
cultural heritage' as in the Italian or German tradition. The revolutionary construction of the 
nation did not and could not rely on a pre-existing notion of cultural homogeneity or ethnic 
“purity” of a people; at the time of the French Revolution only about 50% of the population 
spoke French (Balibar 1985) and the 'social contract' negotiated between citizens affirmed 
explicitly the right 'to be different' (in terms of religion or life style) but emphasised all the 
more legal equality as the basis of national unity. What united the new French nation was not 
so much a common past but a common task, the ending of traditional privileges. 
Nevertheless, cultural heterogeneity soon became a problem for the French revolutionaries 
as it threatened stability and citizenship was in fact far more than a pure formality: it soon 
became conditional on the knowledge of the French language and thereby on being able to 
participate in the 'official French culture', a criterion of 'cultural and civic collectivism' 
(Greenfeld 1992) which still has enormous integrative power in France to this day (Brubaker 
1990). 
 
In the fundamental re-ordering of the political map of continental Europe which followed the 
Napoleonic wars a curious mixture of ideological-mythical and rational-economic criteria 
gained prominence to determine the territorial outlines of all those new political entities of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Nation 
states were by no means products of mere cultural aspirations but had to be big enough to be 
economically viable, according to the famous pragmatics of Mazzini (Hobsbawm 1990: 31), 
so that not every wish for national independence, formed by nationalist and romantic 
movements in the wake of the anti-Napoleonic resistance, came to be satisfied. However, all 
those national identities that came to be seen as the basis of nation states (but were in fact 
products of the establishment of political sovereignty) were informed by two overriding 
principles: the difference to a neighbouring culture (Swedish/Norwegian, 
Spanish/Portuguese, Danish/German, French/Dutch etc) and the claim for the 'antiquity' of 
one's own culture (Hroch 1993).  
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In the course of the nineteenth century European societies became increasingly nationalised 
(Balibar 1991). 'Nationalism played the role of the hinge fastening together state and society' 
(Bauman 1992: 683). The 'nationalist' version of the nation state, choosing as its unifying 
principle a common cultural and increasingly also genetic essence and a common past, 
established itself as the dominant model in Europe exemplified by the national projects of 
the unification of the states of Italy and of Germany. In both those countries the internal 
amalgamation of diverse kingdoms, each with their very different histories, traditions and 
language-versions into one nation state required considerable intellectual and educational 
efforts so that Massimo d'Azeglio, one of the chief ideological architects of a united Italy, 
could say at the opening of the first Italian parliament, 'We have made Italy, now we have to 
make Italians' (Hobsbawm 1990:44), and similar 'formative efforts' applied in all new nation 
states. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the Russian empire were perhaps the only big 
continental European entities which managed to resist, in the case of Austria till the end of 
the First World War, in that of Russia one could say until the 1990s, the emerging 
identification of nation and state. Yet in those countries national independence movements, 
inspired by romantic intellectual campaigns searching for 'cultural roots' and spurred by new 
political elites sensing ripe opportunities for power, could eventually not be contained 
sufficiently by those multi-cultural and multi-ethnic colossuses on account of their despotic 
structure that allowed no space for the democratic negotiation of cultural diversity within a 
framework of equal rights.  
 
Contrary to the impression nurtured by the new nation states that their modern political form 
(and the associated territorial claim) was the manifestation of a historical destiny, a 
realisation of ancient dreams just waiting for their moment in history, the European nation 
state is not the product of cultural or ethnic unity and purity. Instead 'it is the state that makes 
the nation and not the nation the state' as the Polish 'liberator' Jozef Pilsudski pointedly 
remarked (quoted in Horsman and Marshall 1994:xviii). In other words, the nation and all 
the mechanisms for its constitution and maintenance, are thoroughly modern phenomena that 
simultaneously couch their modern traits in ‘traditional’ forms and symbols. This spells a 
fundamental ambiguity that time and again impedes the development of political processes at 
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the public and the civil society level capable of responding to the challenges of integration in 
an overt and democratically accountable manner. For a start, many national languages, from 
modern Greek and Italian to Czech, Flemish and Romanian were either 're-worked' from 
prevailing vernacular but non-standardised versions or refined and elevated from the status 
of dialects to that of official languages by the efforts of academics and philologists.  
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century nationalism became the predominant means of 
consolidating and securing the new political entities of the European nation states whose 
boundaries were notoriously difficult to justify on 'historical grounds'. The crucial ally in this 
national project, and indeed in the opinion of some historians (e.g. Hobsbawm 1990, Balibar 
1991) its driving force, was industrial capitalism which derived its conquering power from 
the concept of 'national economies' competing with each other (Wallerstein 1991). Even in 
countries like Great Britain where liberalism was the prevailing ideology the state had an 
essential role in giving private enterprise the required support and protection in vital areas 
like education and, more gradually reluctantly, social services. But both were recognised as 
vital instruments of social control that could be applied to secure the good behaviour and the 
'loyalty of the masses' and thereby their commitment to the national cause, which seemed 
threatened above all by the inherent internationalism of the labour movement. This strategy 
left business free to transcend the boundaries of traditions and of territories where it suited its 
capitalist interests in this early manifestation of capitalism’s globalising tendencies and its 
accompanying divisive effects.  
 
As nationalism began to dominate the political agenda of the nation state the 'emancipatory 
component' of the idea which had inspired and continued to inspire many national liberation 
movements, the fight against 'the arbitrary rule of princes and small aristocratic elites' 
(Mommsen 1990: 215), gave way to new forms of power being exercised through the 
hegemony of a 'national culture'. National culture became not just an ideological symbol of 
superiority externally over 'rival cultures' but also an instrument of internal domination over 
a country's own ethnic and cultural minorities (Mommsen, ibid.). The means of legitimating 
and of bolstering this assumed superiority soon reached beyond cultural arguments and the 
creation of a common language to incorporate new means of affinity and exclusion. It is in 
 25
this context that in order to argue for the uniformity of a nation the 'second-degree fiction' of 
a common race (Balibar 1991: 99) became activated. By grounding the 'togetherness' of a 
nation not primarily in solidarity (which requires an act of will by the individuals) but in 
'blood and soil', in something that we are born into, it removes belonging from the sphere of 
choice (Bauman 1992). Collective identity becomes destiny, secured with references to the 
findings of modern science. Darwinism and the first scientific speculations of genetics were 
utilised to assemble a pervasive ideology of racism which conveniently filled the gaps left by 
scientific evidence with ideology disguised as science. Where the superiority of the white 
race over black races cannot be based on biological evidence the cultural argument takes 
over, the claim of the greatness of one's own 'civilization' proving itself through its rise to 
imperialist world domination. Indeed racism of this kind, tried and tested within the colonial 
context, served the power elites within Europe itself to class themselves as superior over 
those for instance of the Jewish, the Gypsy or the Irish people, and indeed over the sub-
stratum of a 'residuum' defined by their 'deviant' behaviour. The 'substance' which was 
presumed to constitute a European nation changes from political to cultural and eventually to 
ethnic and racist criteria (Miles 1989), producing a particularly lethal bonding of nation and 
race in the case of German nationalism and Nazism.  
 
Within this ideological framework the European nation state depended for its stability on the 
creation of homogeneity, and in the production of this cultural conformity it employed the 
ideological assistance of nationalism. The dynamics of this nationalism expanded the nation 
state project globally. Its aggressive energies spilled over the edges of Europe to reach for 
the furthest corners of the world in the form of colonialism. The political agenda of 
colonialism exceeded the 'economic necessity' generated by the expansive tendencies of 
capitalism in its ideological pursuit of the idea of wanting to civilize the world (Fryer 1984). 
Colonial rule became a paradigm for new forms of internal social control which allowed the 
exercise of power to be advertised as being 'in the best interest of the ruled'. Cultural 
hegemony on a world stage further legitimated the hegemony of the dominant culture 'back 
home', whether it manifested itself through the education system, the civil service or indeed 
the testing and perfecting of methods of community development. European culture was 
'destined' to rule the world, such is the logic of 'progress' to which it conformed.  
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Within the logic of progress and superiority racism found its particular niche in modern 
European national, cultural and economic politics and the aggressive forms of nationalism 
provided it with rich nurture. For the belief in progress was self-limiting where the 
incorporation of 'natives' and their traditions into Western belief systems either did not work 
(because of their 'stubborn resistance') or could turn into a threat to White superiority (on 
account of their 'cleverness in learning'). Colonial rule came to 'ring-fence' certain aspects of 
other cultures which it sought to control and to legitimate these with racist arguments where 
this helped to maintain clear boundaries. It set up race-separated political and administrative 
structures (for instance with 'tribal chiefs' in Africa) thus paving the way for elaborate 
systems of apartheid (Miles 1989). In this way colonialism structured the encounter with the 
'dark continent' and 'primitive societies' to create the Black person as the archetypical 'other' 
precisely in order to underline a fundamental, essentialised distance between superior and 
inferior populations generally. In the process it also united the disparate characteristics of 
'whiteness' into a coherent whole characterised by its intrinsic, unassailable superiority. (Said 
1994). Racism served to eliminate the cultural, subjective and ultimately arbitrary basis of 
the construction of difference and superiority and to quell any lingering doubts and 
uncertainties with 'facts' backed by science. It became a means of avoiding discourse and 
debate and therefore a way of continuing (and thereby totally subverting and corrupting) the 
educational project of cultural unification of the nation state with other means, with the 
means of oppression. Henceforth education and socialisation which are centred on taken-for-
granted notions of 'the national' are at core racist. Once tried and tested in the colonies, this 
educational formula came to dominate also internal social and educational policies thus 
setting the framework for the emerging social and educational professions.  
 
The nascent nation states where potentially as heterogeneous as the colonies and as much in 
need of integration and stability in view of the accentuated social divisions created by 
industrialisation. They depended on instruments of stabilisation of which the conceding of 
limited political citizenship rights was one branch, the gradual expansion of social and 
educational measures another to secure the loyalty of its citizens. Gellner goes as far as to 
postulate that these universal nationwide cultures which became the hallmarks of nations 
were an essential requirement of industrialisation itself. 'A modern industrial state can only 
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function with a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, inter-changeable population' 
(Gellner 1983:46).  
 
But this standardization exercise was not confined to the establishment of a compulsory 
education system, although in most industrialising countries this took precedent. The whole 
project of creating a national heritage of standardised behaviour as the foundation of a 
national culture became the criterion by which it could be decided who was to belong 
properly to the nation, not just in relation to foreigners. Parallel with the school system the 
social organisation of both the public and the private sphere drew on patriotism for their 
inspiration and legitimation: sports became the means by which not only the physical health 
of the (male) nation could be improved in functional readiness for war, it became a forum for 
the dissemination of national fervour, a means of incorporating especially the young 
population which was always regarded as a potential source of instability and disaffection. 
As 'Vater Jahn', the chief ideologue of German national sports during the nineteenth century, 
expressed it: 'The rights of citizens are dependent upon the activity of such citizens. That 
citizen loses his rights who deserts his flag, besmirches his Fatherland in foreign countries, 
or loses his reason' (quoted in Greenfeld 1992: 369f).  
 
At the civil society level philanthropy and countless charitable organisations unfolded an 
unprecedented ‘crusade’ against destitution in what amounted to a national effort at rescuing 
people from the margins of society, bringing those aboard who had been left stranded despite 
the rising tide of national progress (Fraser 1973, Wendt 1985). The bourgeoisie side of the 
women's movement in the nineteenth century derived much of its energies from patriotism, 
from giving expression to women's desire to have a publicly acclaimed part to play in the 
affairs of the nation (Rowbotham 1977), equivalent to the part men were called upon to play 
through military service (which in itself formed an essential plank of the nation-forming 
exercise).  
 
Incorporating the masses into the nation state was by no means unconditional. The process 
operated at the social level with the blunt and often brutal instrument of distinguishing the 
'deserving' from the 'undeserving', used as a moral category of old to set limits to solidarity 
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and moral obligations, but now revived in 'modern' form as a curious mixture of functional 
and ethical criteria. The moral institutions of the state, the schools, workhouses and prisons, 
were in themselves 'setting examples' of where the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour was to be drawn. That boundary became questionable when it permitted the 
'wrong kind of people' to be punished or excluded or indeed when 'the wrong kind of people' 
came to enjoy the protection of society. The rescue efforts of all the blossoming welfare 
societies of the Victorian age, in Britain and in the parts of Europe following Britain's 
industrial lead, had as much a practical as a vital symbolic significance for the consolidation 
of the nation state (Jones and Novak 2000). They showed that the boundaries of the nation 
state run through every community and every family in the sense that membership of society 
and citizenship depended on the willingness to be conforming and worthy members of that 
entity. Welfare and education services ultimately draw the boundaries of solidarity under 
modern conditions in industrial societies where traditional community and family bonds and 
allegiances have become suspended in a massive upheaval of social and geographic mobility. 
The nation constitutes its identity through these educational efforts, through not leaving the 
socialisation of its young to chance, through setting up and enforcing internal boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour and by standardising those criteria. 'Let us simply say that schooling is 
the principal institution which produces ethnicity as linguistic community' (Balibar 1992: 
98).  
 
By this device workers in these emerging educational and social services become 
unavoidably hitched to the national bandwagon whether they are employed in the public or 
in the private/voluntary sphere. What obscured the realisation of this place within a national 
agenda for most of them, to this day, is that they sought to deliver their service precisely not 
from an overtly political position but from a perspective of professional autonomy and 
'neutrality'. Professionalisation was indeed vital to the legitimation of their functions since 
the state, as a modern state, was keen to advertise its 'attractiveness' and hence its conditions 
of solidarity largely not through coercion and arbitrary authority but through the principle of 
rationality. Participation in the national project, choosing to ‘behave properly’ were 
ultimately to be seen as functions of reason and those failing to exercise those rational 
choices where either impaired in their mental functions (in which case they needed 
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treatment) or lacking in insight (in which case they needed education). Rationality therefore 
had to inform the methods and principles applied by the professionals operating the 
educational and therapeutic services in a very fundamental way, and only the use of 
methods, developed in a process of systematic and scientific reflection could lend their 
action legitimacy.  
 
For the social professions the reliance on rational principles of intervention was an 
ambiguous tool. On the one hand it helped to overcome the vestiges of moralism which had 
marred the pioneer phase of social services where volunteers set out in a patronising way to 
teach the poor how to manage their affairs better. The individualism implicit in this form of 
instrumental rationalism, the method of diagnosing each case according to its particular 
circumstances, also acted as a restraint against the whole-sale stereotyping and condemning 
of categories of 'problem populations' as inferior. But on the other hand it operated with 
principles and values of 'normality' derived largely from positivist notions of mental health 
and social adjustment which allowed for little engagement in a cultural discourse on the 
subjective meanings of 'differences'. Even Marxist models of revolutionary social 
intervention, of which there were sporadic 'experiments' in youth work and residential care in 
many parts of Europe earlier this century (Lorenz 1994: 58), were constructed around a fixed 
model of a desired state of society which seemed oblivious to perspectives of gender and 
ethnicity.  
 
Social services developed quite rapidly in all countries of Europe in the 1920s and 1930s 
with increasing direct support by the state. As social service staff came more directly under 
state control the position of value neutrality demonstrated its blindness to political misuse 
most catastrophically in Hitler Germany. That regime had elevated nationalism to the status 
of a central political device not just of its foreign but also of its social policy programme. 
Most Western European countries (and the USA) had sympathised with the technical and 
rational solutions to social problems suggested by the fledgling science of genetics as 
promoted by 'Eugenic Societies' which advocated programmes of sterilisation in the case of a 
broad spectrum of medical conditions considered hereditary (Proctor 1988). Despite the 
extremely tenuous scientific evidence a sweeping range of mental illnesses and disabilities, 
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including alcoholism and epilepsy, were assumed to have a genetic basis and the case was 
made that if science could not cure these diseases in the present generation it could at least 
prevent them from burdening future generations. Nazism seized avidly on those ideas and as 
soon as it came to power in 1933 it enacted as one of its first pieces of legislation a law 
permitting and promoting the involuntary sterilisation of people with conditions deemed 
hereditary, 'where necessary' on an involuntary basis (Klee 1985).  
 
The urgency and speed with which this law was passed underlines its central ideological 
function within fascist social policy which is the complete segregation of those worthy to 
belong to the nationalist state and the unworthy rest (Lorenz 1994: 64f). Nazism did not stop 
at symbolic, partial and temporary physical segregation; disguising its ideology as science it 
swept aside the 'sentimentality of half-measures' constrained by 'moral scruples' and 
proceeded to constantly and consistently select and segregate in all its policies with the 
sterilisation, with the incarceration in concentration camps and with the extermination of 
'unworthy life' as its infamous 'final solution'. The racism of Nazi social policies against 
'weak members of society' runs parallel to and becomes at times indistinguishable from the 
racism perpetrated against the Jewish, Roma and Sinti and other minority populations. The 
'ethnic cleansing' culminating in the holocaust engulfed not only the millions of people 
classed as racially inferior but additional thousands of children, women and men diagnosed 
as 'inferior forms of life' on account of their disabilities, their homosexuality or perhaps their 
social conditions as vagrants or delinquents (Aly et al. 1985). This was not an evil 
afterthought of a regime losing its sanity in the desperation of a war it had unleashed; it was 
the deliberate, calculated and well prepared implementation of an overall policy design with 
nationalism as its pinnacle.  
 
This machinery of segregation and extermination was operated not only by people who 
would commit the final atrocities but also by those ‘experts’ who would assist in 'drawing 
the line' by virtue of their diagnostic skills, and this is where the structural framing of a 
‘competence scenario’ can be seen as making a fundamental difference at the intersection of 
social policy and professional-academic agendas. In this insidious way a whole range of 
professionals became implicated in the system: doctors, social workers, health visitors, care 
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staff, teachers and many others were providing evidence for the courts so that in a charade of 
legality they could issue orders denying marriage certificates to people 'posing a threat to the 
health of the nation', for compulsory sterilisation or for admission to institutions. The system 
relied on all welfare personnel filing case reports in which they listed the family histories of 
epilepsy or alcoholism, assessed the chances of rehabilitation of offenders or of children with 
learning difficulties. Sticking to their professional task with the air of value neutrality and 
scientific detachment (especially after the 'non-conforming', 'politically active' workers had 
been sacked or imprisoned) they did not feel responsible for the consequences of their 
assessments and may indeed not have become conscious of the full implications their work 
had in 'the national context' (Otto and Sünker 1989, Kappeler  2000). This diagnostic service 
was not only provided by statutory services - the main voluntary welfare organisations of 
Germany, with the exception of the socialist one, continued to operate under Nazism, but on 
condition that they 'support the national cause'. While some individuals and some 
organisations offered resistance at enormous personal risk all institutions of German civil 
society, including the churches and their welfare services, de facto supported national 
policies, de-sensitised by the fact that, seen from a functional perspective, this system 
appeared 'only' to continue and perfect the incorporation of welfare into the national interest 
(Schnurr 1997).  
 
After the defeat of Fascism the programmes at 'democratic re-construction' instigated by the 
United Nations, the United States and Britain targeted very explicitly the welfare services 
and their personnel for re-training in 'democratic approaches. But they ignored the element 
of 'scientific value neutrality' as a fatal chain of Nazi dis-welfare. Values were confined to 
appeals to self-determination in case work which became the dominant social work 
paradigm, and in group work where 'democratic', self-directed styles did away with 
hierarchical notions of group leadership (Lorenz 1994:76). But these efforts were not 
accompanied by a fundamental critique of positivism and its function in diagnostic 
categorisation. The evil of a fascist approach to welfare had not emanated primarily from its 
collectivism and from the imposition of ideologically determined forms of practice (which 
social workers usually knew how to get round) but rather from the disjuncture of the political 
and the professional discourse that prevented the 'ordinary welfare workers' from realising 
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the consequences of their actions. The individualist consensus of a 'social pathology' 
discourse (Mills 1943) which prevailed in the social sciences of the 1950s and 60s left social 
and youth workers inadequately equipped to face up to a radical critique of welfare agendas 
which continued to be nationally oriented.  
 
This became evident above all in the area of education and youth and community work in 
European countries confronted once more with cultural diversity in a manner reminiscent of 
the nation-founding period. The massive population displacement of the war combined with 
labour shortages had made many countries of Europe recipients of migration and thereby 
locations of a new cultural and ethnic diversity. Whereas in earlier periods emigration was 
often treated as a kind of cleansing process to reduce diversity, by sending convicts to penal 
colonies and by forcing those to leave the country who potentially constituted 'social 
problems', diversity now appeared on Europe's own doorstep, forcing the nation state to 
confront the issue of cultural diversity which it had sought to displace (Joppke 1999). The 
welfare consensus after the Second World War had been built on the myth that new social 
policies had eliminated structural poverty so that those individuals and families still not able 
to cope were cast in the light of people who had 'problems of adjustment', who required 
treatment or education in order to be able to fully participate in society. And in analogy those 
members of recently arrived migrant groups (e.g. from the British New Commonwealth, 
from former French colonies or from Mediterranean countries as 'Gastarbeiter' in Germany) 
those who came to the attention of educational and welfare services were also regarded as in 
need of help with their ability to adjust. Indeed, 'integration' and 'assimilation' became the 
initial chief objective of 'remedial responses' in all European countries (Miles 1993). Spurred 
often by the wishes of immigrant families themselves who wanted their children to adopt the 
language of the host country as quickly as possible these early strategies aimed at 'levelling 
differences' by 'bringing newcomers up to standards'. In all this the normality of the national 
standards remained unquestioned or, as can be recognised  from this historical perspective, 
became affirmed ever more strongly.  
 
The experience with ethnic minorities has paradigmatic significance for the inability of 
social work, professionally and at methodological level, to take critical position towards its 
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incorporation into national agendas across the whole spectrum of social work fields. 
Integration and assimilation as methods of dealing with cultural diversity were a first line 
pedagogical response in virtually all European countries but did not fulfil their declared 
objectives of establishing 'racial harmony' (Mullard 1982). But they contributed to the 
interest ethnic minority groups took in affirming their own separate identities. A second 
phase of responses which can be classed as the 'multi-cultural approaches' recognised this 
autonomy and the value of plurality; many of these initiatives went as far as celebrating 
cultural diversity and suggesting that many of the 'foreign' cultures contained an exotic 
promise or a truth lost to the 'indigenous' culture and that they therefore represented a source 
of renewal. This phase would correspond to a degree of ‘cultural and gender sensitivity’ that 
influenced social work methods discourses in the 1980s. What these responses failed to deal 
with is the actual process of defining cultural, ethnic and social boundaries, the power acted 
out in the conflicts not so much over cultural contents but over their hierarchical differences 
(Todd 1991). In other words, the social policy dimension was not considered sufficiently in 
the development of academic and professional discourses in response to the growing 
awareness of cultural diversity, even though the effects of the new practice quite clearly 
underlined the necessity to consider both spheres in conjunction, as emphasised in the first 
chapter.  
 
It was left to social and civil rights movements to place the issue of rights on the political 
agenda in the last three decades of the twentieth century in an interesting historical parallel to 
the role such movements played in the latter parts of the nineteenth century. With social 
movements such as the peace movement, the women's liberation movement and the ecology 
movement, the importance of 'civil society' as the site of political action became evident 
once more. Their significance for the political process was first of all that all those 
movements cut right across the concerns of national politics to forge very strong and 
immediate international allegiances, and secondly that they had their issues defined by the 
participants in the political process themselves. Before any experts could tell a group of 
women or a group of black young people 'what was good for them' they sought to define 
their own agenda for change and in this process came to identify and challenge the structures 
of discrimination which had kept them deliberately out of the political process. 
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The methodological implications for youth and social work of this radically changed agenda 
are far-reaching, particularly in the context of globalisation which simultaneously impacted 
on the role of the nation state and triggered fundamental changes in the national welfare state 
arrangements. What is important to highlight in this historical overview is the fact that the 
significance of this change towards a rights discourse and the key to overcoming the serious 
limitations of previous programmes lies not in a new method but in the closer and more 
consistent analysis of the political context in which education, social work and the struggle 
against racism need to be related to each other (Macey 1995). In other words, only by re-
examining their relationship with the national agendas can youth, welfare and educational 
workers start their search for appropriate methods. An anti-racist approach per se that does 
not conceptualise this wider political agenda, no matter how radical it presents itself, can 
easily end up playing right into the hands of  nationalist interests of exclusion and 
discrimination.  
 
The national agenda, in the context of the contradictory trends outlined at the start of this 
chapter, is now at the crossroads. On the one hand its influence and power is being weakened 
by the diverse manifestations of phenomena loosely described as globalisation. European 
unification, international treaties and conventions and an international human rights 
awareness which begins to set common standards across nation states all necessitate changes 
in the way welfare is being conceptualised and delivered. Many improvements in the 
position of oppressed groups in European countries came about as a direct result of European 
or international standards being brought to bear on national legislation through treaties or 
rulings of international courts in what has been described as the ‘cosmopolitan project’ (Held 
2002). On the other hand new forms of exclusion are becoming apparent at national and 
international level. The treatment of migrants and asylum seekers by the EU itself has 
become much more selective and restrictive as 'fortress Europe' erects perimeter controls 
around its territory in a sinister symmetry to the functions of the former Iron Curtain (Miles 
1993). These types of consolidation and protection policies mirror ominously the strategies 
of exclusion and of racism by which the nation states shaped themselves. 'Unification for 
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Europe', in the words of Lyotard (1993: 159) may yet also come to mean 'unification of its 
hatreds'.  
 
And while a 'European nationalism' being established at the level of the European Union 
itself is perhaps too remote a possibility, the power of 'national nationalism' has become 
again a pronounced item on the political agenda, and not just in the programmes of explicit 
right wing and neo-fascist parties which saw a frightening resurgence in Europe. In the 
insecurities caused by globalisation for personal and collective identities nationalism 
advertises itself as a safe solution which takes recourse to sensible, popular certainties. 
National sentiments are once more presented as 'natural feelings', not necessarily genetically 
determined but as the guarantee of a sense of belonging. National belonging as a sentiment 
centred always on a set of taken-for-granted contents appears to offer stability and continuity 
where identities are threatened with fragmentation and discontinuity.  
 
Seen in this historical context the crisis of national identity in Europe is not a product of 
migration and 'imposed diversity', it is a crisis of collective solidarity stemming from the 
inherent instability of the nationalist construction of the nation state which, however, 
manifests itself in the responses to migration particularly forcefully. Signs of this crisis of 
solidarity are as much the fragmentation of the welfare consensus when certain groups of 
citizens like the young unemployed, pensioners or homeless people can no longer rely 
automatically on a minimum level of support guaranteed by the state, as in the numerous 
political conflicts where regions within nation states and indeed small communities make 
claims for cultural and often also political autonomy (Wieviorka 1994: 180). These conflicts 
became exacerbated by the ending of the Cold War which re-focused political concerns from 
an East - West to a national agenda and thereby on all the ambiguities of the nation state 
solidarity. In the attempts at rescuing the nationalist agenda migration and the 'threat of 
cultural alienation' become political instruments that divert attention away from the need of 
negotiating diversity which had always existed in every nation state, away from the need to 
extend the boundaries of solidarity beyond the borders of the nation state and beyond 
assumed, imagined 'natural communities' (Anderson 1983). Racism and xenophobia become 
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negative substitutes for the inability to face up to changing, developing and multiple 
collective identities.  
 
This also highlights the necessity of the anti-racist and black identity discourse to go beyond 
a taken for granted notion of 'Blackness' which has itself at times led to oppressive forms of 
homogenisation (Gilroy 1992). While the strategy of turning the label 'black' from a racist 
ascription into an emancipatory self-referent may have been an important step in the struggle 
of oppressed people to re-claim the right to self-definition it brings with it the danger of 
'essentialising' Blackness within a dichotomised agenda still dictated by existing power 
interests. In this regard international dialogue within the anti-racist debate has been most 
fruitful in recent years in promoting a 'de-centring and de-essentialisation of "race" and 
"ethnicity"'(Rattansi 1994: 58;).  
 
This critique is not to deny minority groups the right to define their own identities and to 
have those identities more visibly represented in schools, services, community centres, 
political parties. But in all those 'representations' the danger of culture becoming an 
instrument of exclusion and oppression needs to be monitored against the historical 
background of Europe's experience with nationalism in constant affinity to racism. In the 
search for not exclusive, non-repressive forms of representation and identification it may 
help to return to the as yet under-utilised emancipatory version of the idea of the republican 
nation and its unrealised potential. This version of the nation implies sets of citizenship 
rights which constitute mutual obligations precisely on the basis of differences. The need for 
negotiation, for putting into practice the human right to equality of all members of a 
community, which is ultimately a political and not a biological postulate, arises only once 
diversity has been fully recognised, and the ensuing political and legal arrangements, once 
they secure such equality, are in turn the basis on which cultural, ideological and indeed 
biological differences can be recognised and evaluated and given a negotiated social 
significance. 
 
In recognition of the lessons from the history of the European nation state and the crucial 
crossroads which its development seems to have reached it becomes necessary to strengthen 
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the critical political function of social work and social pedagogy. The development of anti-
racist approaches is not an issue for specialists in preparation of social work with minority 
groups. Anti-racism has come to signify the resistance all youth and social work has to offer 
to the pressure of becoming subsumed, unwittingly or deliberately, under a nationalist 
political agenda. But the anti-racist agenda goes well beyond the strengthening of this 
resistance and searches for the positive contents of collective, inter-cultural, non exclusive 
identities and their realisation within negotiated rights of citizenship. 
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3. Welfare regimes and the practice of social citizenship   
 
 
 
The first European Directive on the mutual recognition of higher vocational qualifications 
(89/48/ EEC) was a vehicle for the harmonisation of social work qualifications. However, as 
the experience of the First EU Thematic Network for the Social Professions (ECSPRESS) 
showed, exchanges will always be affected by the profound differences not just in social 
work titles, but in the social policy contexts which European unification will leave 
untouched (Lorenz and Seibel 1999). This chapter elaborates on the historical analysis of the 
development of professional social work in relation to the nation state project and takes a 
closer look at the impact of specific social policy models on the practice of social work.  
 
 
A superficial glance at social work agencies in Europe up to the 1980s showed a clear 
polarisation between countries where they were mainly run by the state (e.g. Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, UK) and countries where they were predominantly non-
governmental (e.g. Germany or the Netherlands). In general social work everywhere is still 
represented in both sectors but the significance for practice of the organisational patterns can 
only be derived from an analysis of the social policy traditions behind the arrangements. 
Recent developments in social policy which point towards services generally are being 
‘contracted out’ or ‘privatised’ seem to indicate a convergence, but in reality fundamental 
differences remain. One of  the basic characteristics of social work is that it is always 
concerned with mediating the complex relationship between public and private 
responsibilities and that it carries both a public and a private mandate, no matter whether its 
statutory responsibilities are located more on the public or on the non-governmental side. It 
is therefore not surprising to find that social work activities are regulated to highly varying 
degrees by national law, with some countries like Germany defining explicitly and 
extensively the duties and functions of social workers, while others like Italy do not even 
mention the profession in law. In addition, different policy frameworks induce social 
workers to invoke and use the law in very different ways, as is best exemplified by 
 39
comparisons in child care and protection practices in Europe. In some countries social 
workers have a narrow margin of professional discretion and have to bring first indications 
and suspicions of child abuse before a court prior to taking further action, whilst others see 
the role of social workers in avoiding the involvement of legal procedures in all but the most 
severe cases (Hetherington 1998, Hetherington et al. 1997).  
 
One further indicator of fundamental differences between social work functions relates to the 
handling of welfare benefits. For British social workers, as for their colleagues in the 
Republic of Ireland, the handling of welfare payments is not regarded as part of their 
professional duties (Becker 1987) and the profession always carefully avoided taking on 
official responsibilities in this regard. It is as if the danger of becoming so totally associated 
with the control functions of the state through the administration of welfare benefits was so 
immediate for the autonomy of the profession in that country that it had to be avoided totally. 
There is no other parallel for this absolute separation in other European countries, although 
this indicator alone also does not position social work in distinct welfare traditions. Rather, 
these differences of practice in relation to the law and to welfare benefits have to be related 
to the way they variably symbolise the relationship between state and service user or welfare 
recipient generally. 
 
This means that it is imperative to examine to what extent the practice of social work in 
different European countries reflects the nature of the relationship between citizens and the 
state, or in other words the extent to which social work is a manifestation of social 
citizenship.  
 
It is of significance, for instance, that the concept of 'the state' in Britain is very little 
developed and used by comparison with continental Europe. As Dyson observes,  
 
’The composite character of the English idea of parliamentary sovereignty, an 
idea that comprises King, Lords and Commons and represented an 
appeasement or settlement between these traditional powers, contrasts with 
the integrated 'public power' of continental Europe, a rationalist conception 
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which was the product of the attempt to achieve peace by offering an explicit 
defence of public authority in abstract and impersonal terms’ (Dyson 
1980:19).  
 
This means that the powers of the state in the continental concept are on the one hand more 
visible and manifest, on the other hand they are more explicitly prescribed and in principle 
subjected to the continuous scrutiny of 'the citizen'. The state, distant though its central seat 
of power might be in highly centralised nations such as France, Ireland or Italy, is regarded 
by the citizens of those countries as an everyday reality with whose structures they interact 
visibly and almost continuously. It controls them, haunts them at times with the spectre of a 
police state, but it does so with the legitimation that it is the citizens who control the state 
ultimately. This sentiment and the basic features of these continental European relationships 
are enshrined mainly in the constitution of these countries (or equivalent fundamental laws 
such as the German Basic law, Grundgesetz). Britain by contrast has no written constitution 
and its citizens, up to now, do not have to carry identity cards which are still anathema to the 
population who associate them with totalitarian regimes.   
 
Continental notions of the state, far from being homogeneous, are themselves broadly 
differentiated between the Roman-catholic tradition of deriving authority from divine or 
natural law which needs to pay less attention to securing the allegiance and legimitation by 
the general population, and the protestant tradition which holds those in authority to have a 
duty for the general well-being of the ruled and for the maintenance of a 'neutral' public 
order.  
 
The state tradition in France for instance is characterised by a profound contrast between a 
strong, rationally constructed central authority, dating back to the late 16th century and the 
Edict of Nantes when the state became accepted as the carrier of 'nationhood', and equally 
strong collective (emotional) societal movements which challenge this authority periodically 
(Jouhy 1984). Consequently 'conceptions of nationhood and citizenship bear the stamp of 
their revolutionary origin. The nation, in this tradition, has been conceived mainly in relation 
to the institutional and territorial frame of the state: political unity, not shared culture has 
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been understood to be its basis'   (Brubaker 1989). The decentralisation of services in France 
in the wake of the unrest of 1968 was a further manifestation of this basic political tension 
and its 'settlement'.     
 
The birth of many continental European nation states is associated with the growth of 
capitalist industrialisation which had the effect of 'commodifying' people through their 
labour power. 'In pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the 
sense that their survival was contingent upon the sale of their labor power... Stripping society 
of the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labor contract 
meant that people were commodified' (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21). Loyalty to the state must 
therefore be based on principles different from those operating in the market, and 'social 
citizenship', the granting of welfare and security irrespective of the person's position in the 
market, came to be recognised as a most useful ingredient in building this national solidarity.  
'Social integration spread from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that 
of material enjoyment. The components of a civilised and cultured life, formerly 
the monopoly of the few, were brought progressively within reach of the many, 
who were encouraged thereby to stretch out their hands towards those that still 
eluded their grasp. The diminution of inequality strengthened the demand for its 
abolition, at least with regard to the essentials of social welfare. These 
aspirations have in part been met by incorporating social rights in the status of 
citizenship and thus creating a universal right to real income which is not 
proportionate to the market value of the claimant'  (T.H.Marshall 1992: 28).  
 
But just as political citizenship, for instance through the extension of the franchise, was 
being realised albeit gradually and in a manner that reproduced inequalities most notably of 
gender and property, social citizenship was extended, selectively and cautiously but 
according to distinct patterns which were to set the scene for the various types of welfare 
state. Political citizenship, in other words, necessitated social citizenship sooner or later, but 
the realisation of social citizenship was not a matter of policies alone. Each system depended 
for its legitimacy on the ‘fine-tuning’ of those policy arrangements, which means on the 
individualisation of the conditions through which social citizenship can be established and 
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justified. From the very beginning social workers or their pre-professional ancestors came to 
be placed on the frontline of those micro-processes that decided on inclusion or exclusion 
from social citizenship and simultaneously on the commodification or de-commodification 
of people's needs within the wider social policy parameters which social workers therefore 
came to represent to their clients. In all nascent welfare systems case by case assessments 
had to be made as to whether and on what conditions poverty, handicap and behavioural 
deficits could be overcome by 'reintegrating' the person affected into the labour market, by 
granting them public or private subventions or indeed by leaving them to their own devices 
and to the impersonal harshness of institutions, which invariably imply a suspension of the 
protection afforded by full citizenship. The institution of the poor houses or work houses in 
most countries served this purpose. For instance in Britain the tightening of the Poor Law in 
1834 ruled out 'outdoor relief' and 'treated the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of 
the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them' (Marshall 1992: 15). 
 
 
But the pedagogical effects of the work house deterrent never worked automatically and 
never produced the required cost savings. ‘Outdoor relief’ sooner or later became a parallel 
necessity, mostly by default and against the declared intentions of the state to limit public 
assistance to workhouse measures. But in countries like Germany a more proactive role of 
the (initially local) state was accepted, thereby signalling a different conception of the state-
citizen relationship from the liberal ethos prevailing in Britain.. Here early models of 
systematic poor relief committed public funds more readily for such 'outdoor relief', which 
meant in turn that 'case assessors' as the forerunners of social workers were given an 
‘official’ role on behalf of the local government authorities (and later by the state) right from 
the beginning instead of them doing their work on behalf of a voluntary, non-governmental 
relief agency such as the Charity Organisation Society.  
 
An early manifestation of the individualised application of public welfare obligations is the 
'Elberfeld System' of providing personalised financial assistance to the poor on which public 
welfare in Germany came to be modelled. In Elberfeld, a rapidly industrialising town on the 
river Wupper in Germany, the middle class citizens devised in 1853 a coordinated, efficient 
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approach to alms distribution. The system divided the town into 252 districts or quarters and 
allocated a voluntary supervisor to each who had a 'case-load' of up to four families. 
Applications for support would be dealt with by these volunteers who had a duty to assess 
the individual circumstances in great detail and according to guidelines laid down by the 
town administration (Wendt 1985).  
 
The significance of this systematised practice of poor relief for the future development of 
German social work derives from the fact that these proto-case-workers were not actually 
volunteers but had a public mandate. In those days all citizens entitled to vote also had to 
make themselves available for administrative duties for the town council of which the 
supervision of paupers was but one type of commitment (regulations quoted in Sachße und 
Tennstedt 1980: 218). In Strasbourg in 1905 the Elberfeld system of combined care and 
public surveillance was further developed and adjusted to the conditions of rapid 
urbanisation by creating bigger districts, teams of volunteers and staffing the central 
administrative and decision making office with paid, and increasingly also trained 
employees. A format became hereby established which combined and coordinated voluntary 
and statutory activities (Sachße und Tennstedt 1988).     
 
German conservatism was hence prepared to grant the state a much more comprehensive role 
in relation to the daily lives of the citizens. In contrast to the laissez-faire principles of 
liberalism the ‘social question’ became an explicit challenge for the state after the bourgeois 
revolution of 1848 through which it could manifest its historical presence (Geisen 2001). In 
his speech to a congress in 1872 which led to the founding of the 'Association for Social 
Policy', Gustav Schmoller, a member of the conservative group of national economists 
known as 'lectern-socialists', declared:  'The state is the most marvellous moral institution for 
the education of the human race'. As part of his strategy of unifying the until then 
independent German kingdoms into the German Reich, Bismarck advocated that the state 
take the initiative 'to call ever increasing portions of our people to participate in the cultural, 
educational and material wealth [of the nation]' (quoted in Wendt 1985:181).  
 
 44
Bismarck's pioneering and 'pre-emptive' introduction of social insurance schemes in the 
1880s was not a sudden conversion to socialist beliefs (he simultaneously declared the 
social-democratic party illegal) but the shrewd recognition that his strategy for the 
construction of a strong German nation required for its legitimation and for the further 
strengthening of a paternalistic state tradition a carefully targeted package of public welfare 
commitments (Tampke 1981). Bismarck’s ideas are expressed in an official address by 
Emperor Wilhelm I on 17 November 1881:  
‘Schon im Februar dieses Jahres haben Wir Unsere Überzeugung 
aussprechen lassen, dass die Heilung der sozialen Schäden nicht 
ausschliesslich im Wege der Repression sozialdemokratischer 
Ausschreitungen, sondern gleichmässig auf dem der positiven Förderung 
des Wohls der Arbeiter zu suchen sein werde…’ (‚As declared by us 
already in January of this year we are convinced that the cure for social ills 
cannot be sought solely by means of repressing the excesses of social 
democracy but equally through the positive fostering of the well-being of 
workers’ (own translation) (quoted in Diehl and Mombert 1984, p. 185). 
 
These political initiatives provided a lasting framework for the structure of German social 
services which until this day remains based on the close relationship between public and 
private services, statutory and voluntary work, case orientation and policy concerns. 
Conceptually this exemplifies the interplay between subsidiarity and social solidarity, with 
all the ambiguity this entails.   
 
Just how early the differences in social work practice were determined by the nature of 
national political cultures, even where it was practised outside the state system or where 
actual social policies took only a rudimentary form, is illustrated by the developments of 19th 
century Britain which paralleled those in Germany. When the Charity Organisation Society 
in Britain, influenced directly by the Elberfeld model, instituted its system of 'friendly 
visitors' and created an archetype for the interplay between the Poor-Law  authorities and 
private charity during the last decades of the 19th century, the responsibilities of the 'visitor' 
 45
differed in one fundamental detail between Britain and Germany. Octavia Hill, one of the 
pioneers of 'organised, individualised charity' in Britain, states in 1874:     
 
‘The important difference between the Elberfeld and the Marylebone systems 
is that, whereas in Elberfeld the volunteers themselves decide on the parochial 
relief, our volunteers have no such authority committed to them. It would be a 
fundamental change of the gravest nature to throw any share of such 
responsibility on the visitor ... The large discretionary power exercised by 
Guardians under our English Poor-Law (which contrasts with the very definite 
scale for outdoor relief in use at Elberfeld) would make it an additional 
difficulty to place the decisions as to grants in the hands of visitors’ (Hill 
1883: 73).   
 
In the handling of welfare benefits therefore different state traditions, and more specifically 
different approaches to citizenship manifest themselves, which subsequently were re-worked 
as 'methodological' differences in the respective social work discourses at academic and 
professional level.      
 
The history of social services in the Netherlands represents yet another type of state - society 
relationship. This nation state was shaped by a series of struggles for independence in which 
religion on the one hand and bourgeois liberal ideals on the other were important factors. 
The struggle strengthened the internal solidarity of the various fractions and resulted in 
finely balanced compromises and relative tolerance between them (Ellemers 1984). Since the 
late 19th century the state came to be regarded as resting on separate 'pillars', collective yet 
sectionally divided structures representing civil interest groups (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, 
socialist and humanist). The right to have not just schools and hospitals that reflect one's own 
religious or ideological 'sense of belonging', but also trade unions, political parties, 
newspapers and radio stations led to the 'sectorisation' or 'pillarisation' ('verzuiling') of 
Dutch, and to a large extent also of Belgium  public life and society (Schendelen 1984; 
Roebroek 1989; Branckaerts 1983). In relation to welfare and particularly in relation to 
personal social services this principle meant until relatively recently that most organisations 
 46
developed as 'sectoral', privately managed but mainly publicly financed initiatives 
('particulier initiatief'), and the local authority would only set up its own services if no such 
initiative had taken root. While much of this structure has been overtaken by privatisation 
and marketisation (Laan 1998,   2000), these later trends nevertheless continue the theme of 
a differentiated, self-determining civil society.  
 
According to T. H. Marshall's  classical analysis the welfare state represents the third step in 
a sequence from civil rights to political rights and finally to social rights in the organisational 
differentiation of modern societies (Marshall 1992).  'The modern welfare state is a European 
invention - in the same way as the nation state, mass democracy, and industrial capitalism. It 
was born as an answer to problems created by capitalist industrialisation; it was driven by the 
democratic class struggle; and it followed in the footsteps of the nation state' (Flora 1986: 
XII). This means that in the work of welfare personnel complex sets of relationships between 
state and citizens are being acted out even where they are employed in the voluntary sector. 
The different forms of 'welfare regimes' (Esping-Andersen 1990) that developed in Europe 
correspond to the various types of state traditions only to a degree and introduced additional 
independent variables affecting social work. Each type of welfare regime interprets the 
notion of social citizenship differently and extends it to a different range of people. 'The 
welfare state is not just a mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the structure of 
inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratification. It is an active force in the ordering 
of social relations' (Esping-Andersen 1990: 23).     
 
All typologies of welfare states are abstractions which cannot do justice to the complex 
historical relations that make up each national system, but the following signposts might help 
in the general orientation. By combining Esping-Andersen's analysis of 'welfare regimes' 
with Leibfried's typology (Leibfried, 1992: 254) the post-war welfare states of Europe can be 
seen as broadly conforming with the following models:   
 
1) The universalism of the Scandinavian model is predicated on employment as a primary 
entitlement provided or at least sponsored by the state. Its fundamental assumption and 
political legitimation is that if the well-being of citizens can be secured through having 
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access to jobs and a regular income, the state needs to rely less on redistributory measures 
outside the labour market. 'The enormous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, universalistic 
and de-commodifying welfare system means that it must minimize social problems and 
maximize revenue income. This is obviously best done with most people working' (Esping-
Andersen, 1990:28). This strategy is of particular benefit to women as it aims at actively 
facilitating their full participation in employment and reduces particularly their dependency 
on welfare payments.  
 
Within this model, most clearly exemplified until recently by Sweden, social workers are 
mainly employed by state agencies and are part of dense networks of multi-disciplinary 
services which have taken over a considerable proportion of the informal caring functions 
traditionally associated with women in the family. According to the Swedish Social Services 
Act of 1980 the role of social services is to promote democracy and solidarity and public 
assistance are regarded as an entitlement. The structure and the resourcing of municipal 
social services not only allows but compels social workers to be directly involved in 
evaluating, adapting and developing these services in line with changing needs of their users 
and in an integrated manner. The emphasis on public employment has led to a high 
participation rate by women in the labour market, not least in the social services themselves, 
and day care services for children are a high priority. All this amounts to social workers 
enjoying a relatively high status in society and the stigmatising effects of their interventions 
being kept to a minimum. Nevertheless, the central role of the state in the financing and 
providing of services is also changing in Scandinavian countries under the impact of New 
Public Management models and a new distribution of responsibilities between public and 
non-public services becomes established (Sunesson 2000)  
 
2) By contrast the residual model of welfare focuses on supportive measures outside the 
labour market which makes the means test a pivotal device in ensuring both minimum 
subsistence levels and the willingness to work. Measured by its income maintenance system 
the UK conforms to this model 'because the new middle classes were not wooed from the 
market to the state' (Esping-Andersen 1990: 31) and they therefore continue to seek to cover 
their needs by means of private (commercial) arrangements. The universalism once 
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envisaged by Beveridge in the comprehensive design of a welfare state that was to have 
‘rewarded’ in the post- WWII peacetime the loyalty of a nation united in war was eroded by 
the in-built dualism of state and market in insurance, housing, education and now also in the 
privatisation of health and community care services. However, this principle was never fully 
realised and private schools, insurance and pensions schemes (though to a much lesser 
degree private health, until the Thatcher years) continued to play an important role. 
 
Personal social services in their development as the 'fifth social service' in the British welfare 
state according to the Beveridge model (besides education, health, housing and income 
maintenance), have had more than their fair share of the divisiveness characteristic of the 
residual model. Social workers' attention in particular remained focused almost exclusively 
on poor families (and latterly even more exclusively on their children) and they inherited the 
‘last resort’ image of the Poor Law as their mandate rarely extended to pro-active, inclusive 
and universal initiatives. These much more ‘attractive’ (i.e. less punitive) areas remained the 
domain of the voluntary sector and of other professional groups like youth workers. The 
current preoccupation with child protection responsibilities which dominates the work of 
public service social workers in the UK has accentuated the social pathology orientation of 
British social work which is perhaps the most direct result of the residual welfare concept 
within which it is made to operate, with statutory workers bearing the brunt of the political 
dilemma (Parton 1991, Corby, 1991, Dingwall et al. 1995). They are not only made to draw 
the line between acceptable and unacceptable child rearing practice but also to weigh up the 
rights to citizenship between parents and children while not being able to command the 
resources that would secure the social rights of both. Thus the residual framework (and the 
‘residualisation’ of social services in the wake of neo-liberal politics) leads almost inevitably 
to a more pronounced polarisation of care and control. The state comes into appearance for 
the users of services and for the public at large through needs assessments that have the 
character of controlling measures which become activated only in crisis situations while non-
statutory services can provide care. British social work has consequently also born the brunt 
of public criticism over child protection decisions precisely because it is associated so 
directly with a model of the state that determines the boundaries of social rights in a 
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pragmatic case by case fashion and relies for social cohesion of the ‘lower social classes’ 
more on coercion than on endorsing civil and social rights. 
 
3) Compensation is the key principle of social insurance on which Bismarck built his 
strategy of national and social integration in Germany. This principle ensures that the right to 
social security for people incapable of earning a living through labour has the character of a 
private contract which places the compensation beyond the field of public stigma and 
disapproval. The state presents itself as a 'social state' by procuring and safeguarding these 
contracts but it does not compensate directly nor does it guarantee a right to work. The state 
as a corporatist state delegates welfare and above all insurance responsibilities as much as 
possible to occupational, religious and other 'voluntary' organisations thus preserving status 
and class differentials in the structure of society while safeguarding basic welfare rights. 
Exponents of this welfare regime are Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
with France and Italy showing also signs of this corporatist-statist legacy in Esping-
Andersen's view (1990). 
 
'Subsidiarity', recently elevated to the rank of catch-all formula for the salvaging of European 
integration, is the key to understanding the inter-play between the statutory, the voluntary 
and indeed the informal sector of care in this welfare regime. Historically it resulted from the 
confluence of secular corporatist ideas about the 'organic' relationship as one body with 
many parts between individuals, families, communities, interest groups and the state on the 
one hand and catholic social philosophy on the other. The latter is embodied in the 1931 
Encyclical of pope Pius XI 'Quadragesimo Anno' (referring back to the Encyclical 'Rerum 
Novarum' of 1891 with which the Catholic Church had sought to formulate its alternative to 
both socialism and liberalism) and states  
'just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the 
group what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too it is an 
injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, for a larger and 
higher association to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed 
efficiently by smaller and lower societies. ... Of its very nature the true 
aim of all social activity should be to help members of the social body, 
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but never to destroy or absorb them... The State therefore should leave to 
smaller groups the settlement of business of minor importance, which 
otherwise would greatly distract it; it will thus carry out with greater 
freedom, power and success the tasks belonging to it alone, because it 
alone can effectively accomplish these: directing, watching, stimulating, 
restraining, as circumstances suggest and necessity demands. Let those in 
power, therefore, be convinced that the more faithfully this principle of 
subsidiary function be followed, the greater will be both social authority 
and social efficiency, and the happier and more prosperous the condition 
of the commonwealth.'   (Pius XI 1931: sections 79-80)  
 
In Germany the principle of subsidiarity forms the cornerstone of social policy. The priority 
it bestows on the powerful voluntary associations in the field of welfare over equivalent state 
services was upheld by a decision of the constitutional court in 1967 and is reflected in all 
social legislation. This means that in terms of volume and of diversity of services the 
voluntary sector commands a leading position. Its six blocks, the welfare organisations of the 
Catholic, Jewish and Protestant religions, the Red Cross, the association of the labour 
movement and the independent association (Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband) are 
represented nationally and across all fields of services and can draw on public financial 
resources as well as on mobilising voluntary assistance. For subsidiarity in Germany (in 
contrast to countries like Ireland which operate a 'rudimentary' version of subsidiarity 
consisting only of the delegation of responsibilities) was always linked to the principle of 
social solidarity: the 'smaller unit' can claim the support of the 'bigger unit' to fulfil its tasks 
appropriately, while retaining the control over its activities. Only solidarity and subsidiarity 
in combination can form the 'social state' ("Sozialstaat") which 'refers to a state whose legal, 
economic and social system is founded on the principle of social security (avoidance of 
material distress for the citizen), social justice and social equality (of opportunity)' (Dyson, 
1980:21). 
 
Social work in countries conforming to the corporatist model generally reaped the benefit of 
the resultant diversity of services, commanding considerable resources for a professional 
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quality of service and enjoying the stability of a statutory framework that extends over many 
functions in the voluntary field. 'Pillarisation' in the Netherlands consolidated the social work 
professions and made them flourish in their diversity (Nokielski 1987). Their influence was 
such that the traditional interest groupings had to give way to functional, task-oriented 'social 
services' administered by professionals, based on social rights and entitlements rather than 
charity and geared towards the rational implementation of universal social policy aims 
(Brenton 1982).  
 
This leaves public social work services in corporatist countries encumbered with social 
control tasks and generally regarded as far less attractive as a field of employment. 
Furthermore, much of the 'competition' between different non-statutory agencies enhances 
creativity and innovation, but often through specialisation and with ideological impositions 
derived from the distinct 'charity tradition' of the agency. Social workers get absorbed in 
'sectoral responsibilities' which can easily reproduce and magnify social inequalities and 
which also make it difficult to develop a community approach. Specialisation can lead to 
relative inaccessibility, as was reported of the Dutch system before its more recent re-
organisation (Roebroek 1989).  
 
4) As ‘rudimentary welfare states’ can be classified Portugal, Spain, Greece and also Ireland 
and some regions of Italy in as much as they instituted no or only minimal legal rights for 
social security (Leibfried, 1992). In these countries the development of social services was 
patchy and often uncoordinated. Full employment was never considered as a realistic goal 
with emigration offering an escape route politically and economically. At the same time the 
promise of a future comprehensive welfare system remained a strong political factor in 
securing loyalty and staving off disaffection.  
 
The employment situation of social workers in countries representing the 'rudimentary' 
welfare model is hard to quantify. In countries like Ireland or Spain plans had existed in the 
late 70s for a decisive expansion and the full professionalisation of public social services, but 
they were thwarted by the economic crisis affecting public expenditure at the very moment 
when the expansion was set to take place. Nevertheless, social services have now steadily 
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expanded, largely under the impact of public disquiet over cases of neglect and the demand 
for more decisive action on the part of the state. As a result most professionally qualified 
social workers in those countries are to be found in public employment. Because of the 
blurred distinction between informal and formal care and between the competences of 
different professional groups a large part of personal services is still however being provided 
by the voluntary sector which utilises unpaid volunteers and by professionals with other 
qualifications. The new Spanish constitution of 1978 declared Spain to be a 'democratic and 
social state based on rights' (article 1) and details the social obligations of the state (articles 
39ff) but in practice other laws making relatives primarily responsible for assisting family 
members in need ('Alimentos entre parientes') have more effect (Zaragoz 1991: 32).  
 
Particularly in the case of Ireland where the state has a declared reluctance to become 
involved in welfare provision (Peillon 1987) social work skills must of necessity include the 
imaginative wealing and dealing for resources, negotiating with the informal sector for 
institutional places and generally 'keeping the balance' on behalf of society. Indeed, it was 
voluntary initiatives, set up by socially aware Roman Catholic bishops, that pioneered the 
idea of a generic and community based social service (Kennedy 1981). In articulating the 
needs of their service users these early centres had a major role in bringing social issues to 
the attention of a wider public and in rendering them an object of the State's attention. The 
result was that when regional health authorities were set up in Ireland in 1971 they included 
a limited form of social work provisions, concentrating however on child care and family 
work and gradually taking over child protection functions from the Irish Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children which had been in existence for decades (Gilligan 1989). 
More recently this cautious approach by the state in relation to personal services in Ireland 
has given way to a massive, panic-driven investment in child protection services following 
the public exposure of a high level of child abuse (Ferguson and Kenny 1995).  
 
 
Social policy regimes therefore form the structural basis for social citizenship which in turn 
defines the margins within which social work can operate. Nevertheless there are great 
similarities in the daily practice of social workers across different models of the welfare 
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state. For the regimes are by no means static and just as social workers are products of and 
represent different versions of social citizenship, they are also engaged in the shaping of the 
actual practices of social citizenship and hence of social policy. 'It is an intrinsic feature of 
the Welfare State as it was built and planned, through conflicts and compromises, that it 
implies both acknowledgement and displacement of needs, both support of social rights and 
new forms of social control through the enforcing of rigid regulations and the increasing 
power of professionals and bureaucrats' (Saraceno 1987:61). In no European country has 
social work become associated entirely with state services, nor does it indeed operated 
anywhere totally outside a statutory framework. This indicates that while the profession 
certainly carries out functions of the welfare system and above all interprets it by 
individualising its provisions, it also acts potentially as a corrective in taking its mandate 
from the users of services or from its own professional standards. All types of welfare 
systems create a growing demand for social workers on account of both their logic and their 
inconsistencies. To quote Saraceno again, 'Paradoxically, we might say that the more social 
rights are acknowledged, the more individuals and groups become aware of their partiality 
and ambivalence; not only because their private lives and responsibilities have been eroded 
by the state, but because through the state's acknowledgement of their needs they become 
able to develop a fuller and richer consciousness of themselves as subjects of rights and 
needs' (Saraceno 1987:61). These dual dynamics played a role even under political 
conditions which denied the existence of social problems and hence the need for social work.  
 
 
The existence of social work during the period of state socialism in eastern European 
countries, albeit under a variety of ‘disguises’, is further evidence that the state, even a 
socialist totalitarian one, requires the assistance of additional 'steering mechanisms' 
performing the task of translating public problems into personal issues. 'It was maintained 
that with economic growth based on socialist relations of ownership social evolution would 
soon get rid of all kinds of problems, such as delinquency, alcoholism or mental illness, 
poverty and even economic hardship ' (Ferge 1979: 63). Officially, the concern for material 
subsistence had been taken care of by the state regulating employment, housing, education, 
health and income maintenance universally. But even within the logic of this approach, 
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leaving aside for the moment its feasibility, there remained the need for the function of 'fine-
tuning' the state measures to the needs of individuals, or indeed the adjustment of 
individuals, their attitudes and abilities, to the collective interests. This necessitated the 
growth of a stratum of workers in official or semi-official capacities but also on a voluntary, 
in-official basis, who dealt with such issues of 'adjustment' thereby fulfilling the role of 
social workers without carrying their official title. 
 
Much of this work traded as 'rehabilitation' as the term 'social work' would have meant the 
acknowledgement of social problems. Rehabilitation was strongest in the field of guiding 
people back to a productive life after physical illness or accident, in ‘conductive education’ 
for young people with congenital disabilities, and professional competences spanned the 
range of medical, physio-therapeutic, educational and counselling skills. But rehabilitation 
also extended to work with people suffering from addictions and to delinquents, where the 
parallels to western type social work were even more apparent. Rehabilitation and education 
as conceptual (and ideological) reference points allowed for the emergence of explicit 
'welfare workers' particularly in Hungary, East Germany  and Poland who were employed in 
welfare centres advising parents on child rearing problems, dealing with substitute care 
arrangements or with material hardship and coordinating the work of voluntary organisations 
(Ksiezopolski and Sienko 1988: 300). Georgy Konrád's veiled autobiographical account of 
such work in Budapest in his novel The Case Worker (Konrád 1977) highlights the 
universality of everyday dilemmas across the ideological state barriers. 
 
At the same time, party and trade union officials also carried a mandate for some types of 
welfare work, particularly in relation to housing, job transfers, marital difficulties, 
alcoholism and minor forms of delinquency. This was partly in response to the desire to get 
away from the stigmatising effects of charity when support and insurance schemes handled 
by 'the people themselves' through their representatives were meant to underline their self-
help and rights character (Ferge 1979).     
 
The work of unofficial volunteers was organised mainly through the churches and their 
respective welfare organisations whose assistance was officially disapproved but practically 
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prevailed upon by the official welfare workers for instance in Poland (Medical Post-graduate 
Education Center in Warsaw 1978). These organisations had often been re-constituted after 
their original banning with secret approval by the government, an ideological slide of hand 
which allowed for the utilisation of existing informal welfare networks without however 
giving official approval to the continued existence and thereby publicly demonstrated 
necessity of 'bourgeois' welfare support services.    
 
Together these formal and informal welfare workers had to fill the gaps remaining between 
officially proclaimed and actually existing social rights. They could not publicly articulate 
the existence of these gaps thus demonstrating the fundamental discrepancy between social 
rights on the one hand and civil and political rights on the other. 'By far the most important 
factor … which ultimately led to the downfall of these regimes, was that the real 
enlargement of social rights (even though unequally distributed among different groups in 
the population) was accompanied by a severe restriction of civil and political rights' 
(Bottomore in Marshall and Bottomore 1992: 62).     
 
These latter considerations are of particular significance in the re-construction of social 
policy and social services in former socialist countries under capitalist conditions. A similar 
rupture looms when market principles are introduced both for economic activity and for 
social service delivery in the wake of neo-liberal social policies. This ideology claims that 
economic market principles alone would take care of the steering processes of social 
development. Under that ideological dictate social work is bound to be relegated to a 
secondary, auxiliary function of redressing imbalances, compensating for the lack of rights, 
gate-keeping at the boundaries of entitlements, if the political systems do not aim for the 
comprehensive implementation of civil, political and social rights. The momentum for such a 
development of comprehensive social rights can only be generated in a vibrant civil society 
which asserted itself briefly and effectively in the overthrow of communism but which 
subsequently requires support and stimulation, not least through social work in the form of 
community action, to sustain its momentum. The following thoughts on the role of social 
policy in society, formulated during the dying years of the Polish communist regime, retain 
their validity in principle after its eventual collapse:  
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'The state has an untransferable responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. 
This does not mean that the state should take over responsibility from the 
people but that conditions should be created to enable people to manage by 
themselves, in co-operation with the family, other citizens, local communities, 
social organisations and, of course, the state. People have to regain a 
subjective role in the creation of a social policy on all levels of the decision-
making process as well as in the realisation of its goals. Without these changes 
it would be impossible to direct social policy towards awakening a feeling of 
affiliation with a community, towards promoting mutual aid or social work 
motivations'  (Ksiezopolski 1987: 105). 
 
But the relative stability of Western European welfare states also begins to give way to 
fundamental changes since the late 1980s. Significantly these were first heralded by changes 
in the administrative structure of social services, justified often with the intention of bringing 
them closer to the citizens and enabling more participation, but increasingly the underlying 
ideological interests of greater control and above all of cost reduction became more apparent. 
Recent social policy changes therefore amount to a fundamental questioning of citizenship 
guarantees, and this not just through the tightening of welfare conditions for migrants and 
asylum seekers (Humphries 2002). 
 
 
In view of the challenges posed by New Social Movements and their demands for self-
determination and participation, fostering solidarity and endorsing formal democratic rights 
proved to be particularly difficult for those European countries with highly centralised 
governmental structures. Their weakness was exposed in the wave of protest movements 
'from the basis' which swept Europe (and much of the rest of the world) in 1968. It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find that some countries like France, Italy and Greece (after the end 
of the dictatorship), in seeking to address the political credibility deficit without wanting to 
yield power, made efforts to change over to accessible, community-based social and health 
services, thereby heralding similar developments in other countries.     
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In Italy, the trend towards decentralistion had a variety of origins; mutual aid associations 
and particularly co-operatives had always been a strong feature of Italian life and the 
political demands for participation and greater immediacy were articulated both from radical 
sources such as Marxism and feminism and from catholic social teaching. Italy's law 833 of 
1978, which launched the radical reorganisation of health services, designated the local 
'district' or borough ('comune') as the political and administrative level for the provision of 
services. The over 8,000 'comuni' with usually 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants (but sometimes 
less than 1,000) set up local health units ('Unità sanitaria locale', USL) which may combine 
health and social welfare responsibilities (Cigno 1985).  
 
The Italian achievements in terms of decentralising state services are considerable given the 
complexity of Italian state-citizen relationships. Local service committees confront 
politicians, who are proportionally represented on them, with the practice dilemmas caused 
by their politics (Cigno 1985). But the initial agenda of 'gestione sociale', management by the 
collectivity, simply aimed at more direct representation of citizens while failing to address 
their dependency on bureaucrats and professionals. Government backing for local initiatives 
often had the effect of 'demobilising' the social movements and burnishing the caring image 
of the state (Ergas 1982). The dominance of the political culture impeded actual progress in 
service delivery systems, and this exemplifies the impossibility of changing merely one 
element of the overall citizenship structure.    
 
Compared to the Swedish system of local social service committees, which are similarly 
composed but operate in a political context that emphasises the legal and universal 
entitlements of service users, the Italian experience with decentralisation tends to still play 
into the hands of the old patronage system ('clientelismo') which is deeply engrained as a 
pattern of dependence (Ascoli 1987). There are striking parallels in this regard with the 
situation in Greece where clientelism is also very much part of the political culture. 
Stathopoulos (1991) describes the limited impact recent legislation promoting 
decentralisation and citizen participation at local and regional level (laws Nr. 1262 of 1982 
and Nr. 1622 of 1986) had in rural Greece. Political power remains concentrated in the hands 
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of central government and of political parties. The newly created participatory structures 
were quickly seized by members of national political parties seeking to 'promote their own 
party's interests at local level' (Stathopoulos 1991: 124). Consequently, local people are 
inclined to measure the usefulness of community workers by their ability to open up funding, 
channels of political influence and access to government. The political culture yields very 
slowly to the sense of empowerment community workers seek to engender in the local 
population.  
 
In France decentralisation officially came about with the law of 1984 when the Mitterand 
government sought to radically alter the centralised structure of French government. But the 
path had been prepared through participatory initiatives in the 70s, notably in the sphere of 
social services: Well over 100 social centres ('Centres Sociaux') sprang up all over the 
country, financed from both governmental sources and the French 'private' health funds with 
the explicit brief of applying the principle of user participation in the running and the 
direction of the centres. Triggered by the political events in France of 1968 this movement 
meshed with the typically French system of 'caisses', funds for old age, sickness and family 
welfare, which have consumer representatives. But it also activated new forms of social and 
cultural work which de-emphasise a problem orientation (Chamberlayne 1992) in the form 
of 'animation'. This facilitated forms of interaction between workers and community 
representatives on the causes of need instead of concentrating solely on delivering state 
responses to these needs (Cannan 1991) Overall however, the complexity of local 
government structure and the dual responsibilities of social service centres (to state and 
private organisations) have once more not increased their direct democratic accountability to 
service users (Wallimann 1986).  
 
The very fact that governments in the context of their decentralisation policies frequently 
called upon the services of social workers to 'make it work' reveals the ambivalence of 
decentralisation. It has been argued (e.g. Mayer and Müller 1984) that overall, the 
'enmeshment' of private lives with the institutions of the state has not been reduced. Instead, 
the growing complexity of these relations and the emphasis on cost effectiveness diverted 
attention away from the state and the arena of politics towards economic and local 
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management issues which then became the declared framework of neo-liberalism. 
Professionals like social workers, priding themselves on their autonomy but tending to 
ignore their political mandate, become pivotal in lending legitimacy to new, cost-cutting 
principles of resource allocations with their 'objective assessments'.  
 
'Whatever new levels and forms of decentralisation can be observed, they are part and parcel 
of a system growing in complexity... In many areas of health and social services the 
individual meets the State mediated through the professionals charged with the provision of 
care and services. It is ironic that the individual as client on whose behalf the whole system 
is said to be organised has so few opportunities of taking part in a more active sense' 
(Nowotny 1984:11). 
 
The UK has perhaps embarked on the most fundamental restructuring of community care of 
any European country lately. Under the banner of choice for the users of social services the 
role of local authorities as providers of social services was dismantled and replaced largely 
by evaluation teams that seek to purchase the most cost-effective services from non-
governmental suppliers. This split between ‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’ (Harris 1999) not 
only divides the profession according to interest positions dictated by a virtual and actual 
market situation, it also fragments social solidarity in general as users of social services are 
only seemingly in control of the process and are in fact banded into risk groups and a 
gradient of ‘worthiness’.  
 
 
The trend towards decentralisation and ‘consumer choice’ contains an ambiguous message in 
terms of the conditions for social citizenship. Decentralisation can on the one hand turn into 
an opportunity of client participation, into a questioning of the taken-for-granted basis on 
which welfare and welfare services are structured and organised in a society. The role of 
self-help movements and of general social movements in the 1980s will be examined in 
more detail in another chapter. But the concept of ‘participation’ can also lead to a more 
insidious form of control, a greater presence of the state and its agenda in the lives of citizens 
under the guise of ‘choice’, and to greater inequality as user groups compete among 
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themselves for scarce resources. Shifting services from official agencies to voluntary groups, 
informal networks, 'the community' and indeed to 'the family' has now a well established 
place on the neo-liberal political agenda that may lead to new forms of capitalist exploitation 
and hegemony (Chamberlayne 1992). There is therefore a clear role for social workers to 
assert their professional autonomy critically in the context of these developments, not as a 
widening of their power position, but as a critical and independent reflection on the political 
consequences of their 'fitting into a given agenda', no matter how closely this agenda appears 
to meet the fundamental principles of client initiative and participation that underlie social 
work. The task of empowerment is not achieved by merely mechanically applying an official 
participation agenda.   
 
The 'crisis of the welfare state' and the subsequent rise of New Right policies which 
exploited and deepened the crisis led western European countries into a similar dilemma to 
that being confronted by Central and Eastern European countries after the fall of 
communism. All four types of welfare regimes experienced this crisis both at a material and 
at an ideological level. In fiscal terms, the Keynsian mechanism of public investments 
boosting economic expansion had exhausted itself under the increasingly costly burden of re-
payment commitments of public borrowing, which exacerbated the unemployment crisis 
(Carter 1998). Full male employment as the economic basis of insurance-based welfare 
systems began to crumble just as women started to question their marginalisation in the 
labour market, their increasing dependence on assistance and the lack of public and 
economic recognition of their care and domestic functions (Esping-Andersen 1996). 
Unemployment and marginalisation associated with the fundamental restructuring of 
industrial and agricultural economies in the 1970s combined with the demographic effects of 
an aging population and a loosening of marriage and family ties simultaneously placed 
heightened demands on welfare services. At the same time social security regulations were 
altered in the direction of limiting and tightening social insurance conditions thus driving 
more and more recipients to draw on social assistance. This in turn resulted in more means-
testing generally, not just in the traditional area of social assistance, a phenomenon generally 
referred to as ‘workfare’ replacing ‘welfare’ (Saraceno 2002). All this caused the 
relationship between social insurance and social assistance and the boundary between self-
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help responsibilities (voluntary, private and commercial) and the responsibilities of the state 
to become redefined. Assistance was made to cover risks and sectors of the population for 
which it was never intended. Through these developments the state's controlling functions in 
welfare matters became more visible as such social control measures added to the alienation 
experienced by recipients of welfare (see chapter 9). At the same time the bifurcation of the 
labour market into those enjoying stable, well-paid employment and those in marginal, 
temporary and discontinuous employment  turned the mutuality principle of insurance 
schemes on its head so that insurance shemes became 'bastions of corporatist privilege from 
which the most vulnerable were increasingly excluded' (Chamberlayn 1992:7).  
 
At the ideological level, the political left with its traditional advocacy for institutional 
universal welfare measures changed its key demands for equality and universal services, 
even in Scandinavian countries and in Austria and began to woo the middle class voters 
within an agenda dictated by the New Right rationale. In this climate the 'Swedish model' of 
relying largely on state services was being curtailed since 'the national efforts to solve the 
economic problems seem to develop local social problems that create, in the long run, heavy 
structural costs for the public sector' (Nilsson and Wadeskog 1988: 37). The Italian efforts of 
moving from a rudimentary to a more egalitarian though still corporatist welfare state 
experienced a 'jamming up' under bulging public expenditures and divergent consumer 
interests (Donati and Colozzi 1988).    
 
In the Netherlands the dismantling of its traditional welfare structure by the conservative-
liberal government in the 80s coincided with the gradual dis-establishment of social work 
just as a comprehensive, pro-active, profession-led concept of welfare was within sight. The 
politics of retrenchment exploited the growing demands for 'basis-democracy' which had 
also turned against the power vested in professional organisations and extolled the virtues of 
the 'caring community' ('zorgsame samenleving', Nokielski 1987:122). Nevertheless, the 
Netherlands for a long time remained an example of at least the attempt at the 'needs-led' 
structuring of social services: local authorities grant-aid (albeit according to measures of cost 
efficiency) private non-profit making organisations ('stichting') set up around particular 
fields of need and social problems, notably in areas like mental health, family work, 
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homelessness and drug dependency. Only one project catering for a particular area of need 
per local authority receives assistance in a process of competitive tendering and the 
performance of the winning agent gets monitored annually (van der Laan 1998).  
 
The progressive erosion of the principle of equality in social welfare heightened the crisis of 
legitimation the nation states experienced since the 70s. Social workers are once more in the 
frontline of political pressures to maintain the appearance of legitimacy by providing a 
'caring image' to society. More acutely than ever before do they have to mediate in the 
conflicts between an increasingly vociferous service user population and political objectives 
which aim at individualising or particularising social resources to selected 'vulnerable 
groups'. The continued expansion of welfare expenditure and of social work posts in all 
countries as well as the rush in former communist countries to establish social work services 
testify to the continued need for the stabilising functions by social security and personalised 
welfare.      
 
But citizenship issues feature now also at the supra-national level with the more explicit 
development of a social policy agenda of the European Union through the Social Charta and 
the Amsterdam Treaty. The various programmes of the Social Fund are designed to foster a 
sense of European citizenship and belonging, in close parallel to (and sometimes, as in the 
case of the Combat Poverty Programmes, in actual competition with) the social policy aims 
of the nation states. Social workers in all parts of the EU, but particularly in 'peripheral' 
countries and 'regions of industrial decline', work in projects financed through these 
programmes and have to tailor their project objectives to the EU guidelines. This describes a 
situation where opportunities for tangible citizenship in the EU are either being created or 
denied, depending on the conditions of funding but also on the 'interpretation' those 
conditions receive at the local level. 'In the short run, the structural funds appear to be 
competitors to any emerging focus on social citizenship' (Leibfried and Pierson 1992: 340), 
but the struggle for citizenship has to be taken on, not so much by the professionals but by 
the users of services themselves. Networks are being set up between different user groups 
right across Europe which take self-advocacy right to the level of lobbying the EU 
institutions and MEPs. their experience is that the politics of the funding process no longer 
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conform to the channels of local and national government structures but show an interesting 
propensity for 'short-cuts' directly to Brussels. 'Eurolink Age' for instance maintains an office 
in Brussels, the Single Parent Action Network (SPAN) is forging cross-national links as is 
FEANTSA, a Europe wide campaign on homelessness (Baine, Bennington and Russell 
1992).  
 
There remains ample scope for scepticism: 'For the moment there is not a single civil right 
which is defended by the European Community. There is not a single basic right of citizens 
which has anything to do with the Treaty of Rome' (Dahrendorf 1992: 85) - and European 
integration confronts social workers once more, like in the history of each nation state, with 
the alternative of developing social services as compensation for the lack of social rights or 
as the vehicle for the full rights  of citizenship. The un-coupling of welfare benefits from 
market principles will be the single most crucial task to be achieved not by the EU 
bureaucracy, but by the nascent European civil society in which social work must become a 
driving force.  
 
When Pinker states, 'it seems obvious - to me at least - that problems of a personal nature do 
exist and that people are quite capable of being the architects of their own misery' (Pinker 
1990: 93) by way of calling on social workers to concentrate on these personal issues instead 
of ‘meddling in political issues’, he misses the point that the political mandate social workers 
carry out within all the welfare systems is to locate and define first of all the boundary 
between personal troubles and public issues. The dichotomy between case work and social 
action as two distinct methods treats that boundary as given, whereas the actual core skill of 
social workers lies in the ability to leave the choice - and the mix - of methods open and to 
give clients a say in the choice. It is the hallmark of modern societies that this boundary can 
no longer be regarded as fixed, that it has become problematic and the subject of political 
negotiations. The fact that every modern state has developed some system of public welfare 
and that the EU is being drawn, very reluctantly, into ever more expansive social policy 
areas bears ample witness to this. Society is implicated not just in people lacking resources, 
education, jobs or housing, but also in every case of fatal child abuse, in the death of a 
pensioner from hypothermia, in the plight of a homeless person. In counselling people in 
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their personal grief, helplessness or outrage it is essential for social workers to open up the 
official, taken-for-granted definitions of the boundary of ‘the personal’ and in particular to 
resist the translation of public wrongs into personal troubles, but equally not to deny the 
people immediately affected their share of responsibility for their condition (and the 
necessary changes) which constitutes their human dignity. The different European welfare 
systems and the process of European integration itself do have an immediate bearing on the 
practice of social work, and the mode of every intervention contributes to the version of 
social citizenship, at national and European level, that is yet to become a lived and practised 
reality, not just in social service transactions. It is precisely this ability to define ‘social 
service work’ as a matter of shaping social politics which is under threat from the advance of 
neo-liberal politics, and it therefore becomes necessary to explore the nature of the 
relationship between social work and capitalism in the next chapter. 
 
Having established however the cultural origins of the different versions of citizenship and 
their continuing influence in terms of distinct welfare regimes and hence of distinct forms of 
social work practice, the issue of cultural diversity within nation states becomes problematic. 
Methodological unity and national cultural homogeneity appear to be intricately linked and, 
as ideological constructs that tend to be withdrawn from critical debate and scrutiny, 
inherently instable and troublesome. The next chapters examine therefore ‘minority issues’ 
from cultural, political and also methodological perspectives. 
 65
 66
 
4. Minorities and cultural diversity as challenges to the nation state 
project  
 
 
 
 
'In 1990 21.2 per cent of the population of Greater London were black, "foreigners" 
(excluding foreign-born citizens) constituted 16 per cent of the resident population of greater 
Paris ... in Amsterdam at the beginning of the 1990s 22per cent of the population were 
"foreigners" - and half of the primary school population -, in Frankfurt about 25 per cent, and 
in Brussels some 28 per cent' (Therborn 1995:50). Cultural diversity had certainly arrived in 
the urban centres of Europe by the last decade of the 20th century, at levels comparable to 
those prevailing in New York. Europeans find this astonishing, sometimes alarming; they 
had become habituated into considering their territories as ethnically homogeneous and now 
regard the rising number of ethnically distinct groupings in their urban centres as a 
disturbance of this 'established' pattern - forgetting, on the whole, that the pattern of 
homogeneity was of quite recent origin. Only by 'around 1950 had the states of Europe 
achieved an unprecedented ethnic homogenization of their populations' (Therborn 1995: 47). 
This had come about largely as the indirect or direct result of the impact of Nazism on 
Europe and the world, its racist policy of the extermination of whole populations, its 
aggression against countries near and far. It had been compounded by an armistice 
settlement that, while not repeating the Wilsonian doctrines of the Versailles peace treaty 
that had concluded the First World War, nevertheless gave renewed impetus to the idea, that 
cultural and political boundaries should be made to coincide as a means of identification and 
for purposes of their political utilisation. This temporary impression of homogenisation came 
about through the deliberate, politically motivated displacement of minority populations, 
most notably by Nazi Germany in the territories it occupied, and through the backlash after 
the war of the German population of Eastern Europe, creating among them some 10.7 
million refugees (Niethammer 1991). After the Second World War population movements 
happened on a large scale, and not only in Germany; Austria and Finland for instance 
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received 6 per cent and 10 per cent of their populations respectively in refugees, Italians 
were expelled from Dalmatia and Istria (Therborn 1995: 46). With the exception of the 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Switzerland the European nation states came to consider 
themselves as mono-ethnic, although the realisation of this ‘ethnic’ homogenisation had been 
veiled by the global re-ordering of political alliances along the lines of the cold war divide 
into communism and capitalism. Political block mentality superseded and 'dampened down' 
the potential and actual nationalism contained within this order, an example of which was 
also the creation of the European Economic Community.  
 
This political recipe that was to ensure peace in large parts of Europe after the devastation of 
the second world war Europe-wide was in this sense strangely reminiscent of the formula of 
appeasement which had produced the welfare state consensus: it, too, regarded society as 
basically homogeneous or at least constituted by common needs and interests and solidarity 
as something that could be achieved therefore through the coalition of former adversaries 
who forget their differences on the grounds of shared rational interests superseding irrational 
cultural (or class) barriers. To conform to this concept was equivalent to normal, rational 
behaviour and any deviation from the rational norm of 'good citizen behaviour' was treated 
as a matter of individual pathology. The refugees that arrived during that time and had to be 
'integrated' counted as in essence 'indigenous' on account of the rational, sensible choices 
they had made in a political sense:  Germans who had escaped an alien, i.e. communist 
regime; refugees from the uprisings of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and who quite 
‘naturally’ belonged to 'our side', even if at a cultural level of everyday encounters mistrust 
and conflict was all too apparent. But at the ‘official level’ their belonging to the national 
community was prepared with the acknowledgement of the choice they had made. The 
position of these political refugees stood in contrast to that of economic migrants who started 
to appear in western (and to some extent in eastern Europe) a decade or so later, who were 
not regarded as refugees and instead, in countries like Germany and Switzerland, were made 
to retain their status as foreigners over several generations.  
 
Historically speaking, cultural homogeneity of major cities in Europe certainly was an 
anomaly. Therborn calculates the proportion of the population of capitals which by today's 
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criteria would have represented the typical national ethnicity in Central and Eastern 
European countries in the decades before the First World War as ranging from 36 per cent 
(Prague), 38 per cent (Bratislava), 40 per cent (Bucharest), 46 per cent (Helsinki) to 62 per 
cent (Warsaw), 75 per cent (Zagreb), 85 per cent (Vienna) and 89 per cent for St. Petersburg 
(the highest 'indigenous' proportion for those capitals, Therborn 1995: 44). The 1950s 
therefore completed a process of social homogenisation constructed around ethnic concepts. 
This tendency had set in with the political transformations of Europe in the post-Napoleonic 
era, had been fuelled by the patriotic movements which gave rise for instance to German and 
Italian unification in the latter half of the 19th century, had spread into global rivalry in the 
period of aggressive colonialism, had resulted in the break-up of the remaining multi-ethnic 
empires at the end of the First World War, flared up again in nationalism, fascism and 
Nazism in the inter-war period and plunged the world into cataclysmic destruction in the 
Second World War. Europe is world-wide the continent with the lowest concentration of 
languages and hence a special case where language concentrations and their technological 
and political significance forge hegemonic coalitions:  
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World languages by category of size 
 
World 
region 
Total number 
of languages 
Number of 
languages 
spoken by  
> 1mill 
Number of 
languages spoken 
by fewer 
Number of 
languages 
spoken by very 
few people 
World total 6 417 (100%) 273 (4.2%) 4 162 (64.8%) 1 982 (30,8%) 
Asia 1 906 126 (6.6%) 1 549 (81.3%) 231 (12.1%) 
Africa 1 821 92 (5.1%) 1 607 (88.2%) 122 (6.7%) 
Pacific 1 268 1 (0.1%) 507 (40%) 775 (61.1%) 
America 1 013 10 (0.9%) 428 (42.2%) 575 (56.7%) 
Australia 273 - 18 (6.6%) 255 (93.4%) 
Europe 143 44 (30.7%) 69 (48.3) 15 (10.5%) 
 
(Haarmann 2001, p. 73) 
 
 
 
Ethnic diversity and rivalry in the era of (assumed) homogeneity after 1945 had by no means 
disappeared, but it was not made thematic. The Cold War confrontation saw to that in east 
and west, as did the determination behind the western European integration efforts not to let 
nationalist rivalry become ever again the fuse that set the world ablaze. The Franco-German 
accord between De Gaulle and Adenauer was symbolic for this - the new generation of 
French and Germans youth had offers of exchange programmes  heaped on them. A united 
Europe suggested itself to the immediate post-war generation as 'the solution' to old rivalries, 
a quasi-country with which young Germans (and not only they) could identify without 
shame, without the tyranny of a domineering culture and of stuffy traditions.  
 
A similar political agenda contributed to the integration of the refugees in Western Germany, 
officially called 'out-settlers' ('Aussiedler'), 'German nationals' from beyond the Iron curtain 
who came to constitute 16.4% of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany (Castles 
and Miller 1993). In popular perceptions their official title differed little from the customary 
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'refugee' ('Flüchtlinge') which often was a means of referring not only to East Germans, 
Poles and Sudeten-Czech, but in southern Germany also to everybody who had migrated 
within Germany and spoke with a 'posh' northern-German accent. The cultural diversity they 
created was noted implicitly: language patterns shifted, the difference between Protestant 
and Catholic regions levelled, culinary traditions were exchanged, folk customs from far-
away places occasionally became visible but were contained in museum-like structures. 
Generally the diversity was framed in such a way that it was 'neutralised', subsumed under 
the much more important 'greater identity' of being German, or rather, of being Western, 
being an inhabitant of 'the free world'. 
 
During the first two decades after WWII two types of population movements coincided in 
western Europe: the displacement and reception of refugees mainly from central and eastern 
Europe whose arrival had deep symbolic significance in that it served as a constant reminder 
of the repressive nature of the socialist regimes, and the recruitment of workers from 
Mediterranean countries and the Caribbean to fill vacancies in the labour market in the 
context of the reconstruction of the European economies. Both phenomena were considered 
transient pending the ‘return’ of the migrants to their place of origin, despite the fact that the 
fall of communism seemed ever more utopian, and the rhetoric emanating from annual 
gatherings of ethnic groups ('Volksgruppen') and 'people displaced from their homeland' 
('Heimatvertriebene') enforced that image of an eventual return. The refugee-settlers from 
Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were nevertheless quietly regarded 
as permanent members of western societies. By contrast the permanency of recruited migrant 
workers was never accepted. Their relationship as 'guest workers' with the 'host society' was 
considered as purely instrumental, a contractual arrangement with little implications for 
political and social integration and the acquisition of residency and citizenship rights.  
 
It is against this historical background that the contemporary role and range of methods of 
the social professions in relation to migrants, refugees and ethnic minorities in Europe has to 
be evaluated. Social services and social work methods of intervention are not of the nature of 
private arrangements between individual service users and independent service providers 
who seek to resolve crises over resource shortages and questions of personal adjustment. 
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Rather, such interactions are framed by this historical background that has given rise to the 
problem situation and they are affected by the various political agendas impinging on it at 
every stage and in every detail. Ultimately the traditional mandate of social service staff is to 
legitimate the boundaries of solidarity of a society, to ensure that solidarity is being extended 
only to 'the right kind of people' and that as many as possible of those remaining on the 
margins of society are either being ‘converted’ into 'the right kind of people' or their 
exclusion is being legitimated on the grounds of their refusal to conform (Mynott 2002). The 
assumed ethnic and cultural homogeneity of post-WWII European societies suggested to 
social service operators that this task could be solved primarily through the recourse to 
psychological methods because the question of the identity of the service users lay outside 
the range of concerns and was assumed as simply ‘given’ and hence not at issue. The 
excluded were distinguished by behavioural or cognitive deficits, which prevented them 
from fully availing of that solidarity, a pattern of responses best illustrated by the 
‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the 1970s until which time poverty had been treated as a matter 
of personal (mis-)adjustment. Either the clients had to be helped to adjust personally or they 
could not be helped and were left to the care (and control) of institutions. Behind the then 
prevailing principle of 'client self-determination' stood a whole range of measures and 
pressures, which lay outside the range of social work but ensured conformity and 
assimilation. Social workers were keen to 'treat people as people', to do justice to their 
professionalism by disregarding cultural and ethnic diversity as a source of possible bias and 
prejudice and to thereby remain 'politically neutral', without questioning the very specific 
political assumptions and interests behind this neutrality and assumed universalism.  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the articulation of ethnic diversity in European societies 
which occurred during the 1980s and 90s raised fundamental questions not only about social 
work methods but also about the role of social work in society. It is with this in mind that the 
more detailed look at social work in relation to migration can serve as an opportunity for the 
comprehensive assessment of social work's position in such societies becoming more aware 
of their cultural diversity and the diminishing significance of the nation state.  
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As the immediate experience of the Second World War fades from memory and the 'block-
thinking' of global confrontation disintegrates after 1989, the nature of political crises in 
Europe and in the wider world changes fundamentally. They no longer can be subsumed 
under established patterns of lines of confrontation. The boundaries between 'them' and 'us' 
have become uncertain and unpredictable. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the visible 
permeability of borders more generally which it heralded, boundaries have to be re-
established both on a global scale and at the community level. An immediate response to this 
uncertainty in relation to collective identities is the reference to the earlier experience with 
migration, which had set a pattern of distinction between political and economic migrants. 
This distinction is being invoked as a regulatory principle for the treatment of refugees at 
both national and European level even though this very distinction has become totally 
blurred and superseded by the even greater enmeshment of economic and political issues in 
world politics (Castles and Miller 1993). 
 
This results in an escalation and a short-circuiting of measures between national and 
European policy decisions which amount to a much tighter restriction on entry to the EU for 
political refugees and a relative openness to migration suited to or demanded by changes in 
the economy. The latter applies not only to the active encouragement of the mobility of 
labour, which is one of the central tenets of the European economic integration process, but 
also a relative toleration of illegal immigration in parts of  Europe like Italy (Vasta 1993) and 
Spain and the persistent recruitment drive in response to labour shortages in Germany in 
certain parts of industry, notably the building and construction sectors, the electronic 
industry and increasingly also the personal and care services sector at informal and formal 
level. 
  
Migration highlights not only the already existing diversity of every society; it also tests the 
boundaries of solidarity. All responses to the arrival of refugees are politically sensitive 
because they expose the precarious preconditions of the prevailing rationale for the existence 
of boundaries of belonging, social responsibility and the conditions of citizenship and all 
their inconsistencies and weaknesses (Kushner and Knox 1999). It was the concept of the 
nation state which represented the prevailing attempt to order and legitimate those 
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boundaries, and it was the nation state that was responsible for the creation of ‘minorities’ in 
the first place: ‘It is the state, which as nation state produces “national minorities” or the 
pseudo-national (ethnic, cultural and vocational) minorities factually. Without its legal and 
political intervention they would have remained virtual.’ (Balibar 1993, p 151). In the 
context of the globalisation not just of the economy but of social relations generally (Waters 
1995) national boundaries assume ever more arbitrary character and become irrelevant for 
the purpose of defining the limits of social responsibility. This is reminiscent of the upheaval 
at the beginning of capitalist industrialisation when the system of territorial parish 
responsibility for the poor and destitute was still being invoked to deal with personal 
hardship even though it had become totally abstract and untenable in an industrialised nation 
state that required labour mobility. But while that marked the transition between, in 
Durkheim's terminology, mechanical and organic solidarity with the state becoming the de 
facto new organising principle for the latter, today's transition from the national to the global 
scale of required solidarity patterns and relationships has no new institutional framework 
(Beck 1994). The emergent relationship and responsibility patterns are open and therefore 
constantly prone to premature closure. Individual consciences are instantly implicated in 
world events. The media present wars and disasters in far away places with unprecedented 
immediacy. People respond personally to crises like famines or the plight of orphans in other 
countries or other continents by becoming emotionally and often very practically drawn into 
giving direct help and the work of non-governmental organisations in international aid 
contrasts markedly with the slow and cumbersome organisation of governmentally organised 
humanitarian aid. The spread of ecological awareness illustrates further the connectedness of 
all world systems and the relativity of geographical boundaries as organising principles for 
the ecological husbandry of the earth as such. And yet there are no longer any agreed guiding 
principles with which to limit this infinite burden of responsibility and to legitimate limits of 
responsibility and solidarity, let alone effective systems of governance to deal with global 
issues. The arrival of the new refugees on the Western doorsteps is inescapable evidence of 
the fact that economic and political problems can no longer be externalised, that no society 
can isolate itself from world events or deal with them from a distance. Their arrival is so 
uncomfortable for Western societies because it highlights the sliding loss of control by First 
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World societies over the process of boundary drawing, a form of control which they have 
come to take for granted and through which they had exercised their global power. 
  
The crisis of the geo-political limits of solidarity, precipitated by globalisation and by the 
collapse of the Soviet regime, also represents a crisis of collective and individual identity and 
triggers an ‘identity panic’ (Balibar 1993). This leads directly to a new preoccupation with 
ethnicity in social and political debate (Bastenier 1994). The (re-)ethnification of social 
relations in Europe after 1989 and the dissolution of block-thinking have two fundamental 
aspects. On the one hand this process helped minority groups to articulate their cultural 
identity in a political arena which had become sensitised to cultural differences. This allowed 
them to recognise and utilise the collective assertions of power invested in claims to distinct 
ethnicities, particularly where they were associated with claims to national independence 
(Rex 1996). Alternatively it gave those groups at least the possibility to offer effective 
resistance against the pressure to assimilate through positively revalidating the labels that 
had been used by the majority society to exclude them. On the other hand, using ethnicities 
as markers of the boundaries of community and solidarity re-activates nationalist 
mechanisms which had been so powerful (and disastrous) in the history of European nation 
states. Ethnicity in this sense always implies hierarchical orders of superiority and inferiority 
(Wieviorka 1994).  
 
The re-emergence of nationalism and neo-fascism in popular movements and party politics 
directed in aggressive forms against foreign and minority populations, as happened in almost 
all European countries during the 1990s, has the effect of ethnifying social and political 
conflicts further. Neo-fascist ideologies suggest 'simple solutions' which ultimately amount 
for their victims to the 'choice' between assimilation (on the terms dictated and controlled by 
the dominant group) and ethnic separation, expulsion or the re-drawing of political 
boundaries (Radtke 1994). But ethnicity cannot be treated as a 'natural category' to be 
recovered and retrieved from historical oblivion by means of objective, science-based 
definitions; the conflicts invariably associated with ethnicity show that ethnicity is a means 
of social classification and as such the product of very specific historical conditions and 
political interests. 
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The ambivalence of the ethnic argument exposes the contradictory premises on which 
solidarity as national solidarity is predicated. It suggests nationality as a taken-for-granted 
reference point that distinguishes nationals from foreigners on the grounds of some assumed 
intrinsic qualities. In European history the dominance of a nationalist construction of 
citizenship and national integration has come to imply an ethnified concept of the nation 
(Hobsbawm 1990) and thereby renders the qualities and prerequisites of 'belonging' non-
negotiable and places them beyond the reach of political discourse. At the same time nations 
are classically unable to substantiate the assumed equivalence of ethnic and national 
boundaries (Gellner 1983) as the multiplicity of ethnicities and languages in every European 
nation state demonstrates. There are strong indications that European identity and thereby 
solidarity is being fashioned according to the recipe of the nation state, through closure 
constructed on ethnic lines which confirms a Fortress Europe mentality, and not just in 
relation to asylum seekers (Pieterse 1995). The fundamental changes in the nature of the 
welfare states and the selective manner in which a European social policy agenda is being 
developed point also in that direction. It no longer suffices to be born into the community of 
a nation to be entitled to a minimum of support. This support has to be 'earned', not 
necessarily financially but in terms of loyalty to the nation and conformity with its standards. 
Fortress Europe is being erected not just against foreigners, but also against homeless people, 
single mothers, people who seemingly brought about their own hardship (Humphries 2002). 
For economic reasons the 'contract between the generations' which had ensured the payment 
of old age pensions from contributions paid by those earning a wage is being questioned. 
Solidarity no longer exists automatically between the economically active and those in 
retirement who get constructed instead as a separate cultural group on lines akin to those of 
ethnicity. Both on the inside of nation states and on their external boundaries, fortified by the 
European unification process, boundaries of solidarity are being mapped out anew, but the 
criteria by which these boundaries are being determined have long lost their universal 
validity and legitimacy. Solidarity reveals itself as a whimsical, fashion-driven, media-
dependent, ultimately arbitrary game. The encounter with migrants and refugees is not the 
cause of this fragmentation of social solidarity within European societies, but it activates 
those very uncertainties in localised, everyday, inescapable contexts and interactions. 
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What is more, the ambiguity in the actual meaning and operation of national boundaries is 
indicative of a fundamental re-ordering of the command over time and space in the course of 
globalisation, which in this context signifies the intensification of global interconnectedness 
at every level, economic, cultural, political and technological. In the analysis of Giddens and 
Harvey, accelerating trends in post-modernity or late modernity (as they prefer to call 
contemporary developments) have completed a process of distanciation of time and space, 
which had started with early industrialisation and resulted from the formation of 
international sets of relations by the nation states; the emerging national economies of the 
19th century and the concomitant technological advances further advanced this distanciation 
(Giddens 1984, 1991, 1994; Harvey 1989). Time and space today have not only separated 
from each other and have become independent of a locality, but the technology to 'shrink' 
space and to create virtual simultaneous encounters across the globe is having the effect of a 
dramatically increasing time-space compression. This is not an inevitable linear development 
of history; it is the direct result of the power to command the use of time and space, a power 
that  accumulates in the hands of an elite. In other words, globalisation according to this 
analysis is about the re-distribution of time and space, about their very unequal re-
distribution. The rich and powerful occupy more and more space, which they claim as their 
own (while running out of time in the process which has to be utilised ever more efficiently 
as the global stock market never closes) whereas the dispossessed have 'time to kill' and are 
being squeezed out of economically usable space to become ghettoised in wastelands 
(Bauman 1997). This is the motor for global, end of twentieth century migration patterns 
which drives jobseekers from declining national rural regions into the same contested 
metropolitan arena as migrants and asylum seekers from distant places. Globalisation is 
about a forceful and rapid rupture within the ordering of space and time. Additionally, it 
reduces the migrant population and the 'indigenous' excluded to an over-reliance on time: 
They are being eliminated from the present and relegated to the past, made to carry around 
with them an oversize baggage of history of which they are being constantly reminded. They 
are being identified with traditional forms of behaviour as former peasants, as leftovers of a 
working class culture, as settled nomads who have never left behind their habits and who are 
therefore by definition not capable of arriving in the present. In a similar vein one of the 
 77
mechanisms of excluding women is still their identification with traditional values and roles 
as bearers not only of children but also of historical continuity and a particular type of 
traditional social order. This prevents these groups from ever fully participating in the 
present and laying claim to a piece of contemporary territory. It also sets them in competition 
with each other as different groups of dispossessed populations and reveals another insidious 
aspect of the sporadic popularity of neo-fascist ideas among disaffected youth and insecure 
sections of the working class: By clinging to their ethnic identity they can easily become 
hooked on a selective, tendentious version of history and thereby remove themselves from 
the economic battleground of the present. Consequently, they can only make their presence 
felt in violence and provocative disruptions. 
  
It is therefore not surprising that conflicts over the unequal distribution of resources erupt 
with increasing frequency into open violent conflicts over territories. Seen from this 
perspective, conflicts ranging from inner-city riots to neo-fascist agitation and certain forms 
of violent crime share with the wars in former Yugoslavia, in different parts of the former 
Soviet Union and Northern Ireland the same underlying connection to the re-distribution of 
time and space under globalisation. They are extreme means of settling the boundaries and 
conditions of belonging. Their appearance as ‘untimely relicts from the past’ belies the logic 
of their acute contemporary role as manifestations of globalisation. The distinction between 
political and civil conflicts becomes as tenuous as the distinction between economic and 
political refugees. Populations can become a 'threat' to each other without being physically 
on the move, at least not at the moment of the conflict. Once the right of one part of the 
population to fully 'belong' has become contested, references to past migrations and 
displacements become moral justifications on the dominant side of such conflicts for claims 
of having 'been here first', no matter how arbitrarily such historical data are chosen. These 
conflicts and wars represent a new type of phenomenon which is linked directly to the 
changes in the nature of the nation state and they are marked by new forms of organised 
violence as the inversion of processes of solidarity (Kaldor 2001). ‘The goals of the new 
wars are about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier 
wars’ (Kaldor 2001, p. 6).  These conflicts represent desperate attempts to re-connect time 
and space, territory and culture, with reference to a reified past unity. Ethnic cleansing is 
 78
evidence of a fundamental contemporary conflict over the disappearance and the symbolic 
reconstruction of criteria for social and political solidarity (Brubaker 1996). The message of 
'simple, self-evident' and thereby deeply racist solutions it contains is bound to set the scene 
for endless future conflicts because it localises a problem that is in fact global. The exclusion 
from territory and the denial of contemporary time go hand in hand, and the new forms of 
guerrilla-type wars in turn create a wide-scale displacement of populations. 
  
What is now the significance of this analysis for social work? Quantitatively, direct social 
work with refugees and asylum seekers is of marginal importance to the whole field of the 
social services. Although the work with these minority groups shares many characteristics 
with general social work and consists largely in helping people to come to terms with the 
experience of a crisis, with the trauma of displacement, with the financial insecurities, it has 
become in most countries a highly specialised field and usually not one that is 
‘mainstreamed’ into the domain of general social services or that is exclusively the 
responsibility of the social work profession. Nevertheless, seen against the background of 
this analysis and in the context of a general crisis of social solidarity, social work with 
refugees and migrants assumes a paradigmatic significance. It challenges the profession 
ethically and methodologically to re-consider what constitutes the basis on which assistance 
is being offered to any service user and at the same time to clarify its socio-political 
reference points for intervention generally. The work with migrants, with people whose 
citizenship status is in doubt, tests the relationship of social work with the project of the 
nation state and its possible over-dependence on it (Lorenz 1996). Was it ultimately the 
national agenda that gave social work its mandate to ensure national solidarity, to make its 
contribution towards the creation of a national identity at the breaks and fault-lines of 
modern societies? Has the distinction between the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' cases, 
which was always part of the profession's patriotic, nation-building, nation-purifying legacy, 
really disappeared and given way to a universal, critical, objective, scientifically based 
approach to diagnosis and intervention? Or does social work, having ostensibly adjusted to 
the realities of multi-cultural societies, operate with notions of solidarity which are 
ultimately infused with a categorical concept of diversity and which make it inherently prone 
to misuses for racist purposes? 
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 Social work with refugees and people of uncertain citizenship status is therefore basically 
not at all a specialist area, a field that requires a separate set of methods and principles. 
Instead, it may be more conducive to regard this area of work as sharing the same 
characteristics as 'mainstream social work', notwithstanding the necessity to develop 'special 
techniques' and even the occasional suspension of 'normal practice' in war conditions, as 
described by Hessle and Hessle (1998). Under the impact of globalisation all users of social 
services are in danger of being displaced from the present, of losing a foothold in the 
imaginary territory of solidarity, of being re-invented as 'strangers among us' whose lack of 
self-reliance testifies to their existence beyond the pale. Or seen the other way round, the 
specialised forms of knowledge and skills developed in the area of work with refugees, in 
war zones and with people trying to 'settle' have far-reaching general, critical implications 
for social work in contemporary society which is grappling with fundamental 
transformations in society everywhere.  
  
These critical methods will not emerge as straightforward prescriptions and techniques 
which resolve dilemmas in a one-dimensional way.  The contradictory effects of national 
(and indeed European) social policies in relation to migrant populations are indicative here. 
These policies oscillate broadly between attempts at 'integration through dispersal', through 
the avoidance of ghetto formations and the ensuing stigmatisation and discrimination (e.g. in 
France and to some extent the UK), and strategies directed explicitly at special needs and the 
acknowledgement of separate ethnic, cultural identities (e.g. the Netherlands and Sweden) 
(Castles and Miller 1993, p210). Both strategies are aimed at integration and the avoidance 
of conflict, but the experience has been quite universally one of 'unintended consequences': 
dispersal encounters the resistance by the migrant or ethnic groups concerned against the 
implied disregard for their collective identities (with reciprocal reactions on the part of the 
‘indigenous’ population), while special attention creates grounds for new inequalities in 
comparison with other marginalised groups.  
 
These political dilemmas recur equally at the level of direct interaction. Social work and 
social pedagogy methods that have been developed specifically in relation to ethnic 
minorities, refugees and migrants are subject to the same ambiguities. Approaches that 
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ultimately supported cultural assimilation were often applied by social workers in the belief 
that this was the most effective way of preventing or eliminating discrimination, particularly 
in Germany. ‘The pedagogical discussion in Germany has, without much critical debate, 
settled on a central interpretative formula that suggests that the problems of migration are 
simply or primarily cultural conflicts’ (Hamburger 2001,  97). The instruments of such 
assimilation range from language tuition to group work on coping with tasks of daily living 
in a new environment.  In the process they disregarded the importance of cultural continuity 
for identity formation and reinforced the perception of non-native life-styles as inferior or 
deviant. Similarly, a superficial multi-culturalism that tries to give 'special attention' to 
cultural differences either reduces inequalities to a matter of culture and life-style or it 
'essentialises' socially constructed differences (Aluffi Pentini 1996). It thereby renders inter-
cultural dialogue and critique of values and standards impossible (for instance through 
applying the 'safe' formula of same-race fostering and adoption) and brings with it the danger 
of re-interpreting trauma and vulnerability as inherent weaknesses.  The reproduction of 
discrimination and exclusion as a result of such interventions is not a consequence of the 
methods or strategies as such but of their being 'overtaken' by structural inequalities and the 
prevailing institutional racism in societies, conditions which constitute the problem of split-
off solidarity zones in the first place. 
 
It has now been recognised in most European countries that developing social work methods 
for work with migrant groups and ethnic minorities is therefore not primarily a matter of 
concentrating on migration or cultural differences as the specific causes of the social 
problems to be dealt with, nor can such methods be designed by way of ignoring those 
specific conditions and reverting to a 'treating people as people'. Rather, the tension between 
the specific forms of exclusion encountered by those groups and the general nature of 
exclusion as encountered by all users of social services has to be explored in both directions. 
All forms of social work are liable to either bringing pressures to bear on people to 
assimilate to prevailing norms or of 'othering' clients, of arresting them in their categorical 
otherness and thereby confirming, even legitimating their being excluded.  
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The reflection on the impact of racism on social work practice in several countries helped to 
bring out these connections in the discourse on social work methods. But it does therefore 
not follow that anti-racist methods developed under the specific conditions of a country and 
a particular historical development can simply be exported to other countries. Seeing 
methodological developments as linear would imply a mono-cultural bias, as if for instance 
other European countries would have to wake up, sooner or later, to the necessity of applying 
the anti-racism approaches that have become a feature of some aspects of British social 
work. The engagement with racism and exclusion needs to recognise the multifaceted and 
constantly changing manifestation of contemporary racism and the historical dynamics of 
exclusion. In particular, the discourses over methods that address social identity critically 
need to take account of three reference points in the formulation of these specific responses, 
as becomes evident in the literature review by Hummrich, Sander and Wöbcke (1997): 
 
a) The different academic and disciplinary traditions prevalent in the social professions; for 
instance, social work in the form of community work is not inherently more political than 
that in the form of social pedagogy or counselling, and yet each academic discipline 
makes visible different mechanisms and consequences of exclusion.  
 
b) The differences in political culture that exist in different countries, particularly in relation 
to the degree and kind of mobilisation of civil society; there is no formula as to whether 
state or non-state services and agencies are less discriminatory, but what is important is 
the way the relationship between citizens and the state is mediated by associations and 
self-help movements. This is of special significance for the development of social 
services in former communist countries where notions of civil society-based agencies 
and institutions are often hailed as inherently better than state-based services.  
 
c) The different legal conceptions regulating 'citizenship' as the manifestation of national 
solidarity, for instance the principle of ius sanguinis in Germany as against the ius solis 
and the emphasis on cultural integration as an expression of citizenship in France.  
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The encounter with users of social services whose basis of 'belonging' to a given society and 
nation is in question on psychological, cultural and legal grounds gives occasion to reflect on 
the need for a 'multi-layered' approach to social work methods generally. Responses 
particularly in the area of dealing with ethnic and cultural diversity need to acknowledge 
explicitly the interplay between personal and political factors, but this in turn underscores the 
general approach needed in social work which contains the same necessary tension. 
  
It is through this combination of perspectives and skills at personal and political level 
simultaneously that social work has an important contribution to make to the development of 
a critical social policy perspective in Europe generally. Social policy, particularly at 
European level, is no longer just a matter of top-down developments but contain an 
increasing bottom-up element in the form of new forms of participation and representation 
and this needs to be fully developed in the context of every type of social work intervention. 
At European level the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in comparison to that of 
migrant workers is highly contradictory and indicative of the fact that principles of selective 
exclusion, which had prevailed in the formation of nation states, are being reproduced rather 
uncritically at European level. Social workers know that it will not be possible to simply 
'manage' the tensions arising from this unequal treatment except by force. In any case the 
policy of defining 'Europeanness' by means of exclusion will not produce a sense of 
European social solidarity or European citizenship. European social integration requires a 
broad consensus on the principles by which to construct such solidarity positively and needs 
to move therefore the concerns for a social Europe centre stage. The convergence of 
European immigration policies from the Schengen agreement to the Dublin convention and 
their ratification in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 was intended to strengthen the perimeter 
fence around Europe while allowing greater mobility between EU countries. Measures taken 
concentrated on negative aspects, on keeping out 'undesirables', and it is very significant that 
refugees and immigrants from outside the EU are regarded in line with drug traffickers and 
terrorists for the purposes of controls and surveillance. The intergovernmental committees 
dealing with such questions operate under a cloak of secrecy and are not subject to effective 
democratic controls.  
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This 'fortress Europe' mentality antagonises the attempts of positively defining a European 
sense of belonging and solidarity. The significance of this can be seen by considering that 
simultaneously a defensive, excluding and discriminatory fortress mentality is also becoming 
the hallmark of national social policies in the wake of the advance of the neo-liberal critique 
of the welfare state. The better off in society, the coalition of higher level tax-payers, feel 
under siege from welfare claimants as their property rights appear threatened by high levels 
of taxation and redistributive policies. Policies yielding to this mentality amount to a serious 
erosion of social citizenship in a parallel to the denial of full  political and often civil 
citizenship to migrants. But formal and legal arrangements by which citizenship rights will 
be established or secured are one important dimension of the political process. Equally 
important is the actual practice of citizenship in everyday contexts, particularly between 
citizens and state officials, between clients and professionals, between claimants and service 
providers. In other words, the political dimension of social work does not only come to bear 
in campaigning, in social workers contributing to the debate on social rights and submitting 
evidence to social policy committees, but also in the form of the actual practice of delivering 
a service to users of social services. It is at this level that 'substantial' citizenship in the 
distinction of Bottomore (in Marshall and Bottomore 1992) is either established or denied.  
 
What is suggested here is the equivalence between the political 'framing' of actions around 
consistent sets of anti-racist principles (Dominelli 1998 ) and the extension of those 
principles and their 'substantive' interpretation and application in all direct personal 
interactions. The physical arrival of minority groups among the ranks of social service users 
raises the question of citizenship in a highly acute form. It highlights the deep ambivalence 
contained in European practices around citizenship by triggering well-established 
mechanisms of ethnic closure and thereby exclusion. Of these the most prominent and the 
most insidious is the inversion of cause and effect: the arrival of migrants can be construed 
as 'causing' xenophobia and racism, just as the appearance of homeless people in the streets 
'causes' aggressive reactions from the public, or the establishment of a hostel for people with 
schizophrenia in a respectable neighbourhood 'causes' social tensions. Social workers 
themselves, on account of the attention they direct towards those problem areas and their 
failure to make them invisible, become implicated also in having caused or contributed to 
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them. Underlying this ideology concerning the formation of social problems is always the 
assumption that a community is essentially homogeneous, that standards of normality are 
something akin to a natural state of affairs which society then strives to 'preserve', and that 
homogeneity is a guarantee against the emergence of social problems. Citizenship status is 
then only bestowed on those who already possess the assumed qualities of that community 
(Parekh 1995). This detracts from the realisation that such normality is but a social construct 
and a means of legitimating the boundaries of society, externally as well as internally.  
 
Minorities do not need to migrate at all to become entangled in these mechanisms, they can 
encounter them also by finding themselves on the wrong side of the border (and in most 
parts of Europe there are examples of ethnic conflicts arising not over the moving of people 
but over the moving of national boundaries). As far as social work is concerned the 
underlying pattern is the same: social workers invariably deal with people who find 
themselves on the wrong side of a border or who are being shunted back and forth between 
agencies or departments who contest their claims for support. The difference between 
political and social boundaries becomes further relativised when one recognises that 
boundaries are always social constructs and as such manifestations of power interests; rivers, 
mountains and other markers on the physical landscape like skin colour, appearance, 
language and habit on the social landscape are merely the symbols that serve to legitimate, 
however spuriously, the planting of a border post and the operation of sentinels or of special 
rules. 
 
'The migrant' is therefore a paradigmatic test case for social work. Displaced, dislocated 
people challenge social work to declare whether its values are rooted in (an ideology of) a 
place, in nationalism or even in racist assumptions about the given, innate qualities of those 
who deserve to belong, or whether it succeeds in transcending the securities of territory and 
nation to realise its universal potential. ‘Migrants’, non-citizens, hold up a mirror to our 
societies which have come to expect seeing a picture of themselves as enlightened, rational, 
well ordered modern entities. But seeing themselves reflected in the expectations and claims 
of those ‘others’ the mirror image shatters into the fragments of post-modernity. The 
insecurity, relativity and arbitrariness not just of national boundaries but of the prevailing 
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principles of social order and cohesion emerge with uncomfortable clarity. The problems the 
others ‘cause’ for us by claiming a part of ‘our’ society are evidence that we are not fully in 
control of our circumstances, that fundamental issues of order and cohesion lay unresolved at 
the core of the rationalisation project of western civilisation, that our social and political 
organisations are incapable of facing up to the complexity of situations to which they have 
all contributed. Social work has been an intricate, small but important part of this civilising 
project. It now sees itself questioned in that role and plunged into the uncertainties associated 
with globalisation.  
 
Globalisation brings with it individualisation and fragmentation of social relations, the re-
distribution of time and space referred to above, and social workers have to examine 
critically what functions they are called upon to fulfil in this new scenario. Globalisation 
transforms social problems and issues into risks, into something that has to be and therefore 
will be eliminated with technical means (Beck 1992). The technical management of such 
risks has the function of securing the new distribution of space and time, of protecting 
private spaces which occupy more and more what was formerly public space, from leisure 
amenities which now exist for private profit to hospital beds and places in educational 
institution. The elimination of risk, the exclusion of ambivalence, of free spaces in which the 
unpredictable may happen, very often involves the exclusion of those who are seen as 
causing the risk. This leads to 'attempts to burn out the uncertainty in effigy - to focus the 
abhorrence of indetermination on a selected category of strangers (immigrants, the ethnically 
different, vagrants, travellers or the homeless, devotees of bizarre and thus conspicuous 
subcultures) while hoping against hope that their elimination or confinement would provide 
the sought-after solution to the problem of contingency as such and install the dreamt of 
routine' (Bauman 1995a, p. 128). Indiscriminate deportations of refugees originating in 
countries that have been declared ‘safe’  is an institutional solution parallel to the 
indiscriminate reception into care of more and more ‘at risk’ children.  
 
Paradoxically, globalisation itself teaches that it is impossible to externalise risks, that there 
is a global, systemic nexus between all human activities, most vividly demonstrated in 
ecological matters. But this awareness and the skills required to act accordingly are by no 
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means automatic consequences of the suspension of national boundaries and the arrival of 
satellite media conveying global cultural influences in even the remotest corners of the 
globe. On the contrary, as the treatment of migrants shows, first reactions mobilise defensive 
ideological responses, both at the personal and at the political level. In Beck’s analysis (Beck 
1994) societies find themselves on the threshold of a second phase of modernity which has 
direct and very specific implications for social work. The reflexivity, core characteristic of 
modern societies (Giddens 1991), becomes conscious of its own insecurities, of the 
unreliability of the norms of rationality in which modernity had invested so much. 
Overburdened by this need for constant reflection and unable to come to terms and to get to 
grips with it many sections of modern society retreat into constructions of ‘counter-
modernity’, into ‘fabricated, manipulable self-evidence’ (Beck 1994, p473). Territorial ideas 
of identity abound and with them the fallacy, that identity could be something simple, 
unequivocal, the product of simplified dualisms (in or out, acceptable or unacceptable, them 
or us). The ethnification of social relations therefore has to be regarded as part of this 
counter-modern backlash. The warning examples of the consequences of such 
simplifications under Nazism and its ‘final solution’ are not sufficient to avert the dangers of 
neo-nationalism and neo-fascism in Europe. The conflicts and complexities arising have to 
be re-worked in the present circumstances, albeit with historical references. The 
'ethnification of social work methods' would be equally inappropriate as it reduces all 
differences, all problems encountered to fixed, undifferentiated categories when social work 
is really about the constitution of complex, multi-level identities in situations where identity 
has become threatened.  
 
What is required instead practically, and this becomes clear in practically all social work 
situations, is a dual strategy around which social work methods capable of engaging with 
‘Europeanisation’ and globalisation can be constructed. This applies not just to the work 
with migrants and refugees but must become a feature of all social work in multi-cultural, 
diverse societies. One requirement of such a strategy is that it fosters psychological security 
through competence in reflexivity, allowing individuals to fully accept their multi-layered 
identities in the context of 'fluid' communities. The other is that these re-negotiated identities 
and the conflicting demands on others that arise from them are worked out jointly with the 
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people concerned and with the representatives of institutions which define their life chances 
structurally with regard to civil and political rights (Lister 1998). Differentiated social groups 
and communities require rules, but not as externally imposed rules, but as frameworks of 
rights and obligations, which those affected by them can shape collectively. This means for 
instance that in the work with offenders or perpetrators of violence their human rights 
become tangible reference points for all interactions and interventions, that the ties of mutual 
obligations with various sectors of the population get re-established, that institutional 
segregation, where it becomes necessary, does not mean the end of regarding inmates as 
members of society and of distinct communities of interest. The uncertainties and anxieties 
not just on the part of the excluded but also on the part of those benefiting from globalisation 
and the expansion of their space can only be met effectively by the development of new, 
effective and immediate social and political structures. Globalisation challenges social work 
to contribute imaginatively to this re-construction of ‘the social’ which neo-liberalism had 
declared all but obsolete. 
 
This re-construction is above all a moral question, 'since it is only the full relationship, a 
relationship between spatially and temporarily whole selves, that may be "moral", that is 
embrace the issue of responsibility for the other' (Bauman 1995a, p 134). But as a moral 
question it becomes an immensely practical question, a matter of action and not just one of 
attitude. The re-construction of what constitutes a social self begins with daring to show 
social responsibility in non-routine ways, in ways that build trust, mutual obligations, sets of 
agreed rules, negotiated structures and hence communities, in ways that allow criticism of 
other life-styles and cultural traditions and make reference to universal principles. The 
approach does not start with searching for communities as given entities with fixed rules and 
linear continuities. Continuity is desperately important, particularly for those who 
experienced forceful disruptions and dislocations, for children caught in the cross-currents of 
incompatible demands and for societies in transition. Language can be a crucial factor in 
ensuring such continuity, and social work has to pay very special attention to the use of 
languages in the constitution of multi-dimensional identities. But this continuity cannot come 
from references to ontological qualities like race and culture, nation or blood or soil which 
are a means of deception and will always render those putting their faith in them powerless 
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and disoriented once they experienced their unreliability. Continuity can only be secured in 
the interplay between personal freedom and social responsibilities, a process, which has 
found its diverse manifestations in modern notions of citizenship. Taking citizenship as a 
lived experience (Lister 1998), as moral practice among people who recognise each other's 
multi-layered, dynamic identities, could provide a reference point for social work practice 
not just with migrant groups, but for social work in the age of globalisation per se. 
 
Within the prevailing politics of recognition where ethnic identities and other 'expressions of 
self-interest' have currency, where political correctness conjures up notions of moral 
righteousness, social workers are ill advised to choose the road of 'ethnified approaches' as a 
means of refuting the suspicion of racism and other inherent biases raised against them. Such 
'partiality' alters nothing about the nature of discrimination in society and ultimately plays 
into the hands of power interests that utilise ethnic boundaries as markers for discrimination 
and exclusion. Furthermore, from an ethical point of view it locks social work into a 
fundamentalist framework which Giddens warns against: 'A Nietzschean view is sometimes 
lauded these days as allowing for that recognition of the “other” - that necessary 
cosmopolitanism - which makes possible a multi-national world. It does nothing of the sort. 
What it leads to, in fact, is precisely a world of multiple fundamentalisms; and this is a world 
in danger of disintegration through the clash of rival world-views' (Giddens 1994, p 252). 
His proposals of a 'generative equality', negotiated through 'generative politics', are very 
much the domain of social work because such equality needs to be worked out primarily 'at 
the basis', at community level, as the condition of tangible, substantive, experienced, lived 
citizenship which matters to transient and stable populations alike. 
  
These observations call for a more detailed examination of the relationship between the 
professional and the political agendas around issues of identity, which will be the subject of the 
next chapter.  
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5. The significance of culture and identity for general social work practice 
 
 
 
The question of identity and of the role of social work in the constitution of people’s identity 
has become inescapable. The historical considerations in previous chapters gave a first 
indication of the reasons why social work at various stages of its development distanced 
itself so vigorously from operating explicitly with cultural norms and hence with the notion 
of identity as a valid reference point for intervention. In the contemporary context which 
presages a confluence of politics and of cultural movements, the various ‘solutions’ of the 
past need to be examined afresh. The analysis of the significance of issues of ‘identity’ for 
the general practice of social work, and not just for social work with migrant and minority 
population groups, shows the importance of considering the intersection between civil 
society developments and academic-professional discourses in social work.  
 
There can be no doubt that social work interventions directly or indirectly impinge on 
people’s identity once identities have been recognised not as essentialist qualities but as sets 
of social relations, but it has been only from the more recent post-structural perspective that 
various academic analyses began to focus on how social work exactly defines and constructs 
the identities of its clients (e.g. Rojek et al. 1988). This explicit attention given to identities is 
by no means unproblematic as it contains the danger which the profession has always been 
anxious to avert, that through its interventions people might become labelled, confirmed in 
their negative identity categories as deficient, excluded from the ‘normal’ part of society. 
Social work’s declared project was instead to make a contribution to the integration of 
society by means of establishing equality by giving dignity to individuals. What is new since 
the last decades of the 20th century, however, is that ‘differences’ are being affirmed by 
minority groups in society ever more confidently and vociferously, labels become tools for 
emancipation, separate identities are being re-claimed as a defence against levelling, stifling 
homogeneity.  
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‘In the very moment when modern liberal states fully realize their secularism 
(as Marx put it in “The Jewish Question”), just as the mantle of abstract 
personhood is formally tendered to a whole panoply of those historically 
excluded from it by humanism’s privileging of a single race, gender and 
organization of sexuality, the marginalized reject the rubric of humanist 
inclusion and turn, at least in part, against its very premises. Refusing to be 
neutralized, to render the differences inconsequential, to be depoliticized as 
“life-styles”, “diversity” or “persons like any other”, we have lately 
reformulated our historical exclusion as a matter of historically produced and 
politically rich alterity’ (Brown 1995, p 200).  
 
Identity, and with it cultural identity as the key to diversity, matters inside and not just 
between societies. At the same time, such cultural differences serve again as justifications for 
inequality, as arguments against the socialist aspiration of equality, as a means of unhinging 
the finely balanced sets of rights and obligations which had undergirded the nation state.  
 
To raise the question of culture and social work means therefore dealing with a paradox and 
calls for an investigation of the history of that paradox. The paradox lies in the observation 
that for most of its history, social work strove to rise above the level of the culturally 
particular and reach a level of universalism as the hallmark of its professional autonomy, 
while it was precisely that universalism that played into the hands of particularism, in the 
form of nationalism (and indeed, at times, of fascism and racism) and in the form of 
‘unintended’ mechanisms of exclusion (cf. Müller et al. 1995). Investigating the history of 
that paradox might indicate ways of avoiding new unintended outcomes of today’s greater 
attention to cultural differences, namely that they would serve to justify and solidify 
exclusion and inequality. Culture and difference cannot be dealt with responsibly by either 
embracing the concepts uncritically or by excluding them categorically from practice 
discourses.   
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The renewed focus on culture and difference occurs at a time of economic globalisation. A 
central aspect of globalisation, as outlined in the previous chapter, amounts to a fundamental 
re-structuring of time and space in as much as the mobility which allows for the exploitation 
of market opportunities has become the prerogative of a dominant elite who can conduct 
their business in electronically aided virtual ubiquity and which can claim this global space 
and the resources it provides through their ever accumulating wealth (Bauman 1998a). At the 
same time, this very mobility is being denied to those whose livelihood derives from labour 
rather than capital. They are being held to ransom by a combination of material factors, such 
as their poverty, their family obligations, their rootedness in particular geographic areas, 
restrictions on immigration and, not least, their identification with distinct cultural 
boundaries (Castles and Miller 1993).  
 
Globalisation threatens the broad welfare consensus that had developed in Western European 
nation states in the era immediately after WWII. The various welfare state models, as 
discussed above, had ensured the constant ‘recommodification of labour’ (Bauman 1998b, p. 
52), the capacity of labour to make itself available to the labour market,  but at the same time 
the support of organised labour for the task of economic re-construction and expansion for 
those nations. ‘By providing good quality education, an adequate health service, decent 
housing and healthy nourishment for the children of poor families, it (i.e. the welfare state) 
assured a steady supply of the capitalist industry with employable labour - an effect no 
individual company or group of companies would be able to secure on their own’ (Bauman 
1998b, ibid.). 
 
‘The welfare state may be seen as a “completion” of the nation state, to the extent that 
individual social rights become an essential element of citizenship as the main basis of 
political legitimacy’ (Flora 1986 p. XV). It substantiated the idea that belonging to a nation 
could become a lived experience and not just an abstract idea made concrete only in war by 
giving individuals a material stake in their state. The current crisis of the welfare state 
therefore spells also the crisis of the nation state and vice versa. While the welfare state 
secured a high degree of integration (at the price of conformity and uniformity with assumed 
national standards, which will be discussed below) internally, it depended on a high degree 
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of differentiation of nation states externally, on their political sovereignty and autonomy in 
terms of policy making, particularly in the area of social policy. With the erosion of this 
sovereignty the seat of governance is moving away from the nation state, making room for 
collective identities and identity coalitions to form without reference to the nation, but also 
for new centres of power outside the national systems of democratic control. In a weakened 
nation state ‘modern’ forms of social integration as enshrined in the ideal of equality may 
become less effective and legitimacy of the political system may become based more on 
differentiation and ‘the politics of recognition’ (Taylor 1992).  
 
Social work is deeply bound up in these processes and only a critical examination of its 
relationship with the nation state project can clear the way towards a critical ‘opening’ 
towards issues of culture. This chapter seeks to illustrate this by focusing on the example of 
the development of social pedagogy as the decisive paradigm in the German context and 
contrasting its origins with the social science paradigm prevalent in Britain. The purpose of 
this comparison is to show that both paradigms were de facto ways of responding to 
questions of culture and identity and that they were and still are both responding in their own 
ways to a double mandate built into the social and political role of social work. 
 
Early forms of social work in the 19th century were characterised by a fundamental 
ambivalence in relation to political issues and also to the treatment of culture and cultural 
identity. Charity workers in Britain, both as representatives of the middle classes and as 
women, regarded their work as being above state politics in their commitment to Christian or 
humanist values which they considered to be also above class politics. As representatives of 
organisations of civil society and demonstrating a distinctive element of British political 
culture they, on the whole, did not want the state to play a dominant role in relation to the 
values that quite obviously guided and differentiated these charitable organisations. But this 
attitude committed them implicitly, in the absence of a reference point in the universalism of 
science (which notably medicine could claim), to the state as the guarantor of this freedom of 
choice exercised by members of civil society, a freedom of whose boundaries they were well 
aware and which they paid respect to in terms of their patriotic loyalty to the state. The 
nation state project, the unification of a diversity of political entities and the legitimation of 
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political power through democratic principles, had set itself the task of creating a coherent 
and unifying national culture, in Britain as much as in ‘late’ continental European nations, 
which it did with reference to pre-modern cultural reminiscences and the reconstruction of 
national symbols. As Rattansi comments with reference to Bhabha’s analysis of national 
narratives: ‘The “people” thus must be thought of as existing in “double time”, for the 
project of producing the nation as a community involves a tension between a “pedagogic” 
authority of continuity and a “performative” strategy in which the ragged, potentially 
transgressive cultures of everyday life are constantly brought under the sway of a narrative 
of what one might call a national “community”’ (Rattansi 1994, pp40-41, his emphasis).  
 
As far as most continental European countries are concerned whose boundaries were re-
drawn in the wake of the Napoleonic wars and which formed themselves in the course of the 
19th century this constitutes the paradox of the modern state as a nation state: it had to 
reinterpret the romantic dream of liberation and self-determination with the imagery of a 
community, in analogy to the family. These nations organised their cohesion increasingly  by 
pre-existing common bonds, instead of the mere social contract between free and therefore 
‘fundamentally different’ individuals, which the push for democratic rights and civil liberties 
in the republican tradition had demanded (Lorenz 1996). But the nation state could only 
establish its legitimacy and its unifying power by attending to social issues, by concerning 
itself with the affairs of people as private individuals and families, by transforming the 
prevailing vertical cleavages into a horizontal community of equals and distinguishing itself 
from ‘outsiders’ (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991). This task required its own missionaries, 
foremost provided by the teaching profession, but social work came to fit equally into this 
project. It was largely an education project, carried initially by the ‘lower and middle 
professional, administrative and intellectual strata, in other words the educated classes’ 
(Hobsbawm 1977, p 167). It was a project that operated as the patchy, anticipatory 
construction of social citizenship in Marshall’s sense grafted on top of the emerging political 
citizenship grounded in the principle of democracy. 
 
While the task was the same in all new nation states, different political and historical 
contexts affected the meaning and role given to the concept of culture. In relation to social 
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work the contrast between Britain and Germany is particularly significant. In the British 
tradition of liberalism in which the state was initially very reluctant to go beyond the 
introduction of compulsory schooling and some public health measures as positive means of 
integration, the emphasis was on leaving the initiative to private organisations which would 
regulate the cultural blend of homogeneity within a version of national identity that was 
ultimately confident of its meaning and its boundaries in the wake of the political and 
economic successes of the empire. Culture in Britain, like in France (where this confidence 
was however a legacy of the revolution and the equalising effects of a national culture) was 
closely associated with the notion of civilisation. ‘Both [terms] were used increasingly to 
describe a general process of human development, of becoming “cultivated” or “civilized”’ 
(Thompson 1990, p 124). The role of the charity workers, in contrast to the staff of the 
expressly punitive and exclusionary state institutions like prisons and work houses, was to 
patrol the margins of the nation, to see to it that ‘right kind of people’ were included, that the 
harsher social control measures of the state only affected those who were not ‘deserving’ of 
the membership of the body of the national people. What was more important in their work 
than the particular culture and ideological ‘message’ of their charitable association, which in 
pre-modern times had meant that charity was an end in itself, was the instrumental use of 
‘universal’ cultural reference points such as sobriety, industry and thrift which became 
identified with the ‘rational’ ideals of patriotism: ‘Patriotismus lässt sich so durchaus als 
Voraussetzung eines höheren Allgemeinsinns begreifen, der die nationale Eigenheit 
übersteigt und als Vorstufe des Kosmopolitismus gelten konnte Der Patriot opponierte gegen 
Verfall, Künstelei und Korruption, und plädierte für den väterlichen Patriarchen…’ 
(Patriotism can be understood as the pre-condition of a higher sense of community which 
transcends national particularity and could be regarded as a preparatory stage for 
cosmopolitism. The patriot is opposed to decay, artifice and corruption and calls for a 
fatherly patriarch) (Giese and Junge 1991 p. 273). The actual educational task in this context 
was marginal and ultimately quite ineffective. ‘Any such classification by merit was found to 
have no relation to the necessary classification according to needs… Eventually the Charity 
Organisation Society was driven to drop the criterion of desert; “the test is not whether the 
applicant be deserving but whether he is helpable”, we were told’ (Beatrice Webb 1926, p 
174). However, the ‘education’ was effectively but indirectly carried out by the institutions 
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of the Poor Law which represented the boundary of exclusion visibly, and in relation to that 
the work of charity workers had enormous symbolic significance. The normality of the 
national standards of behaviour was defined from the margins, through the boundary 
between what is acceptable and what is unacceptable behaviour. It is on this standard that the 
variety of ‘culture-based’ organisations and activities of British civil society had already 
begun to converge. In England between 1780 and 1830 ‘the “average” English working man 
became more disciplined, more subject to the productive tempo of “the clock”, more 
reserved and methodical, less violent and less spontaneous’ (Thompson 1968, p 451), and 
this largely thanks to the Sunday school system and the effects of Methodism and other 
‘evangelical’ movements which ultimately all enforced the same message. The service to the 
one nation later found its secular expression for instance in the Settlement Movement which 
sought to express the need for both classes to meet and mould a new sense of belonging 
through ‘colonies’ in the inner cities. 
 
The border patrol, the rescue of the deserving from exclusion, and the personal attention to 
the poor and destitute was in particular the patriotic duty of women (and not just in their 
capacity as charity workers, but also in their educational role as mothers) in the same way as 
serving the country in war, in the defence of its external borders, or as administrators of the 
colonies was the patriotic duty of men. Women in the ambit of middle class charity work in 
Britain see themselves as ‘natural’ carriers of the idea of the nation without having to 
represent it ‘officially’. Octavia Hill, in commenting in the preface to her book of 1875 on 
the Artisans’ Dwellings Bill going through the British parliament at that time, strongly 
supports the intended provision of affordable housing for the poor but adds: ‘There needs, 
and will need for some time, a reformatory work which will demand that loving zeal of 
individuals which cannot be had for money, and cannot be legislated for by Parliament. The 
heart of the English nation will supply it - individual, reverent, firm, and wise. It may and 
should be organised, but cannot be created’ (Hill 1983, p10).  
 
The pronounced individualism of British charitable activities expressed in these sentiments 
endorsed the basic tenets of the liberal state. By ‘privatising’ the concern for cultural 
contents while invoking the notion of the nation as an organic community it also curtailed 
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the political impact of an independent working class culture (Jones 1983). Working class 
consciousness and identity, mirroring the rationality of capital but being denied a 
symmetrical role in politics, typically extended across country borders and the labour 
movement was constantly accused of its unpatriotic internationalism through which it, for 
some time at least until the surrender to the nationalist fervour which fuelled the First World 
War, refused to be incorporated into the nation state project. Philanthropy and the state’s 
concessions in terms of early social policy measures served to de-politicise this 
consciousness and to establish a regime of power into which the working class movement 
could be incorporated (Donzelot 1979). If the nation state were to succeed in reinterpreting 
the political conflicts, created by glaring material and political inequalities, as issues of 
insignificant remnants of cultural difference within a much more important shared national 
culture, to which both the poor and the well-to-do could be committed, then the political 
relevance of the class argument could be refuted. Within this shared commitment remaining 
differences became re-defined as individual differences of cultural and life-style choices. 
Cultural arguments then, especially in the form of the ideology of nationalism, had the 
function of legitimating the hegemonic role of the state as promoter of a shared sense of 
belonging which broke the disruptive power of persistent inequality, whereas today the 
argument of cultural difference has the function of legitimating the minimalist role of the 
state and its indifference towards the worsening of inequality.  
 
At the academic level, in the British political tradition the search for universal reference 
points found its equivalence in social science paradigms, and this despite the individualistic 
orientation of practice. Characteristically, in the British context these focused on the 
diagnosis of social deficits which prevented an adequate social functioning of individuals 
within the wider society. The pioneers of social work training in Britain were ultimately 
engaged in the creation of ‘subjects’ for their emerging discipline as much as for the new 
organisation of the modern state (Philp 1979). From this perspective cultural norms were not 
evoked explicitly but were instead brought in line with the principles of civilisation and its 
much more universal appeal, for which in turn the state was the ultimate custodian.  
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For the German nation, created from an array of independent kingdoms by the uniting force 
of war against France in 1871, culture had a much stronger and more direct collective 
function. Here the programme of national unification could not be grounded in a unified 
religion or in justifiable claims of ethnic unity, nor indeed did geography provide clear 
assistance in the drawing of national boundaries as did the coastline in the case of Britain 
(leaving aside the vexed problem of Ireland). Instead, the dominant political elite in 
Germany utilised selectively the cultural arguments developed by artists and intellectuals of 
the romantic period. Their celebration of the uniting force of the German language already 
spoken in dispersed countries and their idealised notions of a nation based on cultural ideals 
provided a rich soil of symbols while at the same time their calls for freedom and democratic 
national unity in the revolutions of 1848 were material carefully sidelined by the political 
restoration. This meant that the new, ‘belated’ nation state of the second German empire had 
to tread a careful balance between concessions to the ‘progressive’ national forces which had 
regarded national aspirations as the vehicle for democracy and freedom and the conservative 
definitions of a shared national culture. This emphasis on a shared cultural heritage 
symbolised by language placed the German nation in a sharp contrast to the ‘mere’, 
superficial ‘civilisations’ of neighbouring countries (Zimmer 1996). On both political sides 
however, the concern for a cultural renewal and consolidation as the basis for a national 
identity was associated with the concern for ‘the social question’, for social solidarity 
expressed in social policies (a term which was already a central reference point in the 
decades before unification, Wendt 1985). This gave the state a very different role from that 
of liberalism in Britain: the state had to become the embodiment of an idea, it had to create 
its own heritage and ancestry and it had to carefully and watchfully see to it that the 
organisations of civil society and the potentially explosive diversity of their highly diverse 
cultural positions fitted into this superstructure and support it. The strategies of corporatism 
and subsidiarity provided the solution and allowed Bismarck as the architect of the German 
Reich to launch almost immediately into decisive social policy provisions as the second 
corner stone of national unity. His social policies were designed to give the state a guiding, 
patriarchal role while at the same time enlisting the ‘voluntary sector’ into the delivery of 
those services, under the close and constant inspection of the state. With the simultaneous 
outlawing of the social-democratic party he also eliminated what he considered to be this 
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unpatriotic source of instability and yet he implemented de facto many of their demands for 
the social protection of workers (Briggs 1961).  
 
The pioneers of social work and the intellectuals responsible for the development of a 
distinct German discourse around the emerging field tuned into this political context in a 
unique way. They found in the concept of ‘pedagogy’ the means of articulating the cultural 
agenda as a social agenda and thereby as a political agenda while retaining, on the whole, a 
critical distance to the mere implementation of particular governmental programmes. In this 
tradition, going back to Rousseau and Pestalozzi, culture and civilisation were not 
exchangeable concepts but contrasts. Where civilisation for them symbolised the superficial 
appearance, the polite manners, the outward conformity, culture was an inherent value of 
people and artistic products can only be measured against the authenticity with which those 
inherent values are expressed. But this realisation of the innermost core of humanity is 
precisely not an individual act, but takes place in the context of a human community since 
human beings are social beings. This, rather than the need by a state system to create a 
uniform culture, constitutes the pedagogical mandate for social policies ‘from the bottom 
up’, although as a social programme it cannot be fulfilled without the participation of the 
state to ensure its equal reach to the totality of society (Hamburger 2003).   
 
Social pedagogy as the constitutive paradigm of German social work is, in this fundamental 
sense, a cultural project and one that extends far beyond school pedagogy and hence the 
notion of ‘education’ in the English language. The term is normally attributed to a 1844 
pamphlet by Karl Mager for whom ‘Pedagogy [was] the theory of the acquisition of culture’ 
(quoted in Kronen 1978, p223) and therefore not directed primarily at individuals but at 
society as a whole. The concept received its first full academic exposition in the work of 
Paul Natorp who used the term in 1894 in the subtitle to a book entitled ‘Religion within the 
boundaries of humanity’. Natorp’s intention was to develop an alternative to both the 
individualised charitable projects which aimed at the rescue of individual ‘cases’ and the 
emerging procedural formality of the ‘social state’ in which he recognised the assimilatory 
pragmatism of ‘civilisation’ (Niemeyer 1998). Ultimately his concept requires for its 
realisation the transformation of society (Gesellschaft) into community (Gemeinschaft, with 
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explicit reference to Tönnies), a community which determines its own cultural and thereby 
social parameters. The formation of culture can only occur ‘in a community, through 
community and as community’ (Natorp 1894, p 85).  
 
This approach received its most vivid and spontaneous realisation in the movement which 
influenced German pedagogy lastingly, the youth movement of the turn of the century. This 
started typically as a bourgeois movement channelling all the disaffection which this class 
felt with the industrial landscape of growing urban prosperity (Hamburger 2003). The 
movement of the Wandervogel set its sights on a cultural renewal through the suspension of 
the effects of civilisation: hiking through the countryside, living communally in tents, 
connecting with the music and poetry of folk traditions became some of the signals which 
heralded a new sense of community and a cultural renewal in which young people defined 
their own parameters. Youth work organised by every sector of civil society, church, 
humanist and political, sprang up in the wake of this spontaneous movement in an attempt to 
capture the spirit it had set free.  
 
This ‘social experiment’, which came to be of lasting importance in German social history, 
illustrates however the central dilemma of the social pedagogy approach: Can social 
pedagogy, by placing culture in such a central social position, make a contribution to ‘the 
social question’, i.e. to resolving the social divisions on account of poverty and inequality, 
and above all a contribution that is different from both the charitable attention to individuals 
and the social engineering and social control programme of the state with its ‘civilising’ 
educational and social policies. Or, to ask it the other way round, what are the guarantees 
that the process of emancipation, the authentic articulation of needs, interests and desires 
which the pedagogical process wants to foster in this ‘bottom up’ approach, will actually 
lead to a viable society that is not rent apart by sectional (cultural and class) agendas and by 
the weight of its own diversity. For academic German social pedagogy in the 1920s this 
dilemma became all the more a challenge as the Weimar Republic took decisive measures to 
develop a coherent social policy and to ground its legitimacy as a democratic state in a 
comprehensive programme of social reforms. The cornerstone of that reform is the 
Reichsjugendwohlfahrtsgesetz (Child and Youth Care Act) of 1922/24. Its opening article 
 101
states ‘the right of every child to education (Erziehung)’ which is not an affirmation of 
compulsory schooling but gives expression to the institutional application of the principles of 
social pedagogy: all children have the right to the pedagogical attention which enable them 
to become full and competent members of a society. This is very much a cultural programme 
to which academic social pedagogy had to provide the appropriate concepts and tools. Its 
cultural mission, which amounted indirectly to a political programme, was the identification 
and formulation of culture as the basis of community, an all embracing community, which 
would supersede and obviate actual cultural differences and their divisive power within the 
nation state. It meant to formulate a compromise between the demands of the youth 
movement (and numerous other movements and organisations with similar aims and 
objectives) which insisted on giving their programmes their own distinctive cultural flavour 
(‘youth can only be educated by youth’ was one of the slogans of the youth movement) on 
the one hand and the institutional interests for integration enshrined in the state on the other, 
interests which could not allow for these differences to ‘matter’ too much. Above all, it 
offered the opportunity for social workers and pedagogues to secure a professional (and 
existential) foothold in the nascent welfare state institutions with a methodology which 
would not alienate the spontaneous initiatives led by non-professionals (Niemeyer 1998).  
 
Conceptualising culture as a universal entity while holding on to the notion of an educational 
process towards ‘higher’ forms of culture meant grounding it in universal principles. In the 
intellectual climate of German academia of the 1920s two options were available which lined 
up to oppose each other vigorously. The positivist camp of the human sciences ventured to 
emulate the objectivity of the natural sciences to arrive at ‘hard data’ as the basis for their 
concepts of human behaviour and society. A key representative of this approach in the 
history of German (and indeed international) social work is Alice Salomon who pioneered 
professional training for women in the 1920s. Taking up the title of Mary Richmond’s 
textbook of 1917, ‘Social Diagnosis’, she seeks to combine in her own version the social 
science based positivism, consisting in the accumulation of a comprehensive ‘factual’ picture 
of people facing social problems, with a pedagogical concept for learning how to overcome 
these problems. Diagnosis, like in the natural sciences or in medicine, ‘means a short, precise 
and absolutely fitting explanation’ (Salomon 1926, p7). But diagnosis is not an end in itself, 
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it enables a process of using the material jointly with clients to work towards solutions. 
Anticipating the principle of ‘client self-determination’ she cautions that this learning must 
be a shared process between worker and client. This amounts for Salomon to nothing less 
than ‘the art of living’, and since insight and resources are always limited, this means 
‘coming to terms with one’s circumstances’ (Salomon 1926, p 52). This comprehensive 
design of the helping process is for her grounded in the specific ‘nature’ of women outlined 
in an earlier key text of hers: 
(As women) ‘we want to express our nature. We must help to create 
something new for which men do not have the necessary experience and for  
which aim they also have to search for new energies and ideas. Women 
especially are equipped for this new task with one quality. It is the sense of the 
totality of the people as an organism (“Volksorganismus”), the social idea, 
which grows out of the destiny of woman to be a mother and which gives her 
the special ability to go beyond her own interests and those of her immediate 
vicinity in her feelings and actions. It is this thought which has to become the 
foundation of the people’s state (“Volksstaat”)… There is no true democracy 
as long as the life of a people is split by class interests and troubled and torn 
apart by class movements and class war. The people’s state requires citizens 
who place the interests of the totality above their own interests. In its true 
manifestation, in its ideal form it would not contain parties any longer, only 
vocational groups and guilds (“Stände”) (Salomon 1919, p 10). 
 
Salomon struggles with the dilemma of unity and division at all levels. These for 
contemporary ears uncomfortable sentiments have to be taken as an attempt at formulating a 
programme that could be described as ‘universalist identity politics of social work’. They 
take their departure from an essentialist view of women and particularly of motherhood 
which they then elevate to the status of a universal criterion of welfare and national politics. 
Different starting points with varying life experiences and versions of the role of women in 
society and in the family no longer matter, just as party-political differences ultimately do 
not matter, once they all become subsumed under a joint objective.  
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The alternative model was provided in the explicit anti-positivist tradition (to be explored 
more explicitly in chapter 7), represented most comprehensively by Herman Nohl, the figure 
that was to shape the German social pedagogy discourse lastingly. For him, life as a spiritual 
process cannot be captured by objectifying psychological methods but only through the 
hermeneutics of understanding (in the sense of Dilthey). It is this life and its ultimately 
unifying force which Nohl identifies at the heart of the various social movements, labour, 
women, youth, as the autonomous pedagogical energy which social policy and pedagogical 
methods have to harness. The great movements of the nineteenth century have a converging 
meaning: ‘an awareness of the crisis of our culture which lacks an inner bond with an ideal, 
and the will to resolve this crisis from within a new form of being human, of which the most 
central characteristic is a new sense of community’ (Nohl reproduced in Thole et al. 1998, p 
126). Social policy and particularly the new youth legislation of the Weimar Republic 
incorporate all these movements and aspirations, not without tensions, but united ultimately 
in the concern for bringing about ‘the humanity in human beings’ as the basis for solidarity, 
grounded in ‘knowing oneself contained within a unity of meaning which goes beyond all 
understanding and embraces all communities’ (op.cit. 128).  
 
Cultural differences are recognised as important in both approaches to social pedagogy. But 
each methodological line aims at transforming the inherent divisiveness of culture into an 
integrated whole. For this project the state suggests itself then as the embodiment of an 
idealised, purified form of culture that corresponds to the ‘highest’ qualities of human nature. 
It had been the dilemma of pedagogy all along, how to reconcile the individualised or at least 
particularised concerns which inevitably manifest themselves when ‘freedom from imposed 
norms’ is promised, with the necessity to represent those particular aspirations in an 
organisational form which corresponds to all of them collectively and legitimately. If this 
‘coming together’ of diversity into a whole is not to be brought about by force, it requires the 
ultimately Hegelian dialectical construct, that the historical unfolding of culture at the level 
of society, its ‘coming into its own’, corresponds to the innate educational growth, 
differentiation  and social development of individuals over the life time. Only then can it 
make sense to postulate as the essence of modern social pedagogical thinking ‘that all social 
adjustment presupposes the development of special individual capacities, that the true 
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service for the community is only possible when human beings experience in it a certain 
fulfilment of their personal essence’, as a social democratic pedagogue, Mennicke put it 
(Mennicke 1930, quoted in Thole et al. p 184), whose values and beliefs later earned him a 
long spell of incarceration in a concentration camp. 
 
The irony, no the tragedy was that while these pedagogues sought to overcome conceptually 
the antagonism between ‘person-oriented’ and social policy perspectives and programmes, 
between individuals and society, between difference and unity conceptually by consensus, 
the regime that came to power in Germany in 1933 achieved it practically by decree - at a 
terrible cost. In a way the entire Nazi programme was the continuation of an education 
programme, highly selectively applied but nevertheless within a strong line of continuity, 
through a devious combination of scientific and political means (Schnurr 1997). Hitler’s 
government did not on the whole abolish the institutions of civil society, the diversity of 
humanitarian and religious associations (not even the Jewish welfare association), it got them 
instead committed to a common national goal (gleichschalten). Nor did it rescind the 
pedagogical measures, even the ‘progressive’ ones that developed through the Weimar 
period and aimed at reform rather than punishment. But it operated the pedagogical process 
with a racist criterion of ‘difference’ as the crucial, absolute yardstick (with absolute, lethal 
consequences). Racism recasts cultural differences as factual differences on a scale 
stretching from the superiority of the ‘healthy’ to the inferiority of the ‘life-unworthy’ (Bock 
1983). The device of racism, combined with a distinct anti-individual and anti-intellectual 
brand of pedagogy, sought to create unity and uniformity by absolute measures of exclusion 
(Sünker and Otto 1997). If pedagogical institutions, if the whole country could ‘rid itself’ of 
‘ineducable’ cases then the pedagogical project stood a chance of succeeding, then it would 
be possible to keep ‘diversity’ within such bounds that the stability of society was ensured. 
As a report on the improvement of success rates of residential pedagogical reform measures 
states triumphantly in 1937, ‘As pedagogical care measures have changed fundamentally 
since the year 1933, not only by coming in line with the pedagogical principles of the 
National Socialist State, but also through an earlier referral of children and youth to such 
agencies and through being relieved from responsibility for the so-called “ineducables”, we 
can expect that this change will continue to show positive results for the entire field of child 
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care’ (Ohland 1937 p 12). This ‘unsentimental’, ostensibly scientific, re-building of an 
organic people’s community (Volksgemeinschaft) appeared to represent all the ideals of a 
correspondence between pedagogy and social policy and in the process destroyed all the 
principles of both pedagogy and culture to reveal its true barbarity in the systematic killing 
of people that did not belong into the ideological construct of a master culture for a master 
race (Lorenz 1994). Social workers did not necessarily have to apply racist, culture-specific 
and fascist criteria consciously in their work; it was enough that their seemingly value-free, 
scientifically based diagnostic classifications served the state apparatus to perfect its system 
of exclusion and elimination.  
 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, the programme of democratic re-construction devised 
after World War II by the Western allies and the UN through a whole range of training 
programmes, notably also for social personnel, failed to recognise the specific dilemma of 
the social professions under fascism. The measures were based on the assumption that under 
fascism social service personnel had come under the spell of collectivism, had blindly 
followed instructions, had sought to promote authoritarian obedience to a leader figure and 
had compromised their professional and scientific standards with ideological elements which 
actively promoted a master culture. Hence the emphasis of those (re-)training programmes in 
social, group and community work, sponsored by the USA and the UN came to be on value 
neutrality, individualism and client self-determination. The case work model (and the 
equivalent models of group and community work) studied in the USA were regarded as 
exportable to every country in the world because it espoused a liberal notion of formal 
equality and democracy in the public realm which relegated all questions of cultural 
differences to the sphere of the private. Re-education programmes  did not recognise that it 
had been the assumed value neutrality of the universalism, on which the pedagogical 
concepts as much as the social science derivatives of early case work had been based, that 
had constituted the profession’s blindness to the misuse of their idealism under Nazism. 
What gained prominence instead in the immediate post-war period in Germany, as elsewhere 
on the European continent, was the highly individualised notion of self-determination as a 
guarantee of democracy and therefore the disregard for the public importance of any kind of 
collective identity, be that based on national, ethnic, regional, denominational or gender 
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criteria, at least as far as the actual methods of intervention were concerned. Case work and 
group work methods alike, developed under this ‘democratic’ precept for instance at the 
famous training centre ‘Haus Schwalbach’, aimed at bringing about freely chosen identities 
irrespective of any ‘given’ identity elements (Müller 1988). The model represented a pure 
form of ‘the liberal conception of the public sphere’ in Fraser’s terms (Fraser 1995). ‘This 
conception assumes that a public sphere is or can be a space of zero degree culture, so utterly 
bereft of any specific ethos as to accommodate with perfect neutrality and equal ease 
interventions expressive of any and every cultural ethos’ (op.cit. p 290). Even the churches 
and the big secular welfare organisations which retained their crucial role in the delivery of 
welfare services in Germany after World War II did not articulate their differences in the 
form of distinct methods. On the contrary they were keen to ‘treat people as people’ and 
leave their clients to seek out cultural reference points in the nature of the service as their 
private preferences but not as a condition for receiving a service. In fact the social 
professions generally were only able to re-establish themselves slowly in Germany against 
the widespread suspicion that the ‘social’ in their title was associated with ‘socialism’, either 
of the Nazi or, which in the Cold War climate was even more threatening, of the Communist 
type (Müller 1988). It took quite some time in post-war Germany for the re-establishment of 
the socio-pedagogical tradition and it was only possible under the protection of a ‘universal’ 
social work paradigm - even where this, as in the case of Gisela Konopka, Hertha Kraus and 
other consultants of German origin operating from their enforced US exile, this had many 
roots in social pedagogy (Lorenz 1994).  
 
In an effort to avoid all references to the divisive power of cultural differences social work 
practice and training in Germany (as in most other western countries) became committed to a 
scientific programme of individual definition and fulfilment of  need, which, in fact, 
amounted to a programme of assimilation to a prevailing cultural and political orthodoxy. 
The underlying assumption was that processes and forms of communal life at individual and 
small group level corresponded to those at the societal level, that micro- and macrocosms of 
social life were coherently structured. There was indeed an intriguing correspondence at the 
macro-political level where the bloc-mentality of the Cold War era relativised cultural 
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differences between nations and gave rise to a widely shared but rather superficial 
enthusiasm for internationalism as a means of overcoming old fashioned nationalisms.  
 
This ideological construct and the considerable integrative force it generated, not least in 
Germany with the relatively successful integration of millions of refugees from beyond the 
Iron Curtain (being a victim of communism meant being ‘one of us’), wavered in the wake 
of new social movements in the late 60s and 70s and came crushing down with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the revolutions in former socialist regimes. The cracks in the bloc systems 
had already gradually given way to discourses of identity in the late 60s and 70s. Inequality 
had not been eliminated but had been bracketed out and the neutral public sphere was 
exposed as a gendered, class biased arena. Social and protest movements, though slow in 
affecting the social professions, eventually also exposed the vacuousness of the case work 
approach and its democratic promise. In Germany, this concern with the nature of social 
conflict and inequality in turn gave rise to a re-examination of the conceptual and 
methodological advantages of the social pedagogy paradigm in engaging directly and 
critically with the political level over against that of social work with its orientation towards 
adjustment within given political parameters. 
 
At the level of academic discourse, pedagogy made itself at least receptive to questions of 
identity and culture by  shifting its field of practice decisively from the ‘system’ (of welfare 
organisations, laws and structures) to the ‘lifeworld’, in Habermas’ (1987) distinction. 
Pedagogy matters in ‘everyday contexts’ (Alltag, Thiersch 1986), not in carefully controlled 
and abstract clinical or therapeutic spaces. Questions of identity are very much part of the 
lifeworld, not in a pre-cast form as the ‘system’ produces them, but as expressions of 
collective interests in dynamic yet fuzzy forms. Young people, women, parents of children 
with disabilities, neighbourhood groups began to claim forms of self-representation which 
challenged the ‘universalism’ of received social work definitions and triggered a ‘learning 
process’ that pitted itself against the weight of expert professional cultures in the same way 
as the youth movement had done at the start of the 20th century.  
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And yet, these assertions of identity by social and user movements still did not amount to a 
fundamental challenge of the traditional ambiguity towards the notion of culture contained in 
the socio-pedagogical paradigm. This challenge came from two other fronts, the presence of 
‘foreign populations’ in Germany in the form of migrant workers, refugees and asylum 
seekers, and the rise in violent forms of nationalism among young people in the wake of 
German unification. In relation to the former, German social pedagogy, similar to social 
work and education in other European countries that encountered immigrant populations, 
made efforts to accommodate ‘the phenomenon’ within its conceptual boundaries (Müller et 
al. 1995). It concentrated its efforts first on giving assistance towards assimilation and 
integration, developing a special field of ‘pedagogy for foreigners’ (Ausländerpädagogik), 
and later, realising the absurdity of wanting to level all differences by pedagogical means, on 
forms of multicultural and intercultural pedagogy (Hamburger 1993). In the sudden open 
acknowledgement of a diversity of cultural positions and their relevance for intervention the 
full weight of the pedagogical tradition was brought to bear with its liberal aspirations both 
for the full development of the inherent potential of each individual and for the procedural 
respect for the equal value of ‘the other’. But these aspirations also contained their own 
limitations in as much as they on the whole assumed that the imparting of better knowledge 
and the socialisation in the practice of tolerance would change the nature of racism and 
exclusion which the minority ‘foreign’ populations experienced in their daily lives. 
Undoubtedly, the shift from integrationist to multicultural concepts was significant as it 
brings the notion of cultural difference and of the right to an autonomously defined identity 
into play (Auernheimer 2001). Yet it also highlights the ambivalent political role of culture 
and the limitations of the traditional pedagogical project: once a plurality of cultural 
universes has become theoretically accepted, often to the point of an uncritical fascination 
with the exotic ‘otherness’, it renders itself powerless to fight the inequalities that hide in 
cultural differences and which a multicultural approach appears to even sanction. This 
paralysis seems to have beset the whole of German social work and social pedagogy in the 
context of the realisation of the impact of cultural diversity (Müller 1995). 
  
This becomes noticeable also in relation to the second, related challenge, the rise in violence 
directed at non-Germans. The moral panic generated in the wake of attacks on hostels for 
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asylum seekers and other racist violence concentrated on young people and particularly on 
those in former East Germany. While there is undoubtedly a serious issue to be addressed 
and the behaviour of young neo-Nazis is by no means inconsequential, it has to be asked 
whether the framing of the problem betrays the historical and conceptual limitations set by 
the ‘match’ between the pedagogical and the nation state project in Germany. Firstly, it is 
interesting to note that the focus is so explicitly on the behaviour of young people, precisely 
the group that is the primary subject of pedagogy. Giving pedagogical attention to their 
behaviour may easily divert attention away from more widespread racism in German society, 
especially as the most favoured pedagogical approaches are termed ‘accepting youth 
work’(Scherr 1994). This implies that the lack of tolerance for ethnic minorities and foreign 
cultures displayed by certain groups of young people should be countered by giving them, in 
the face of  the ‘diversity’ of their obnoxious behaviour, a minimum of recognition as the 
precondition for any pedagogical progress towards greater tolerance (Krafeld et al. 1993).  
Secondly, their behaviour is usually framed as ‘violence against foreigners’ 
(Fremdenfeindlichkeit), which implies an acceptance that the specific characteristic of the 
victims is their status as foreigners. True as this may be in the majority of cases in the legal 
sense (although violence against people with disabilities occurs also more frequently), their 
lack of German citizenship is in itself a product of the German citizenship laws which make 
the acquisition of a German passport very difficult even for second generation immigrants. 
The ‘diagnosis’ therefore endorses an underlying assumption of essentialism in cultural 
differences which diverts attention away from the social and political construction of these 
differences. Thirdly, the panic concentrates on the Länder of former East Germany and 
singling out those parts of Germany implicitly constructs notions of a cultural lag in 
comparison with West Germany where a multicultural society has gained greater acceptance. 
Behind these assumptions lies the old zeal of a combination of the pedagogical and the 
national project in Germany which manifested itself for instance in the wholesale export of 
the entire welfare system, including the training courses for social workers and social 
pedagogues and most of the teaching staff from the West to the East.  
 
At this point the critical historical reflection on the place and function of culture in social 
work would have been so necessary. Contrary to the main thrust of current pedagogical 
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efforts in Germany around the issue of migration, cultural minorities and fascist violence the 
problems are neither of recent origin, created by the influx of foreigners and by German 
unification, nor are they specific to the relation between self and ‘others’. Rather, the core 
problem is the inherent commitment of the pedagogical project to the national cause which 
ultimately seeks to suspend, sublimate and merge (to spell out Hegel’s untranslatable term of 
aufheben in some of its components) diversity in one authoritative public norm.  
 
This is indeed not just a German problem and social work everywhere has to confront the 
complex dilemmas posed by cultural diversity even in seemingly homogeneous societies like 
for instance in Ireland, a country which until the sudden reversal in the late 1990s from being 
a country of emigration to one of immigration had considered itself as culturally 
homogeneous, and this despite the glaring cultural divisions marked by sectarianism and 
social divisions between the ‘settled’ and the ‘traveller’ communities (McVeigh and Lentin 
2002). Neither the withdrawal to the ostensible safety of positions of universalism and 
neutrality nor the uncritical acceptance of positions of cultural relativity and subjectivity will 
save the profession from being in danger of becoming a collaborator in power politics 
carried out either in the name of cultural pluralism or of downright nationalism and fascism. 
The issues posed by the ‘struggle for recognition’ which ‘is fast becoming the paradigmatic 
form of political conflict in the late twentieth century’ (Fraser 1998 p 19) should be well 
familiar to social work which in its practice is constantly negotiating difference, the right to 
be different with equality, the right to be treated the same. It is in this daily interaction where 
cultural norms and reference points are being taken up as part of people’s historical 
continuity and are being transformed at the same time into often fragmented elements of 
bureaucratic provisions. It is also the place where the apparent clash between the politics of 
recognition and the politics of redistribution can yield to the practice of democracy. Laclau 
has argued convincingly that while ‘universality is incommensurable with particularity’, it is 
still utterly dependent on the particular for its actualisation, as becomes apparent in human 
rights discourses (Laclau 1995, p 107). This paradox is the precondition for democracy: a 
modern, fair and civilised society can only emerge from the persistent and continuous 
attempts to reach a temporary consensus over the significance of personal identity and 
cultural differences. There are no permanent solutions to the dilemmas and clashes of 
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interest of a multicultural, diverse society, but there are forms of social practice which 
promote a constructive transformation of those clashes, a transformation of personal troubles 
into issues of social policy. In refusing to become absorbed on one side or the other of the 
controversy between a neo-liberal and a communitarian conception of society, between the 
‘new binary’ of modern and postmodern models of social policy (Taylor 1998), between the 
dilution of traditional collective identities and the stubborn, aggressive affirmation of 
nationalism, social work can make indeed a contribution to the realisation of cultural 
fairness, social human rights and human dignity in concrete, particular, everyday contexts. It 
can only do so, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, with reference to 
communication as its core competence. 
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6. Ethics and politics of intercultural communication in social work 
practice 
 
 
 
The observations on the paradigmatic significance of work with migrants and on the 
necessity to conceptualise social work as practised citizenship in relation to the construction 
of multiple identities in the context of the changing role of the nation state immediately raise 
the question of language and communication. This chapter will re-affirm the importance of a 
core political orientation of social work practice as deduced from the very conditions under 
which its communicative competence needs to be conceptualised and constructed in every 
interaction. Once more, intercultural situations will appear not as the exception but as the 
constructive test case for the critique of an instrumental use of language and communication 
in ‘mainstream’ social work. This also necessitates a critical examination of social work’s 
position not just in relation to the project the nation state, but more generally that of 
modernity itself and its current status as this project also appears to be in some difficulty. 
Social work has a role to play in the constitution of the (post-)modern self and it needs to be 
able to deal with the full complexity of this task. Its only tools are language and 
communication, and an inter-cultural understanding of all communication processes and the 
fundamental principles that make communication possible are therefore constitutive for the 
profession. 
 
Culture, identity and with it inter-cultural understanding have become problematic concepts 
in contemporary society to a degree that makes all previous doubts about the reliability and 
consistency of the boundaries of self and of cultural domains appear as naïve certainties.  
Difference and how to constitute identity in full recognition of fundamental differences have 
become the central pre-occupations of existence in a post-modern world in which the self has 
to constantly re-constitute itself through reflection and through choices of life style. ‘In the 
post-traditional order of modernity… self-identity becomes a reflexively organised 
endeavour. The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet 
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continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as 
filtered through abstract systems’ (Giddens 1991, p5). This process of ‘dis-embedding’, as 
Giddens calls it, has led to an acute form of individualism which not only finds itself lost in 
an over-abundance of meanings but has begun, particularly at the level of academic critique 
and reflection, to question the very foundations of the project of modernity upon which it 
was founded. The self now becomes engaged in a very different relationship with culture and 
culture re-emerges in late modernity with a new, and highly ambivalent message.  
 
The project of modernity had set out to bring order into the seeming arbitrariness of culture 
understood as sets of traditions. Its mission, formulated by Kant in his emblematic 
clarification of the notion of Enlightenment, was to initiate a process of emancipation: 
'Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the 
inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another' (Kant 1968 p 53). It 
spelled also the liberation from the bondage of un-reason which held its sway in unexamined 
cultural traditions. Reason began its global trajectory from the conviction that it represented 
the key to a universal understanding of a code at the core of all culture, a key that would 
unlock the door to absolute and universal truth, both as far as the physical world and as far as 
the world of values was concerned. The promises were those of a 'true' universal 
understanding that transcended cultural boundaries and with that of progress towards the 
establishment of a universal civilisation which would set new standards of freedom and 
humanity.  
 
The project today looks precarious. The twentieth century which produced two world wars, 
the Gulag and the Shoah, which has brought every corner of the earth in the grip of a global 
economy and generated the conditions for massive ecological disasters concluded with a 
disillusioned, sceptical attitude towards reason, progress and civilisation. Western societies 
had to realise and realise ever more clearly that the universal understanding across cultural 
divides in the name of reason, where it succeeded at all, was achieved largely by force and 
violence. The advance of reason led to dependency, oppression and the extermination of 
entire cultures through technologically perfected killing machines and politically 
unassailable and largely unaccountable power concentrations. This realisation leaves the self 
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disoriented in its project of self-constitution, unable to find a unifying principle (Touraine 
1995), bereft of the one certainty it had clung to in the questioning of all traditional truths, 
which was the leadership of reason promising order and stability. In this situation, which has 
the hallmarks of a profound crisis infused with existential angst (Giddens 1991), two basic 
options seem to suggest themselves as escapes from the over-load of reflexivity:  
(i)  The option of cynical disregard for all certainties, values and authorities, the retreat (or 
break-through?) to pure, unstructured, uncensored and immediate ‘experience’ for which 
anything goes and nothing really matters (Sloterdijk 1983). On this side the de-
construction of grand narratives gathers momentum, not only at the level of intellectual 
critique and literary analysis, but also quite tangibly at the societal level: ‘The decay of 
the Ego goes in parallel with the dissolution of the idea of society’ (Touraine 1995, p 
269). This mood is captured by the political representation of neo-liberalism which 
questions the existence of society as a figment of sociologists’ imagination and seeks to 
replace the solidarity vested in a state system of welfare guarantees with private, 
commercial arrangements between ‘free individuals’.  
(ii)  The other option focuses on the (re-)constitution of certainties made possible by a halt 
being called to the seemingly infinite regress of critical questioning (or by sheer fatigue). 
‘Factuality’ in the form of common sense, of the cosiness of actually existing 
communities, of the empirical pervasiveness of boundaries marked by gender and 
ethnicity gathers its own persuasive momentum as a seemingly solid and reliable, simple, 
comfortable and popular reference point for the constitution of identity (Habermas 1996). 
In all the questioning of where to belong and with whom to identify it comes as a relief 
to experience the tangible solidarity of a crowd of football supporters identifying with a 
local or national team, no matter how tenuous the actual common base of this identity is. 
It suggests ingenious (and often anti-intellectual) simplicity to take religious affiliation, 
language, or skin colour as markers of the boundaries of solidarity and responsibility 
when national identity becomes too complex to define and negotiate in increasingly 
diverse multi-cultural societies. The flirtation with essentialism and the postulation of 
distinct cultural and ethnic identities constituted by fixed criteria of tradition and biology 
at a political and the emergence of nationalism and racism as forces to be reckoned with 
at a political level are not so much signs of a back-lash or of the return to pre-modern 
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reference points. They are contemporary products of the accentuated dilemma of the 
constitution of the self, a ‘coping strategy’ that bears witness to modernity’s failed 
project of universalism (Bauman 1995a).  
 
These latter references to the political implications of the crisis of late modernity indicate 
that the radical questioning it implies cannot be treated as a matter of detached curiosity, as 
is frequently the case in aesthetic discussions, but as a matter of considerable practical 
urgency in which social work is implicated as it is concerned with people’s coping strategies. 
Therefore the issue of inter-cultural understanding is not an additional question on the 
already very full agenda of late modernity, to be tackled under ‘Any Other Business’ once 
the individual self has perhaps managed to re-constitute itself and to free itself from these 
intense existential anxieties. Rather, inter-cultural understanding matters today as the central 
quest for the possibility of grounding the self in the contemporary reality through 
competence in communication. It is the question of whether there is any chance of sustaining 
the challenge of diversity and of radical questioning without destroying the social basis of 
the existence of the self, without turning from the meaningless cacophony of complexity to 
the deafening silence of abstract simplifications that by-pass communication entirely and end 
in speechless violence. 
 
The approach taken here implies therefore first of all that the question of the constitution of 
the self in late modernity, the question of how to go about grounding and expressing one’s 
identity, is connected to the question of communication. It means secondly that all 
communication has to be approached basically as inter-cultural communication, or to turn it 
the other way round, that inter-cultural communication is a test for the core elements of 
successful, good communication. It requires thirdly for communication to be treated not 
primarily as a matter of technical competence but as an ethical question because its success 
depends on a commitment to a joint cause, however minimally that might be defined. And 
lastly it can be postulated with Habermas that it is this ethical commitment which is the pre-
condition of a social existence, of a social framework that can constitute something like 
community through the act of communicating, and that what constitutes the possibility and 
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indeed the necessity of community in turn gives the grounding of the self some minimal 
prospect of success. 
 
From this perspective is should become clear why it is important to consider inter-personal, 
intra-cultural and inter-cultural communication as part of a coherent complex. Culture is 
meant to signify here systems of meaning which, like language, have on the one hand a kind 
of independent, objective existence, and on the other live and function only through the 
subjective endorsements (and indeed modifications) of members of a cultural community 
(Hamburger 1990). Culture constitutes identity just as much as identity choices constitute 
cultural contours. But seen against the background of the introductory remarks to this 
chapter the criteria of culture cannot be merely of an aesthetic nature but raise the question 
of norms. In this way the reflection on intercultural communication might help to point a 
way between the cynical and the communitarian alternative to deal with the contemporary 
problem of identity. The practice of social work tests whether principles of inter-cultural 
communication can be conceptualised on a continuum of practice situations and scenarios 
between, for instance, the interaction with asylum seekers who arrive in a country of a 
different culture requiring material, language and probably also psychological assistance and 
the work with parents who have abused one of their own children. Referring to both 
situations as culturally constituted in no way endorses the theory of a ‘culture of poverty’ as 
it had been espoused by Oscar Lewis (1959) and as it still lingers in political debates on 
social deprivation today. The term often implies that poverty is meant to ‘reproduce itself’ by 
means of self-imposed limitations in motivation and ambition which have become 
internalised by poor people living together in poverty-stricken neighbourhoods. However, 
lives and life opportunities in society are separated by many factors, most of which are not a 
matter of choice for the individuals concerned and differences in society cannot therefore be 
reduced to differences in life style. The theory of the ‘culture of poverty’ overlooks the 
importance of material inequality and the real limitations this imposes. But in relating both 
situations of social work mentioned above to culture emphasises that the meaning of all 
differences, including that of material differences, is mediated by cultural norms. It is 
through the application of these norms that differences turn into inequality, which makes 
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them no less ‘real’, on the contrary, their cultural and social meaning and significance is 
indeed part of their ‘reality’.  
 
Patterns of behaviour in responding to these differences are also socially constructed and 
mediated by language. Their meanings are always shared among groups of people, even 
where the violation of norms is an individual act and may have pathological origins. The 
‘language’ of a suicidal act, even the ‘language’ of the pain inflicted on a child in the total 
privacy of an individual family, has a socially defined structure and in that sense a 
‘grammar’. The ability to intervene and prevent a suicide attempt or an act of harm against a 
child by a violent parent is ultimately related to the ability to understand such behaviour as a 
language, to engage with it, and to set up a communicative framework within which change 
becomes possible. Bernstein’s observations on the use of restricted and elaborate codes used 
among working and middle class children respectively attempted to capture such differences 
as cultural differences represented in different language systems (Bernstein 1971). However, 
he failed or was at least ambivalent in making these differences amenable to communicative 
mediation and change; he failed to reflect fundamentally on the inter-cultural significance of 
his findings.  
 
This latter focus on the possibility of change and transformation within the discourses on 
culture is frequently also omitted from considerations of inter-cultural communication which 
make it appear as if the task of understanding alone was everything. In relation to the 
situations of social need and conflict referred to above the attempt to understand socially 
unacceptable behaviour is often confused with condoning it. Trying to understand behaviour 
that is totally alien to one’s own cultural norms creates indeed anxieties. The realisation of 
difference can easily become so unbearable that the alternatives indicated above in relation 
to the social and political constitution of the self can also become activated in the interactive, 
inter-personal domain: They confront social workers with the alternative of either 
surrendering to the impossibility of finding an agreed moral reference point from which to 
judge a form of behaviour as unacceptable and thereby conceding that all behaviour, all 
cultural conventions, are equally valid and  thereby implicitly or explicitly condoning it, or 
of retreating to the seeming certainties of the prevailing conventions or official rules and 
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prescriptions that govern bureaucratic interventions. These ‘habits’ of familiarity, which gain 
ground also in current managerial procedures of case management, then assume the role of 
absolute moral principles and function as universal norms from which to judge all forms of 
behaviour leaving no room to really engage with ‘difference’, let alone at reaching a new 
level of understanding. In both cases the chances of achieving any change in the other 
person’s situation are minimal or restricted to the use of power and the imposition of 
restraints.  
 
In both the context of the constitution of the self in a context of considerable uncertainty 
over norms and cultural boundaries and in that more general of the grounding of principles 
of inter-cultural understanding and interaction organisationally and practically the same kind 
of dilemmas seem to operate. This gives a further indication as to how intercultural 
communication is linked to intra-cultural communication at a time when the quest for 
universal reference points has run into such acute difficulties. Linking the issue of inter-
cultural communication to that of the constitution of the self means then, that the question of 
understanding fellow human beings is ultimately not an aesthetic nor a technical question but 
an ethical question. Or, to put it another way, the reduction of the process of understanding 
to a matter of aesthetic indifference or technical feasibility is a violation of the dignity of 
human actors engaged in constituting their identity through communication. It furthermore 
denies the possibility of founding social solidarity on communication and mutual 
understanding and instead erodes the conditions of society. If it is impossible to overcome 
the differences between culturally constituted positions communicatively, it becomes 
impossible to constitute a society from individuals, each with their own identity, and at the 
same time allowing individuals the freedom to be different. It becomes impossible to arrive 
communicatively at a sufficient level of commitment of individuals to each other and of 
solidarity among people characterised by ostensible differences. Solidarity would then only 
be possible among people who are essentially the same, who share an a priori sameness, be 
that genetically or culturally determined, among people therefore who would have only a 
minimal need to communicate. 
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In order to find the way back from this paralysing communicative silence to the possibilities 
of communication it might help to speculatively stretch the potential for inter-cultural 
communication to its hypothetical limits and ask whether it would ever be possible to 
understand aliens arriving on earth from outer space. Communication with aliens will not 
and cannot depend on technical means, on the availability of dictionaries or of computing 
power capable of breaking a secret code. Understanding the visitors from outer space will 
only be possible in as much as and to the extent to which we have always known them 
already in our imagination. The possibility of understanding them will be bounded by the 
way in which we have reckoned on the possibility of their existence and at the same time 
imagined their otherness as the totally other. If they merely confirm a fixed set of ideas, 
particularly if they are made to confirm an available catalogue of well rehearsed fears into 
which all will be subsumed that there is to be understood about them, all possibilities of ‘real 
understanding’ will be lost. This means however that our meeting with them will always be 
partial, if it becomes possible at all and does not resort to violence as the confirmation of our 
pre-conceived fears. The possibility of communicating with them will be conditional on a 
general mutual willingness to meet and understand. It will be limited to the areas in which 
the willingness to meet and to share communicative efforts are reciprocated. If violence 
dominates the encounter, if the fear of the totally ‘other’ gets the upper hand, as it usually 
does in science fiction blockbusters (which can be taken to be cultural reference points 
created at a time when racist violence is simultaneously on the increase), this violence is a 
perverse expression of the claim to ‘total understanding’, of not admitting ignorance and 
sustaining ambiguity. This gesture of communicative oppression is at the core of all 
violence. 
 
This hypothetical thought experiment is meant to illustrate both the possibilities and the 
limitations of inter-cultural understanding in a general sense. Understanding is predicated on 
the one hand on the possibility of imagining shared interests and intentions, and on the other 
hand on conceding the possibility of misunderstanding all or most of what there is to be 
understood. Allowing for the possibility of the ‘totally other’ is the actual safeguard of our 
understanding. This ‘rest’ is therefore both a technical and an ethical safeguard because it 
concedes, or constructs, a self in the other that is the seat of autonomy and authenticity. It 
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posits the right to self-representation without which the encounter with the other would be 
merely the subjection of the other to what is already known, an act of oppression, an 
encounter with an object whose meanings are inferred and thereby fundamentally false. This 
ethical moment cannot function without the ability to sustain the discomfort of strangeness 
as the constitutive element of inter-subjectivity (Hoffman 2001). 
 
All communication, not just inter-cultural communication, operates at two related levels, as 
Gregory Bateson pointed out in his analysis of the conditions for therapeutic communication 
and change: ‘Every message in transit has two sorts of “meaning”. On the one hand, the 
message is a statement or report about events at a previous moment, and on the other hand it 
is a command - a cause or stimulus for events at a later moment’ (Bateson 1951, p 179). 
From this he concludes that the act of communicating can constitute meaning only in as 
much as it simultaneously constitutes a relationship between the interlocutors at a ‘meta-
level’. As people communicate about particular subject areas they also convey to each other 
how what is said is to be taken. They make reference to, but also modify, play with, destroy 
and rebuild systems of meaning which bound the ‘contents’ of their communication. This is 
why Bateson can state ‘that the system of codification and the system of values are aspects 
of the same central phenomena’ (Bateson 1951, p 176). The level of meta-communication in 
conversations operates in a social context with the aid of tone of voice, body gestures, word 
associations and countless other signals which establish the search for and the link to a 
modicum of shared premises, intentions and values. It is the interplay between 
communication and meta-communication, between given codes and personal meanings 
which makes understanding ultimately possible. 
 
Applying this in the pedagogical field Bateson operates with the notion of ‘deutero-learning’ 
(Bateson 1942) which is the ability to learn how to learn, to ‘read’ social situations and their 
inferred meanings and to build up a well tuned, autonomously managed system of meaning. 
Jerome Bruner finds a related aspect of language and language acquisition constitutive for 
the psychological development of the self: ‘Just as the first steps toward learning to use a 
language depend upon a transactional relationship …, so the later elaboration of language 
use for the negotiation of intention and meaning also requires such transactional 
 121
relationships’ (Bruner 1984, p 6). Pedagogical approaches based on these concepts 
emphasise the connection between the development of secure personal identities and the 
competence to communicate effectively. Learning and identity formation take place in the 
context of a community which in turn is constituted by linguistic interaction.  
 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action elaborates on these insights into the conditions 
of understanding in a wider social and political context. His project is the establishment of  
criteria of understanding that take seriously the replacement of a philosophy of 
consciousness (which had postulated a self-sufficient subject confronting an objective world) 
by a philosophy of language, which had been formulated above all by G.H.Mead (Giddens 
1985). He finds them in a universally-pragmatic version of rationality that does not start 
from a priori assumptions of universal criteria but rather constitutes its validity claims 
through the act of communicating itself, through re-claiming Kant’s transcendental criteria at 
the level of language and communication. Validity claims must be and can only be 
postulated, expressed and endorsed by those engaged in communicative action (Habermas 
1981). However, this requires in turn social conditions of freedom, of non-interference with 
the communicative process which permit those engaged in interaction to fully enter into the 
relativity of inter-subjectivity and through it to reach a critically examined, openly argued 
and non-oppressive consensus. Every interference leads to distortions, and communication, 
as it occurs in ‘the real world’, is shot through with distortions of this kind. These distortions 
have their origins in the separation of ‘system and lifeworld’ and in the subsequent 
dominance of power interests which are inimical not just to freedom, but to communication 
and understanding in their full sense. The moral question of the truth of what is being 
communicated turns into a political question of how the moral commitment, contained in the 
communicative interest in understanding, can be safeguarded. 
Habermas’ optimism that the emancipation project of enlightenment could be completed 
once the mechanisms of the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ through ‘the system’ are fully 
known and the dialectics of enlightenment, so extensively analysed by the Frankfurt School, 
have been critically reworked, is not without its ardent critics. Lyotard’s view of ‘the 
postmodern condition’(Lyotard 1984) points towards a definite farewell to all attempts at 
completing emancipation by means of grounding solidarity in universal processes of 
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legitimation.  For him the cultural differences between groups of people are simply 
unbridgeable. What we are left with are localised, self-referential language games in 
Wittgenstein’s sense, and any attempt at universalising them brings with it the danger of 
applying forceful, violent unifying measures: Lyotard accuses pragmatists like Richard Rorty 
of ‘secondary narcissism’, of attempting to make one’s own values the yardstick of all 
cultural systems. This, for Leotard, leaves the door open for terror, for a kind of terror typical 
of Nazism ‘whose rationale is not in principle accessible to everybody and whose benefits 
are not sharable by everybody’ (Lyotard in Rorty 1992, p62).  
 
This terror is indeed all too present in the form of a growing ground-swell of racism and neo-
fascism as a response to the perceived threat of alien cultures to one’s own fickle and 
troubled identity. Relying on the appeal of democracy as the formal forum in which cultural 
and political differences can be sorted out amicably and non-violently, as Rorty seems to 
suggest, is a weak defence against this type of terror when the democratic institutions 
themselves are losing their appeal. Instead, there appears to be an urgent need to focus on 
learning how to defend and to practice democracy, on the acquisition of competences in 
everyday situations and on the creation of an awareness of how much our welfare and our 
future depend on reaching a minimal consensus over the priorities of this ultimately 
pedagogical enterprise, parallel to the process of securing formal democratic structures and 
procedures. Only then can the formalities of democratic rules and processes command new 
legitimacy and reach a level of effectiveness. The distortions in the communicative 
competence which is potentially given in the lifeworld, of which Habermas speaks, need to 
be tackled very directly as the factors that also prohibit meaningful inter-cultural 
communication. Appeals to tolerance, to understanding and awareness are insufficient in the 
construction of anti-racist strategies.  
 
This means recognising the connection between the tasks of establishing meaningful 
personal identities and of establishing meaningful inter-cultural communication, and that 
means the connection between the pragmatics, the ethics and the politics of communication. 
The isolation of any one of those factors plays into the hands of further distortions, further 
alienation, further exclusion. 
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To come back to the examples from the everyday practice of social work and social 
pedagogy: social workers simply cannot allow the mind of a person who uses a position of 
trust with or power over children in order to harm them to occupy a world of his own. The 
outcry that such behaviour causes in the general population once it becomes known, the calls 
for more effective intervention indicate that society cannot cancel the minimum of solidarity 
a society expresses for a child who is being harmed and to whom a wrong has been done 
(Parton 1991). There is a need to make the situation safe for the child, but in order to achieve 
this effectively somebody must try to understand ‘what has been going on’, somebody must 
negotiate the total strangeness that it confronts society with, because the solidarity of society 
as such is at stake, and this precisely because it might be necessary, to control the contact a 
perpetrator of abuse has with society. Equally, society cannot cancel solidarity with asylum 
seekers who have a ‘genuine case’, who have suffered torture and persecution, without 
losing an essential part of its humanity and dignity and its faith in the protective, constitutive 
qualities of a humane society (Humphries 2002). In conceding this minimum of 
understanding human beings also concede the possibility of difference within themselves as 
they relate to both what they can reach or at least imagine and to what remains strange in 
both those situations and in themselves. But it is one thing to state such sentiments in 
abstract, it is quite another to translate them into action, into effective and legitimate 
strategies of intervention. It is in these border-areas of understanding that social work is 
challenged to develop its actual competence, and to develop core competences therefore by 
necessity as inter-cultural competences. 
 
In following in broad terms the stages in which inter-cultural approaches developed in 
various European countries, the following is an outline of three ideal-typical options as to 
how these questions are being or could be handled in practice within and beyond the stark 
and inappropriate alternatives posed for the constitution of identity under the conditions of 
late modernity. 
 
(i)  ‘Simplification’ can be called an approach which ‘solves’ the problem of diversity by 
denying that there is a problem of mutual understanding. In its strong form it imposes a 
universal yardstick of right and wrong, if need be by force, and cuts out all ambivalence. 
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According to this position, values are there to be upheld and they prove their success 
intrinsically by being able to command compliance. In pedagogical terms this approach 
advocates assimilation to and conformity with the dominant, indigenous culture for all 
minority or immigrant groups, not necessarily overtly for control purposes, but ‘for their 
own good’: it is only by adapting to a prevailing, successful culture, by learning its 
language and mastering its system of symbols that members of minority groups can hope 
to gain access to the benefits of civilisation, to share the rewards of a system of values 
that can claim universal validity. In its weaker version it concedes the existence of a 
variety of moral systems represented by different cultures and focuses more 
pragmatically on the validity of localised value regimes instead of making demands for 
universal acceptance (Hamburger 1990). But within the confines of those dispersed 
communities values have something equally unquestionably self-evident about them and 
communication works best if those boundaries are being rigidly maintained. 
Universalism may be toned down to a matter of showing sympathy for somebody’s 
difficulties perhaps. However, 'difficulties' count only within the meaning of an already 
known framework of universal human conditions, a knowledge that is oblivious within 
its subjective perspective, and this de-personalises the specifics of the other person’s 
distress. The ‘other person’ can only be understood because ‘people are people’ and what 
people are is known totally by looking at oneself. This ‘colourblind’ approach to inter-
cultural communication and to dealing with questions of identity also seeks to avoid the 
discomfort of encountering and dealing with differences as they actually present 
themselves. Both the authoritarian and the ‘colourblind’ approach deny the ‘other 
person’ the right to define her own identity, deny the right to authenticity and agency and 
thereby set up highly asymmetrical sets of relationships. This in turn is indicative of a 
way of constituting the self in a static form, particularly as far as the ‘strong’ version of 
authoritarianism is concerned where the self either becomes defensive or indeed 
aggressive and violent, in total denial of the challenges to sensitivity that the encounter 
with the other presents. Even the ‘weaker’ version of this approach constructs in essence 
a ‘tolerant’ self that defines the limits of such tolerance from within its own tightly 
controlled value system and maintains thus always the upper hand. 
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(ii)  The ‘multi-cultural position’ by contrast abandons the claim to universality rather too 
readily and with it the concern over the difficulties and the actual meaning of 
establishing understanding that could lead to a negotiated consensus. Politically it sees no 
problem with a myriad of simultaneous positions entering the arena competitively just as 
pedagogically it celebrates diversity and revels in the freedom that the de-construction of 
grand narratives seemingly bestows. One reading of a text is as good as another, each 
culture has its own fluid values from which life-styles can be picked as randomly and as 
playfully as a set of always matching colour co-ordinates can be picked from Benetton’s 
multi-cultural catalogues. The ethical questions dissolve in a celebration of a cynical 
nihilism for which ‘anything goes’ is the maxim of this approach and everybody seeks to 
protect his or her interests as best as they can, privately and without recourse to a public 
arena or without seeing any necessity for an organising entity like the state. The position 
is reflected in a fragmented, ephemeral constitution of the self that has given up knowing 
itself and locating itself, a self that is adrift in the sea of globalisation. 
 
(iii)  But the post-modern condition may ultimately yield a trajectory between the Scylla and 
the Charybdis of the previous positions for those who tenaciously persevere with the 
project of communication despite all the difficulties and disillusionment that the collapse 
of claims to universal validity has brought. In continuing to make the effort to 
communicate at all despite all those difficulties, in ‘bothering’ to strive for understanding 
and meaning despite of and in the full knowledge of the divisions which culture and 
identity seem to impose, the act of communication itself might release reference points 
for the conditions under which understanding, however partial it might be, could become 
possible. Such a project will not just point a viable direction but also release the energy 
required to secure the chances of this approach succeeding, communicatively and 
politically, and hence as a basis for social work competence. One of these crucial 
conditions is the link between the pragmatic project of inter-cultural communication, the 
ethical project of truth in understanding and the political strategies of anti-racism. 
Together this connection could form a set of discursive-democratic principles on how the 
social could be re-constructed and defended against further power infringements and 
attempts at colonisation. This is the optimism which inspires for instance Zygmunt 
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Bauman to persevere with the idea of a postmodern morality: ‘it is possible now, nay 
inevitable, to face the moral issues point-blank, in all their naked truth, as they emerge 
from the life experience of men and women, and as they confront moral selves in all their 
irreparable and irredeemable ambivalence’ (Bauman 1995a, p18). 
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These trajectories can be summarised in the following diagram which highlights the 
connections between psychological, cultural, ethical and political levels:  
 
simplification / assimilation multi-cultural indifference
self static - 
strong version: 
defensive / fearful 
of change 
weak: tolerant 
 cynical 
fragmented 
cultural / 
communicative 
practice  
strong: assimilation 
weak: colour blind 
 multi-cultural, 
indifferent to 
diversity 
ethics dogmatic  nihilist - 
postmodernist 
politics authoritarian,  
conservative 
colonising 
ethnic cleansing 
 neo-liberal, laissez-
faire 
   
 
 
 
 
communicative inter-cultural  
self 
 
 autonomous, 
multi-layered  
integrated 
 
cultural / 
communicative 
practice  
 intercultural / 
antiracist 
 
ethics  transactional, 
communicative, 
facing issues of 
morality without 
security 
 
politics  discursive – 
democratic 
 
 
 
 
 
The choices are indeed stark. The effects of a politics of identity that aims at simplifications, 
at retrieving identity by violent means, at creating territories of homogeneous communities, 
of dividing good from evil absolutely, are all too evident. Ethnic cleansing, this epitome of 
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the unwillingness to communicate, of violence replacing inter-cultural communication, does 
not just happen in Ex-Yugoslavia - it happens on the territory of urban centres of population 
concentrations where spatial segregation is proceeding apace (Bauman 1998a). No-go areas 
are being claimed by groups of people who, having lost their stake in society at large, are 
desperate to defend their neo-tribal identities with reference to particular territories. At the 
same time, an increasingly globally connected economic elite defends itself also spatially 
with ever more elaborate security arrangements and the creation of fortresses within a hostile 
environment. ‘The contemporary crisis is centrally located in the city and its role as a vehicle 
for socialisation into modernity. The resort to identity as a source of social redemption 
articulates this crisis. As Said observes, it bears out Fanon’s worst fear … “identity, always 
identity, over and above knowing about others”’ (Humphrey 1996, p. 81). 
 
The pre-condition for the re-constitution of a social self, an identity that allows for otherness, 
both in the relation to others and in the realisation of difference in oneself, springs on the one 
hand from the realisation of not-knowing, the shuddering at the prospect of the total loss of 
meaning, the suffering from discontinuity, the despair of finding oneself lonely and 
abandoned in a bewildering, undecipherable world of disjointed symbols. But on the other 
hand it derives from the courage to sustain this void and these uncertainties for long enough 
so that simplifications, common sense truths, surreptitious power interests cannot colonise 
that moment. This sustaining allows instead memories of a future to emerge, of a security 
and sense of self that is constituted by being with others, being for others, not despite but 
because of their strangeness. We can only live in and sustain this void if we allow language 
to fill it, ambiguous, contingent and yet reliable, once we endow it with meaning, once we 
give a moral commitment to language and to understanding in the knowledge that language 
is all that can constitute a dense social reality. Social work competence is therefore, 
paradoxically, grounded in the ability to sustain ambiguity and to make space for difference, 
rather than on the claim to definite solutions for seemingly factual problems (Jordan 1978, 
Parton 1998). 
 
This is not to give inter-cultural communication and inter-cultural pedagogy a privileged and 
unique position in resolving conflicts, overcoming inequality and creating a viable society. 
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The provision of material conditions, the establishment and securing of human and legal 
rights, the development of reliable and accountable structures and systems all play an 
important role and understanding differences is no substitute for institutions. But these 
institutions and provisions are all dependent on language and understanding for their 
effectiveness, for becoming factors that matter in particular ways. And the use of language 
for the purpose of understanding is ultimately dependent on a moral commitment, a 
commitment that can only be derived from the participation in communication in everyday 
contexts. ‘Humanity is not an essence to be realised, but a pragmatic construction, a 
perspective, to be developed through the articulation of the variety of individual projects, of 
differences, which constitute our humanity in the broadest sense’ (Weeks 1993, p 200).  
 
Ultimately, social work practice in all its forms and in all its fields stands in the service of 
this humanity. But as a specific form of practice it is particularly concerned with the social 
conditions necessary for the realisation of this humanity. As the conditions for establishing 
and practicing social solidarity become ever more tenuous in late modernity and the 
integration of society turns into a task for specialists, it is vital for the social work profession 
not to approach this task in a technological manner. Grounding solidarity is something 
entirely different from risk reduction which is what social work is becoming increasingly 
saddled with through changes in social policy and the introduction of management models 
(see chapter 9). The refusal of this functionalism must however go hand in hand with an 
alternative framework both for the methodological competence of social work and its moral 
justification. This raises fundamental questions of the consequences of the analysis of 
communication processes for epistemology and research in social work  which shall be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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7. Hermeneutics as a paradigm for European social work research and 
practice 
 
 
The considerations concerning the grounding of social work competence in the ethics of 
communication lead not only to a re-examination of social work practice methods from the 
perspective of inter-cultural processes and principles, they also have an immediate bearing 
on the role of research as the basis for social work intervention. The professionalism of the 
social work profession has come in for serious questioning in the light of increasing demands 
on social workers and the greater public scrutiny and attention attached to their role, and 
reflections on the epistemology of social work and its grounding in research are therefore an 
essential part of the competence discourse. It shall be shown that the inter-cultural paradigm 
has relevance also in relation to the dilemmas posed by competing research paradigms and 
that the recourse to the basics of communication as a hermeneutic principle can map a way 
forward for practice-relevant social work research. 
 
The public image of the social professions does not seem to be particularly favourable in 
Europe at the start of the new century, given the numerous mistakes social workers are 
widely seen as making in assessing precarious childcare arrangements with fatal outcomes. It 
is of little comfort that other professions are also currently finding themselves in the crossfire 
of public opinion; notably medicine, the profession social work has always tried to emulate 
in its aspirations.  True enough, not every country criticises its social workers quite as much 
as Britain does, but social professionals still have a hard time everywhere convincing the 
public that they can be trusted. Despite the fact that social services are expanding 
numerically this growth is not generally regarded as a welcome sign of progress but as a 
regrettable indication of the decline of standards in a society and an admission that we are 
not effective enough in the battle against social problems (Rauschenbach 1999). Societies 
want to put their trust in social workers as experts and yet retain a feeling that they would be 
better off without them, or rather without this kind of specialised expertise. Social problems 
ought to be resolved by ‘ordinary people’ – there is something unsettling about the idea that 
everyday life situations are sometimes no longer amenable to commons sense solutions. 
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There is a growing general mistrust of expert systems of knowledge and many self-help 
groups articulate publicly their conviction that having studied a problem merely theoretically 
leads to a different kind of knowledge from having experienced it (Williams and Popay, 
1994). 
 
But on reflection the appeal to common sense is today also more contentious than ever. 
While appeals to common sense continue to be used by politicians and the media as a means 
of establishing, or rather (as they see it) of ‘discovering’, an already existing consensus 
submerged perhaps by too many divergent expert opinions, the diversification of public 
opinion and of special interest lobby groups also reflects an acute suspicion on the part of the 
public that such an underlying consensus does not exist on any of the normative issues social 
professionals have to deal with. As knowledge is increasingly being constructed around ‘the 
person’ and around personal experiences with the advance of ‘identity discourses (see 
chapter 5) confidence wanes that this will lead to commonly shared insights and conclusions. 
On the contrary, this recourse to personal experience inevitably leads to a greater emphasis 
on differences and on the rupture of fixed and closed systems of knowledge which have 
failed to admit such difference. This is most vividly exemplified by the demands of women 
to end the pretence that male-dominated professions administered and promoted a neutral 
kind of expertise when in fact highly subjective factors and interests bore heavily on such 
areas of knowledge (Oakley, 2000).  
 
The implications of these ideas and developments for training and for employment selection 
in the social professions are that personal qualities are again being taken into consideration 
more seriously over and above mere insistence on qualifications. The issues of subjectivity, 
relativity, diversity, and the multiplicity of identities and therefore of theoretical perspectives 
are not only the subjects of abstract epistemological debate but are dilemmas in and for 
everyday practice. The challenge of a post-modern rupture and fragmentation of unity leaves 
no professional field unaffected and has its direct parallel in the growing importance that 
diversity of identity and multiplicity of cultures have in societies everywhere (Lash et al., 
1996). At the same time the pressure on all professions not only to be publicly accountable 
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but also to ‘get it right’ and help society reduce and eventually eliminate all risks is also 
growing and professional misjudgements are being judged ever more harshly (Parton, 1998).  
 
For social work this poses a particularly serious dilemma and confronts the profession with 
the most fundamental questions, not about the merits and demerits of this or that form of 
practice but concerning the very possibility of accountable practice in the first place. The 
questions social work professionals have to ask themselves constantly are, how can they ever 
claim to know something about another person, something that has validity for that person 
and is not an imposition of their personal world view or of ideologically determined 
objectives? In the contemporary context, if they resort to arguments of objectivity they feel 
more and more uncertain about the actual universality that reason and rationality can 
command, given the recognition of their being infused with cultural values and norms (even 
though the demand for ‘evidence-based practice’ more and more demands and constructs  
just such rational diagnostic criteria). If they resort to personal, subjective preferences they 
stand to lose any authority in their assessment and thereby their professional standing (even 
though this is exactly what the demand for ‘empowerment’ , which is being promoted so 
strongly as a professional practice principle, seems to imply).  
 
Fortunately this dilemma is not new to social work, although it seems that the profession, in 
most European countries, has been doing its best to hide from it. The proposal here is that 
facing up to the peculiarity of its type of knowledge creation and the discomfort that social 
work professionals have sensed in the past when giving an account of their knowledge base, 
can form the point of departure for an epistemology and for a reformulation of the principles 
of research that meets the contemporary critique of professional knowledge head on (Dewe 
and Otto 1996). This requires an examination not just of the type of knowledge used by 
social workers but of the processes by which such knowledge is established;  this overall 
problematic will be referred to as ‘research’ in the following, for doing research, thus 
understood, certainly involves more than work on empirical data. It also acknowledges that 
although in the UK, for instance, there was relatively little in the way of formal research 
activity in social work as such before the 1960s (Lyons 2000), social work educators 
certainly did not simply develop their methods ‘on the hoof’. Their primary mode of doing 
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research was the systematic evaluation of case notes, and case studies, finding in them 
evidence of the implicit or explicit application of the relevant tenets of academic disciplines 
like sociology and psychology, formed the knowledge base of social work at the time.  
 
It is often regarded as a deficit that social work did not develop its own independent 
knowledge base and ‘borrowed’ so heavily from those other disciplines. The borrowing as 
such is no problem– all professions and disciplines borrow from each other and if the placing 
of social work training in universities is to have any meaning at all it is to underline its place 
in a ‘universitas’ of disciplines that are meant to define their approaches and their subjects 
through mutual exchanges. What is problematic, however, is that social work in English-
speaking countries has been wedded until recently to certain models of sociology and 
psychology, and this for reasons of gaining status and prestige within a given academic 
status hierarchy. These models derive largely from positivist epistemologies and 
methodologies which deliberately separate the observing subject from the observed object. 
The adoption of such a position enforces also a separation of theory from practice which is 
ultimately counter-productive for social work, as it locates the realm of theory formation 
outside the actual discipline of social work which then appears as having its ‘proper place’ 
only in the realm of practice. As a result of this division, research insights by practising 
social workers become either mere ‘refinements’ in the area of application or correctives for 
certain theoretical assumptions, while their influence on theory formation as such remains 
limited. What this has meant in many European countries is that in addition to the 
theory/practice tension a de facto divide has operated between on the one hand a socially 
determined aspiration  to become grounded in positivist empirical research which always 
stops short of informing practice directly, and on the other the development of skills and 
competences largely in the ‘humanist’ tradition (client-centred), without critical reflection on 
the theoretical foundations of the latter. Typical British pragmatism accommodates this 
tension, as is still evident from recent research by Lyons (2000).  
 
While social science based approaches to social work and social work training, particularly 
of the positivist kind, are also to be found on the European continent, we find there 
additionally a strong intellectual counter-force in the form of the hermeneutic tradition, 
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which has influenced the development of ‘pedagogical’ models of social work (Lorenz 
1999). Admittedly, there is a strand within pedagogy that, taking its point of departure from 
the taken-for-granted societal function of education, also quite pragmatically seeks to 
improve the efficiency of ‘the education system’ according to this societal agenda, mainly in 
the form of didactics as the science of teaching methods. On the whole, however, 
continental-European pedagogical reflection tends to start from the person of the learner. For 
this tradition, the ‘formation’ of people into competent adults and citizens is not a 
mechanical processing of ‘raw products’ to a standard pattern, but is rather the process of 
engaging with the innate inquisitive and creative potential of the learner as an active subject 
who shapes society at the same time as it shapes him or her. This process requires a scientific 
method of its own, a method of studying and evaluating what happens in the encounters of 
people as subjects, in the creation of life concepts and social meaning, in the attempts at 
understanding the process of the formation of synchronic and diachronic cultural differences. 
Here the separation of theory and practice is much less straightforward and the complexity 
and immediacy with which this web of meanings is being investigated and conceptualised 
seems to correspond much more to the complexity and immediacy which characterise social 
work practice. Seen from this perspective social work need not be apologetic about the 
‘messy’ nature of its theory formation – it can, rather, be proud of its immersion in ‘life 
processes’ its discipline represents, possibly as a paradigm for other disciplines and 
professions (Parton, 2000).  
 
Nevertheless, as shall be shown in the following, there are no grounds for ‘glorifying’ the 
social pedagogy model and simply adopting it as the answer to all the problems social work 
is facing within the applied social science tradition. Social pedagogues are being confronted 
with exactly the same dilemmas at the theoretical and political level (Thole 1999b) and it is 
therefore more important to highlight the intricate interplay between academic and political 
discourses throughout the history of the social professions and to advocate that the answer 
lies not in social work refining its research agenda but in taking the political aspect of 
research more seriously, not just as context but as a critical dimension of the methodology 
itself. The theme of ‘encountering the other’ dealt with in the previous chapter has equal 
relevance in research as it has in practice. A communicative approach means not taking 
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identities as fixed, essentialist qualities, but as negotiated, emergent sets of social 
relationships which need to be embedded in political frameworks of rights and obligations. 
The aim of social work research is not the discovery of pre-existing communities of identity 
or layers of meaning, but the creation of the conditions for interactive social citizenship in 
the creation of such meaning, in practice and in research. 
 
There has indeed always been something peculiar about the type of knowledge used by 
social workers. It is hard to deny that their methods, in all European countries, very much 
originated in ‘plain common sense’ being systematically applied by ‘no-nonsense people’. 
They saw themselves not as soft-hearted almsgivers who did their work for heavenly rewards 
in secular imitation of religious missionaries, but as rational beings intent on bringing 
general and long-lasting solutions to social problems. Their type of common sense was 
characteristic of a particular class in the industrialising Western societies, a class that had 
gained its social and economic advantages by applying the particular pragmatic rationality 
that a capitalist market economy required. This rationality was turned into common sense 
and thereby assumed also its moral authority, parallel to and interlacing with that rationality 
of patriotism (see chapter 5). Common sense sees no need to base itself on research – it 
regards the personal daily success stories of practice experience as its field of research, often 
encapsulated in proverbs and hence given the appearance of universal validity. Early social 
work needed no other way of knowing; in fact the application of common sense had what 
today would be termed an anti-discriminatory dimension about it: as long as the solution to 
the problems encountered by recipients of organised charity needed no ‘special’ knowledge, 
these clients could be seen as part of ‘mainstream society’, at least potentially, and it was up 
to them to prove through their behaviour that they were capable of belonging to mainstream 
society. ‘There can be no doubt that the poverty of the working classes of England is due, not 
to their circumstances (which are more favourable than those of any other working 
population in Europe), but to their improvident habits and thriftlessness. If they are ever to 
be more prosperous it must be through self-denial and forethought.’ (Charity Organisation 
Review 1881, vol 10 p. 50 quoted in Jones 1983 p 76).  The price of this incorporation was, 
as with all universal expert systems, the loss of self-defined identity, the imposition of a 
generic identity which always already knows ‘the other’.  
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Sure enough, these early charity workers did not actually get very far by trying to model 
their clients’ behaviour on their own successful adaptation to shrewd economic thinking, by 
giving good examples themselves and appealing to reason and its intrinsic rewards. The 
subsequent rise of Freudian psychology to the position of the decisive paradigm in so many 
of the early social work courses in the industrialised world and its impact on the 
development of the casework method can partly be attributed to the ingenious and alluring 
project it pursues, which is to shed light on the workings of the unconscious and emotion-
driven parts of the human mind that are largely responsible for our irrational and 
unreasonable acts by systematising them and identifying their internal logic. In other words, 
it claims to succeed by bringing the realm of unreason also under the sway of reason, by 
completing the great Enlightenment project of gaining insight into the last uncharted 
territories of the all-too-familiar: human weaknesses, failures and depravities. 
 
Freud’s psychological model remains highly controversial and epitomises in many ways the 
dilemmas faced by all modern, rationality-based and therefore objectifying scientific 
paradigms when they turn their attention to the enquiring subject, in other words when they 
try to come to terms with the phenomenon of human reflexivity. Freud himself was very 
clear about his goals and the consistency of his method when he extended his scientific 
medical training and his research experience in neurology into the realm of human 
behaviour. For him the world he discovered, the world of unconscious drives and of the 
mental apparatus, revealed their logic to the explorer with such regularity that he felt able to 
deduce scientific laws of nature from his observations with which he could explain the 
genesis of mental illnesses such as neuroses with the same consistency as the models of 
causality which physicians had used to understand physical illnesses like cholera and 
smallpox and treat them effectively. And yet Freud’s findings are not verifiable in the same 
empirical way, and terms like the Id, the Ego and the Superego remain ambivalent to this 
day. Do they signify ‘actual’ structures of the mind or are they best thought of as metaphors 
whose substance can never be confirmed in the same way as the metaphor of an atom or a 
bacillus can be verified under the microscope? Much of the validity of research done on 
Freudian findings depends on the perspective of the observer. 
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It is interesting to note how this ambivalence in Freud’s method was then given opposite 
‘spins’ in the context of different prevailing national and political cultures. In England 
Freud’s method, and the security and prestige it promised to practitioners in the 1920s on 
account of its positivist implications, was treated as a direct parallel to the social enquiries 
that had been conducted earlier by figures associated with the Fabian Society. Statistical 
investigations into the prevalence of poverty in certain districts, as conducted by Joseph 
Rowntree in York and Charles Booth in London, had found clear evidence that poverty was 
not the result of individual failings, weakness of character, or lack of motivation, but of 
structural causes such as the absence of work opportunities, poor housing conditions and 
lack of educational opportunities. The factors accounting for social problems were 
quantifiable and the moral appeals, the principal instrument of the early charity workers, 
though being based largely on reason rather than on religious or other ideological prescripts, 
were therefore misplaced.  
 
Although an ardent controversy characterised these contrasting positions in the early phase 
of the search for theories to underpin social work practice, reflected in the contrast between 
the Charity Organisation Society which advocated individual case-work and the Fabian 
Society seeking to establish the basis for social improvements in the reform of social 
conditions, they were united in the quest for the establishment of objective criteria for their 
actions. The responsibility of the expert or the professional was expressed in a fund of 
knowledge which was acquired through systematic studies with individuals or sections of the 
whole society as their objects. The objectivity of such knowledge was regarded as a 
safeguard against arbitrary or interest-led interference and manipulation in the lives of 
people, whose interests were taken care of in an impersonal manner by the quality and 
detachment of the knowledge base. The compromise was reached in the classic textbook of 
the time, Mary Richmond’s Social Diagnosis (Richmond, 1917), which advocated the 
systematic investigation of all pertinent factors affecting a person’s problematic situation. Its 
title makes conscious reference to diagnosis as the defining tool of medicine. This served not 
only as a practical guide for the complex social and psychological indicators to be taken 
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account of by the practitioner but also to enhance the status and prestige of the profession as 
a respectable, science-based activity.  
 
But what are the underlying assumptions of this kind of practice and this kind of knowing? It 
basically continues the line of development which since the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment had installed science, defined in the form of the systematic application of 
reason, as the dominant and most powerful paradigm of understanding the world, freed from 
the impositions of dogma and the hierarchy of learning that was passed down the line of 
illustrious authorities. Knowing was now in the hands of anybody who followed the method 
and used the power of thinking linked to the accuracy of observation. It was in this sense a 
democratic tool, paralleled in religious terms by the Reformation which set out to liberate 
believers from the grip of the Church hierarchy and gave them direct access to the truth in 
the form of the Bible translated into the vernacular.  Reason promised to establish its 
authority not by coercion or persuasion but by revealing the universal self-evidence of the 
truth as contained within the laws of nature. Science made its spectacular conquests, closely 
accompanied by the military conquests by the West that culminated in colonialism: 
rationality, the superiority of Western science and technology, functioned as the decisive 
element of legitimation for these displays of power, force and violence. For rationality 
admits only one universe, one truth, and one authority, a realm within which there is really 
no room for diversity. ‘The other’ is an object of investigation until it is incorporated into the 
codex of ‘the known’ and hence robbed of its qualities of ‘otherness’. Western rationality 
simply had no room for pluralism, and even where it came face-to-face most directly, vividly 
and inescapably with plurality, namely when dealing with human beings and their diverse 
interests, life-styles and cultures in politics, the political and legal systems that emerged in 
the process of democratisation based on reason showed a precarious propensity to help 
reason along with coercion and violence. Democracy became the formal instrument with 
which to reconcile the divergence of interests that exists in every society.  But it had severe 
limitations: first of all it involved only a highly selected group of citizens who were entitled 
to vote, at least at the beginning, secondly it was only a formal device which in itself did not 
promote the substance of social and legal values, and thirdly it posed the question of 
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representation that brought with it political parties and their ‘objectified’ class interests 
(Mouffe 1996).  
 
With the advent of industrialisation and the development of nation states, but also with the 
spread of movements for greater representation, democracy and liberation, societies in 
Europe began diversifying structurally and not just culturally. At the same time 
industrialisation and the agendas of nation states required homogenisation and 
standardisation of knowledge, behaviour and attitudes (Gellner 1983). Reconciling these 
conflicting demands became partly the task of the emerging social welfare systems; partly it 
was also the function of education systems, with compulsory schooling playing a central role 
in the creation and standardisation of national cultures and national languages. In both the 
educational and the social field two fundamentally divergent approaches could be (and were 
in fact) taken; one that treated the learner or the recipient of a social service as an object, as 
the material to be formed and processed so that it would take the required shape, and one that 
started from the inalienable personhood of the learner and his or her right to self-realisation, 
be that in situations of need (for social problems can be conceptualised as life-long learning 
opportunities), or in the course of a continuous process of the improvement of an 
individual’s innate potential.  
 
This latter direction can be exemplified with the reception of Freud on the European 
continent and particularly in Germany, which took a different course within this pedagogical 
tradition from that within Anglo-Saxon positivism. Pedagogy as an academic discipline was 
keen to develop an epistemology that differed from the positivism prevailing not only in the 
natural but also in parts of the social sciences. In the latter part of the 19th century the ‘human 
sciences’ generally (‘The Arts’ or Geisteswissenschaften) had put up resistance against the 
threatened dominance of the positivist model of scientific enquiry over all disciplines and 
argued that they required instead a methodological basis of their own (Dewe and Otto 1996, 
Hamburger 2003). The understanding of historical or literary texts required involvement in 
the lifeworld to which they referred and of which they were part rather than analytical 
abstraction and neutral distance as was the case with the objects of the natural sciences. The 
academic tradition which consolidated around these hermeneutic concerns asserts that 
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human beings are characterised first and foremost by their ability to give meaning to their 
world and their actions and that these meanings cannot be understood ‘objectively’ and from 
the outside; the learner, the researcher, has to participate in them, albeit systematically and 
consciously. Hermeneutics therefore proposes an at first sight paradoxical approach to 
understanding, namely that recognising the possibility that both the observer and the 
observed occupy separate subjective worlds and therefore cannot really understand each 
other is the decisive step that will eventually lead to some kind of understanding between 
both persons/worlds. Of course, such understanding cannot come about if both parties, both 
partners in this dialogue, remain static, even where written texts are concerned. The 
relationship has to be made dynamic and entails by necessity a process of interaction and of 
communication. 
 
In this regard the reception of Mary Richmond’s textbook Social Diagnosis on the European 
continent was indicative (see above chapter 5). Alice Salomon, a leading figure in the 
development of German professional social work and social work education (Kuhlmann 
2001), published a textbook under the same title, arguing that diagnosis (or Recherche, as 
she terms it significantly) does not amount to the amassing of mere data but involves their 
‘evaluation, comparison and interpretation. The total picture does not result from the 
addition of details’ (Salomon, 1926, p.7). Social workers research by involving themselves 
rather than by staying detached, by being moved and by recognising the affective processes 
that evolve from every encounter (cf Treptow 1995). Salomon in seeking to become engaged 
in a holistic process of Verstehen does abandon neither the concern for finding a universal 
reference point in the process nor her fascination with positivism; she develops a version of 
subjectivity-cum-universality that is most intriguing in as much as it appears to us today to 
be at one and the same time hopelessly dated and acutely modern (Treptow 1996). For her 
the subject of the social worker/observer is indeed not neutral. Her concern is the 
professional and academic training of women as social workers and it is to their womanhood, 
to their specifically female qualities, that she takes recourse as the guarantee for a non-
partisan, non-ideological approach to ‘caring’. Alice Salomon believed that the construction 
of an ideal of ‘motherliness’ could provide a point of encounter and of reference that not 
only gave individual clients directions for the improvement of their situation without feeling 
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threatened by the ideological, party-political agendas of a welfare state and a powerful class 
within it, but could also provide a blueprint for a better society in general beyond the self-
interests of political factions and interest groups.  
 
The texts of Alice Salomon give the impression that this form of feminism, which she uses 
very much for hermeneutic purposes, was constantly verging on the edge of total subjectivity 
but recoiled from its relativist consequences to seek reassurance in a ‘mystic’ universal 
reference point. Motherhood was one such universal heuristic; the idealised national 
community became another. This latter was the pathway taken, perhaps typically for a male 
scholar, by the prime exponent of German social pedagogy of the time, Hermann Nohl. He 
had been a student and assistant of Dilthey, the 19th century philosopher who had laid the 
foundations for the hermeneutic approach, and largely as a result of the experience of the 
First World War brought his philosophical studies to bear on practical concerns about the 
state of German society. He, like many ‘reform pedagogues’ before him, regarded pedagogy 
as the vital ingredient for the formation of a nationally integrated ‘folk’ community, an 
encompassing entity which in turn was vital for the moral formation of individuals in the 
face of party-political divisiveness and the alienation caused by industrialisation. For Nohl 
the universalising element in the pedagogical process is the encounter with ‘life’ in which a 
Hegelian Spirit has a guiding presence for those who do not rely on abstract reflection but on 
‘experiencing life as such’ (Blickenstorfer 1998).  
 
Both Salomon and Nohl wanted to avoid at all costs ending up with subjective relativism for 
their discipline, despite the value they placed on subjective meanings and their historical 
construction and reconstruction in intervention. Motherliness and the formation of a national 
folk community for them were not elements in the formation of particular, exclusive, 
superior identities, but reference points for a universal societal community capable of 
accommodating the diversity of ‘the other’. They were also agreed in setting their 
pedagogical programmes in opposition to party politics, although Nohl pessimistically had to 
admit that all pedagogical reform programmes ended up being subverted by party politics 
(Nohl 1982). Nevertheless, these proposals sound to present day listeners at best hopelessly 
idealist, nostalgic and romantic sentiments, at worst folk- and motherliness-promoting 
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ideologies that paved the way for Nazism. Neither Salomon nor Nohl were in any way 
propagandists or apologists for the Nazis - quite the contrary: both lost their positions under 
Fascism, although the latter had for a time seemed ready to give the ‘community appeal’ of 
Nazism the benefit of the doubt. But Nazism imposed its positivist reading on their intended 
hermeneutics.  
 
For just as social work was gingerly feeling its way towards an appropriate epistemology 
through the dilemmas of detachment and involvement and of universalism and particularism, 
in both research and practice, the political vulnerability of both the positivist and the 
hermeneutic approach was exposed devastatingly in the context of Nazi totalitarianism in 
Germany. The extent to which the status and knowledge insecurity of the social professions 
contributed to their incorporation into Nazi welfare ideology and their role in the selection of 
people destined by the system for segregation, incarceration and eventual elimination 
remains very much under-researched (Sünker and Otto 1997). The subjectivist approaches, 
in either their hermeneutic or in their identity-centred versions, amounted easily to a kind of 
naïve idealism that ‘went with the stream of history’, especially when the Nazi regime 
glorified motherliness, community, and the infusion of meaning into the coldness and 
senselessness of modern urban and industrial life. Heidegger himself, the chief exponent of 
hermeneutic philosophy in the 1930s, displayed very obvious leanings towards the regime. 
But although after the defeat of Germany this naïve enthusiasm was held mainly responsible 
for the unprofessional, ideology-driven conduct of the social (and indeed the medical and 
other) professions, it has to be recognised that positivism fared no better. When diagnostic 
decisions were made on the degree of ‘unsocial behaviour’ or on ‘hereditary defects in social 
skills’ in families with alcoholism, in populations with an itinerant life style, etc., the 
professionals firmly believed that they applied ‘objective criteria’ and distanced themselves 
from the consequences of their impartial diagnosis (Sünker and Otto 1997).  
 
In both epistemological traditions of the social professions the ethical and particularly the 
political questions had either been externalised or had been raised far too uncritically. Both 
could be fused and brought in line with political ideology without this triggering much by 
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way of effective resistance. Universalism and particularism had both failed to represent and 
protect adequately the excluded ‘other’. 
 
The social reconstruction and re-education programme which the United Nations and the 
Western Allies instituted in post-Fascist Europe which relied heavily on social work training 
as a means of ‘democratising’ the world (Altmeyer 1955) failed to come to grips with the 
full extent of this crisis of confidence that the Holocaust had represented for all sciences and 
humanities. Conceptually, it put all its faith in positivism and the creation of ‘neutral’ 
professionals bounded only by the precepts of self-determination and human dignity 
(Lorenz, 1994). Universalism was the unquestionable consensus in social work 
methodology, applying science-based methods without distinguishing (and thereby 
discriminating) on account of the recipients’ identity. From this perspective the only valid 
type of research was quantitative, and most of that was not undertaken within social work 
itself but within sociology and psychology, so that the discourse in social work really did not 
advance much beyond the point it had reached in the case work models in of the 1920s.  
 
The fundamental crisis of uncertainty in the social sciences was to occur later. It was not 
triggered, as might have been expected, by the turmoil of war and a world rent apart by the 
Cold War, but by the slow but steady exhaustion of the project of modernity in its failure to 
deliver the promised progress through reason (Nicholson 1999). The civil rights and 
women’s movements of the 1970s and 80s exposed not just the emptiness of the promise of 
universality and thereby equality contained within the project of modernity, but above all the 
highly subjective, power-driven interests vested in this type of universalism. Yet the impact 
of that crisis on social work and social work research was slow to arrive and was masked by 
the still prevailing endeavour of the social professions to gain prestige and status by 
operating to positivist principles regardless of their suitability to social work situations 
(Rojeck et al. 1988). This can be seen in the continuing prevalence of quantitative over 
qualitative studies undertaken in social work, despite some seminal qualitative work, most 
notably in the UK that of Mayer and Timms (1970: with the emblematic title The Client 
Speaks,). As Sherman and Reid state, ‘There was also a recognition that the study and 
analysis of what goes on in the actual process of practice had been shortchanged in favor of 
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measurable outcomes’ (Sherman and Reid 1994, p. 3). Even in the contemporary German 
context, where so much more primary work has been done on hermeneutic pedagogical 
theory, a recent review of trends in social work research found an overwhelming 
preponderance of empirical/evidence based practice (Thole 1999a, 1999b).  
 
This amounts to a very strong indication that social work’s quest for  autonomy and 
respectability is being conducted not from within the perspective of the discipline’s own 
requirements and parameters, but that it follows a political agenda of ‘scientific 
management’ and ‘bureau-professionalism’ (Harris 1998). This is understandable given the 
ever more explicit and overt politicisation of social work. Neo-liberal governments in Europe 
everywhere considered the profession at best a necessary evil that had its social uses only 
when it was kept in a subordinate position. They achieved this by reminding the profession 
of its inefficiency as measured by quantitative criteria and thereby installed quantitative 
measures as the prime outcome criterion. Subsequently, a new agenda set during the late 
1990s by centre-left governments in Europe of the New Labour type uses the efficiency 
criterion as a means of incorporating social work more firmly in its welfare agenda of 
‘activation’ and case management while still applying largely quantitative measures (Lorenz 
2001, Dahme and Wohlfahrt 2002).  
 
In the over-reliance on quantitative research designs highlighted above, the parameters of 
what is to be known have already been defined (Silverman ,1993). The prescription of 
‘evidence based practice’, which corresponds to this research preference and which is 
prevalent in social services across Europe today, accentuates the dilemma for social workers 
over their social and political position: on the one hand they are to take account of the 
concerns of clients first and foremost, on the other hand they have to complete this task 
within socially and politically already defined criteria of acceptability and cost efficiency. 
How can the personhood of the client be constituted as that of a real partner in a context, in 
which socially, culturally and indeed ethnically distinct identities and hence needs are pre-
defined bureaucratically and differentiation is used only for purposes of categorisation? How 
can social work develop a coherent mandate when the very notion of a welfare consensus is 
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disappearing from the agenda, to be replaced by the fragmentation and privatisation of social 
services (Khan and Dominelli, 2000)? 
 
The dilemma is further aggravated by developments within the practice field which are 
generating their own agenda for practice and research, in the wake of the growing 
importance of social movements in all areas of welfare. These take up the critique levelled 
against professions and their hold on social and political power generally, and strive to apply 
research designs that reflect the interests and views of service users (Beresford, 2000). 
Qualitative research models are an obvious choice when the aim is to represent users’ 
authentic voices and this has indeed inspired a proliferation of methods which offer 
alternatives to positivism. This development has been facilitated by the ‘exhaustion’ of the 
project of modernity in the social sciences mentioned above, and their general ‘turn towards 
the subjective’. But it needs to be examined whether ‘the other’ actually has a better chance 
of being represented in this way or whether new distortions and forms of exclusion result 
from these trends. The call for client self-representation could be regarded as a kind of return 
of ‘common sense’ (as the alternative to expert systems), however in its subjective, 
fragmented version, valid not for a ‘common universe’ of meaning but only for distinct 
universes of people who share the same identity characteristics. As Williams and Popay state 
in relation to the development of a new framework for welfare research: 
 
The development of new social welfare movements based on the politics of 
identity has drawn attention to the particular, and often overlooked, needs 
of social groups and challenged the “false universalism” of welfare. … 
However, they (i.e. these movements) also run the risk of freezing or fixing 
people into single unitary identities, when in fact, their self- identities may 
be quite complexly and multiply constituted (in terms of class, race, 
ethnicity and so on). (Williams and Popay, 1999, p. 170) 
 
Hence for social work the split in the consensus on validity criteria is not solely an academic 
question over the detached choice of research methods; underlying that is the struggle for 
social work’s position in society, the conflicting forms of legitimation of its actions, and 
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above all the ethical foundations of various research and practice options. And so the muddle 
seems intractable, and respite beckons only from the direction of some post-modernist 
viewpoints which embrace subjectivity and relativity quite happily and suggest that a 
fragmented approach is indeed the only possible way forward. But an ‘anything goes’ 
attitude is no option for the establishment of accountable practice, no matter how fashionable 
this might look in an intellectual context and no matter how much the post-modern critique 
has helped to weaken the dominance of the positivist position. When Seidmann states that 
 
postmodernity may renounce the dream of one reason and one humanity 
marching forward along one path towards absolute freedom but it offers its 
own ideal of a society that tolerates human differences, accepts ambiguity 
and uncertainty, and values choice, diversity and democratisation 
(Seidmann, 1998, p. 347) 
 
it must be asked whether this ideal simply emerges by letting go of other strictures or 
whether toleration and acceptance can only be achieved by means of a systematic process 
itself resembling a method. Mere deconstruction, mere reflexivity and subjectivity, as Parton 
rightly points out in his critique of Schön’s (Schön 1987) proposal of the ‘reflective 
practitioner’ (Parton, 2000), is not enough and could, indeed, lead to the same kind of 
‘detachment’ that paved the way for ‘ideology-prone’ practice of scientific detachment in the 
Nazi era. 
 
Social work has to confront a bigger challenge than merely the ambiguity and uncertainty 
arising from matters concerned with research. As the previous chapter sought to 
demonstrate, it is centrally and generally concerned with creating the possibility of 
understanding others across the chasms of ‘difference’ that are opening up in a globalised yet 
fragmented society. Or to put it another way round, it is the possibilities of creating such 
understanding on which efforts in practice and in research need to converge. This proposed 
comprehensive project, and the type of research that would follow from it, does indeed 
connect with the hermeneutic tradition and with the perspectives opened up by the discipline 
of social pedagogy on the European continent, which so far have had only a marginal impact 
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on English-language discourses in social work. Hermeneutics in the version of critical theory 
elaborated by the Frankfurt School and in particular by Jürgen Habermas opposes the 
postmodern indifference to universal ethical questions while at the same time addressing 
issues of identity and diversity very explicitly (Ashenden, 1999). Meaning and identity for 
Habermas are not just given entities but are being continuously constituted communicatively 
in what he terms ‘the lifeworld’ (Habermas 1987). In engaging in a process of 
communication, in the course of which we want to be understood and to understand, we all 
(‘experts’ and ‘lay people’ alike) give an implicit commitment, however minimal, to rules 
and conditions without which communication cannot happen successfully. Genuine 
communication can only take place and be defended against all the interference of games-
playing, manipulation and oppression which threaten understanding if in the act of 
communication the transcendental conditions for understanding prevail which require a 
minimal commitment to the possibility of understanding. Just as the encroachments on the 
lifeworld by ‘the system’,  whose rationality is imposed through the media of power and 
money, constitute the true crisis of the welfare state and need to be reversed (Habermas 
1994), the processes distorting communication in research also need to be reversed in the 
search for socially meaningful, critical and emancipatory approaches. The lifeworld in which 
these processes happen cannot be researched from a situation of detachment but only from 
one of involvement, albeit of critical involvement (Fook 1999). This means designing 
approaches that create mutual respect for differences and yet commitment to a common 
cause between the communicators, establish rules in the process of communicating, and aim 
at achieving consensus on the aims, scope and uses of the research. The identification and 
gradual reduction of threats and distortions, which will inevitably occur but which constantly 
subvert communication, are very much part of the research process. Out of this kind of 
action research identities can be constituted in the process not as sets of individually separate 
identities or as given group identities, but as emergent communities, fleeting and yet stable 
enough on account of the rules which inform and govern them, rules which in themselves 
expand to unwritten and indeed written rights and in that sense to political commitments, 
penetrating out from the lifeworld back into the system (Habermas, 1990). The ‘community 
of understanding’ which this process and commitment constitute is therefore ultimately a 
political entity, and the participants consequently need to confirm each other as citizens, as 
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people who do not just tolerate each other’s differences but negotiate them towards common, 
and this means now consensually agreed, elements.  
 
To illustrate this with a topical scenario used already in previous chapters on intercultural 
practice: the very serious concern over the level of child sexual abuse which is being voiced 
in practically all European countries converges ever more strongly on the exclusion and 
incarceration of perpetrators as the only effective means of safeguarding the wellbeing and 
integrity of children. Social workers and other ‘liberal-minded’ professionals get accused of 
having wasted too much effort on understanding the minds of paedophiles and thereby on 
finding ‘excuses’ for them which lead to them being given second chances inappropriately 
and dangerously. From a pedagogical perspective, however, the issue needs to be stated the 
other way round: the mind of a person who is not being understood, who is placed outside 
the potential community of those who seek to share a common language, is a very dangerous 
phenomenon indeed because we can never be sure of ‘catching’ all perpetrators and, when 
they are arrested, of eliminating their influence lastingly. This understanding cannot be 
derived from objective criteria but requires at least a degree of ‘involvement’. Sure enough, 
there are psychological profiles of abusers, there is an array of evidence that accumulates 
about general precipitating factors, there are legal criteria - but all these represent ‘the 
system’ as formalised and abstracted realms of power. They have yet to be researched in 
terms of their real relevance, their meaning, and applied appropriately to a concrete context, 
and such understanding needs to be created again and again in each ‘case’. The ‘truth’ about 
a person rests not with the expert; it emerges from the communicative choreography of 
something like a courtroom, in which all the people affected participate and strive to 
determine rules that are meaningful to the specific situation. And the process of establishing 
the truth only comes into its own when it leads to change, to a situation in which the actual 
and potential damage is not externalised (in the form of procedural avoidance or routine) but 
where the relationships which turned so harmful and damaging are yielding to the possibility 
of being fundamentally re-worked. The child victim remains linked to the father who has 
caused harm, no matter how far and for how long the perpetrator is locked away, just as the 
traumatic events need to be worked on rather than just ignored. Social workers can supply 
the vital link between these separate and yet connected worlds, and their ability to ford the 
 149
divide depends vitally on their communicative competence which is in turn related to the 
kind of research which helps to articulate the internal world of both victim and perpetrator. 
 
This process therefore does involve rationality at the same time as it acknowledges the 
limitations and indeed the destructiveness of rationality. It constitutes ‘the other’ as different 
at the same time as it aims at establishing a consensus over universal principles and criteria 
(Dewe and Otto 1996). This is more than a mere pragmatic and eclectic bringing together of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods, of positivist/empirical and 
constructivist/subjectivist principles, of theory and practice. Instead it spells a research 
agenda that is simultaneously an academic and a pedagogical task, precisely not in the sense 
of teaching the other party ‘a lesson’ but of trying to constitute bonds beyond the mere 
determination of exclusion and inclusion of ‘categories of people’ such as ‘perpetrators’ and 
‘deviants’. It is a research task that strives for accountability in the face of the complexity of 
societies; it seeks to connect and include through the creation of communities of 
communication while at the same time imposing safe limits to the degree of ‘inclusion’ in 
such re-connected, safeguarded communities. But these limits need to be found at the level 
of lifeworld communication; ultimately they cannot be imposed via criteria formulated 
entirely at the level of the system.  
 
Social work’s apparent difficulties with research, and the tangled history of its epistemology, 
just like the entire uncertainty over what actually constitutes its subject matter, are 
indications that the discipline occupies a critical point in society at the intersection of system 
and lifeworld. Hermeneutic reflection on this position and the forms of research and practice 
that follow from  it can not only give the social profession more confidence, but can also 
assume paradigmatic significance for other professions  caught up in the current crisis of 
confidence over professional knowledge and expertise. Accountable practice is inseparable 
from the quest for reliable knowledge, which is in turn dependent on processes of 
legitimation within a democratically constituted community. There is indeed validity in 
seeking ‘common sense’ as the basis for social work intervention; not, however, common 
sense as a fixed, already given form of wisdom, but as something always yet to be 
constituted and negotiated. Social work research must face up to its political responsibilities 
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in this comprehensive sense rather than delegating and externalising them, no matter how 
uncomfortable this burden is. The quest for knowledge is and remains an ethical task, and as 
such its pursuit is to be assessed in terms of how it reaches ‘others’, rather than how 
consistent it is in itself. 
 
In this situation it seems epistemologically helpful for social work that a starker polarisation 
has set in between universalism and positivism-inspired empiricism on the one hand and a 
new self-confidence in subjectivism and constructivism on the other.  ‘Experience’ came to 
be taken seriously again as a subject of and as a vehicle for welfare research, particularly in 
studies inspired by feminism, which simultaneously challenged the alleged neutrality of 
conventional approaches. ‘Because gender-absence and gender-neutrality in social science is 
impossible to obtain, presentations in these traditions do not eliminate power relations 
between women and men, but rather only serve to obscure them’ (Hanmer and Hearn 1999, 
p. 107). Other social movements, notably those of black people, people with disability, 
psychiatric illness, social care users and trauma survivors, add their voice to the critique of 
‘top-down research’ and seek to re-claim the right to their authentic representation in 
research (Beresford and Evans 1999).  
 
With those challenges questions of identity move centre stage once more, not just in terms of 
the identity of service users, but also of that of service providers, individually and 
collectively. For the movement promoting emancipatory, user-led research has a very 
distinct agenda of challenging the professional power of established professions which they 
see as being maintained not least by means of ‘authoritative’ research. Here the interplay 
between intellectual, professional and political factors comes into play again and a shift in 
emphasis and orientation really only becomes effective in the wake of social policy changes 
aimed at altering the role and structure of public social services fundamentally (Gibbs 2001). 
It appears like a curious and dangerous coincidence for social work that the agendas to ‘de-
construct’ its power and structure are coming from both those directions, from neo-liberal 
policies and from user movements, which makes it very difficult for social work to respond 
to these demands in a non-defensive manner. It might hold sympathy for the ‘emancipatory’ 
approach to research as it concurs with some of its central values, but such sympathy is 
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going to be short-lived if it results in the gradual abolition of social work’s recognised place 
in society. But once this conflict is seen in line with social work’s straddling position 
between system and lifeworld new, less defensive responses become possible, not least in 
terms of research strategies. 
 
This might also apply with regard to social work facing the dilemmas resulting from the 
fundamental philosophical challenges posed to all ‘truth claims’ by post-structural and post-
modern positions which compound the uncertainty over its approach to research. Their 
programme has been to lay bare the power structures contained in all regimes of truth and 
resulted in the de-stabilisation and de-centring of all positions previously held to be 
authoritative (Rojek et al. 1988). Identities can therefore no longer be taken as simply given, 
but only as constructed and transient, and this sobering realisation not only suspends the 
authority of empirical studies but also relativises the seeming authenticity of subjective 
accounts.  
 
Seen from a historical perspective, the sharp divisions over the choice and function of 
research in social work today are not a new phenomenon. However, they present themselves 
with unprecedented force (Gibbs 2001), and this indicates not that social work per se is in a 
confused state but that the rupture between system and lifeworld and the processes of 
differentiation within each of those domains have become more acute. Social work is 
unavoidably caught up in this process and finds its role and identity threatened by the 
bewildering plurality of demands and of reference points in this debate. What seems 
therefore to be more important than making decisions on whether to pursue this or that 
research methodology is to relate the discourse on research back to fundamental reflections 
on the place and role of social work in society. The plurality of forms of social work referred 
to in the introductory chapter can serve as a heuristic device to a better understanding of the 
dilemmas it faces.  On the one hand there are many parallel ways of interpreting this role on 
account of the historical nature of the profession, and this means its dual mandate between 
system and lifeworld. On the other hand it also provides a basic understanding for the shared 
themes connecting those different manifestations. In its vibrant and immediate link to 
lifeworld processes, despite their often contradictory effects on epistemology and practice, 
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social work keeps open its potential for communicative action, action that engages with 
conflicting norms, wishes and aspirations in such a way that it creates the conditions for a 
consensus (Lorenz 2001). Social work research can ultimately only make sense as research 
that is congruent with its social mandate, and this means that it needs to develop as 
communicative action. The many attempts at framing social work research as a reflexive 
process which are currently under debate are hopeful signs in this direction (e.g. Fook 1999). 
This debate needs to be linked, however, to a critical theory of society in order to prevent its 
function and its results from becoming absorbed into the system with its pursuit of 
instrumental action, thereby risking to effect unintended consequences of tighter and more 
powerful social control. In this sense it is necessary for both social work practice and 
research to take stock of the changing social policy context in which social work operates in 
Europe, and to explore the interplay between political, cultural and scientific developments 
as they affected social work during the formative stages of European nation states and now 
during the decline of the nation state as a seat of governance. This task will be the subject of 
the following chapter.  
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8. Capitalism and globalisation as challenges for social work in Europe  
 
 
 
From the middle of the 1990s onwards social workers in Europe encountered a perplexing 
similarity of experiences almost regardless of the welfare regime under which they worked, 
notwithstanding the differences in welfare regimes referred to in the last chapter: While the 
demand for social services is undiminished or even growing as reflected in the number of 
staff employed (Rauschenbach 1999), all social services seem to be placed under severe 
financial constraints accompanied by organisational changes pointing towards the delegation 
and privatisation of large sectors of the public social services, and by methodological 
changes in the form of the new concept of social management (Badelt 1997). These 
developments indicate that the relationship social work has, by necessity, with the prevailing 
economic system of capitalism, is changing universally as the nature of the capitalist 
economy is changing. Where the aspiration to obtain professional status formerly meant that 
social work sought to rise above having to compensate clients for the adverse effects of 
economic inequality (this task could then be left to mechanism of gradually developing 
social policy measures, at least ostensibly) it was now becoming increasingly and explicitly 
enmeshed in economic matters and more specifically in helping to secure the success of the 
new form of capitalism. This can be seen both in terms of the economic impact the decisions 
by social workers have on the lives of their clients, and in terms of the organisational 
conditions under which they are operating themselves in the context of the prevailing 
efficiency drive.  
 
With the changes in the dialectics of labour and capital towards what has been described as 
‘digital capitalism’ the nature of ‘the social’ in the form of the interlacing arrangements of 
social solidarity within the nation state are being subjected to a fundamental revision. The 
nation state as a territorially defined unit, which was  potentially always in conflict with 
capitalism but functioned in effect as a stabilising and motivating influence on the 
development of capitalism, is losing its powers of governance and hence its role as central 
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reference point for the organisation of the relationship between labour and capital (Böhnisch 
and Schröer 2002). Transnational companies, which in contrast to multinational companies 
are now capable of forming entire independent economic networks, are intent on breaking 
the link to distinct locations as ‘bases’ for their operations in the interest of the total 
flexibilisation of the production process and hence of labour, re-creating the local instead as 
mere sites of consumption. 
 
The new features of capitalism enlist social work in a potentially very different way in the 
project of economic and social transformation, in making the new economic system work 
more smoothly and in giving it the appearance of legitimacy.  Whilst social work owes its 
existence to its capacity to play an auxiliary role to capitalism it never before had 
experienced the dominance and pervasiveness of capitalist economics as explicitly as under 
the conditions of globalisation. Gone is the political will to create free spaces and 
‘protectorates’ in which the commodification of social relations was held at bay or could 
even be suspended, which had been a central feature of welfare state developments in all 
their national forms (Esping-Andersen 1990). So far the profession and the operations of 
social services within the various constructs of the welfare state were always somehow 
exempt from the strict application of market principles, whereas they now become 
increasingly incorporated into them, and this not only organisationally but also in the 
intention of the service they are to provide: social workers become directly instrumental in 
this project of the transformation of social relations into commodity transactions on which a 
globalised digital capitalism depends, of which the absorption of social services into a 
limitless commodity market is but one sign.  
 
Part of these global economic and social changes is the re-structuring of the nation state as 
the mediating institution between welfare and economics. The ‘hollowing out’ of the state 
(Jessop 2000a) and especially the reduction of its steering capacity through social policies is 
one of the effects of the phenomenon of globalisation which can be taken here as the 
complex interaction of developments at the technological, cultural and social, political and 
economic level:  
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- The technological changes are perhaps most apparent in everyday experience as 
they have offered media access and communication links beyond borders on a 
vast scale causing a decisive shift in the social perception in the relative 
positions of core and periphery.  
- Cultural changes had already been set in motion by the mobilisation of ethnic 
and gender identities in social movements and follow now in the wake of these 
technological possibilities, particularly in the dissemination of cultural markers 
such as music, writing, fashion and general life styles. There ensues a new 
counter-flow of homogenisation and differentiation, explored already in chapter 
2, which constantly pulls down and re-establishes cultural boundaries and 
barriers and sets identities in a constant state of flux.  
- Linked to that are therefore new social phenomena around these processes of 
identity formation and re-construction which become geared towards a much 
wider variety of reference points. Identities are no longer contained within 
national and regional geographical entities and established cultural patterns, but 
offered as infinite, seemingly unlimited choices which are, however, 
simultaneously denied to most on account of resource and power criteria.  
- Politically, the nature of the nation state is changing profoundly ‘not only in the 
greater significance of globalization, triadization, regionalization, transnational 
urban networks, cross-border regions and so on, but also in the state’s 
denationalization (or “hollowing out”) as specific state powers and capacities 
are moved upwards, downwards and sideways’ (Jessop 2000a, p 180).  
- Economic changes, which by many are regarded as the driving force of all the 
other changes despite the relative autonomy of several of the other flanking 
developments, amount to a pervasive liberalisation of the market economy from 
statist policies resulting in a much greater ‘inter-penetration (of economies) 
through a variable mixture of extraversion, inward investment and an expanding 
international division of labour. This weakened the “taken-for-grantedness” of 
the national economy as an object of economic management and reduced the 
effectiveness of Keynesian policies‘ (Jessop 2000a, p 174f).  
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This scenario means that the engagement with politics becomes ever more imperative for 
social work if economic principles are not to be regarded as ‘inevitable necessities’, akin to 
natural processes, natural catastrophes perhaps, to which one can merely adapt and over 
which one has ultimately no control. It becomes vital to re-focus on the political mandate of 
social work, on the exercise of political choices that define the nature of social solidarity, and 
not to delegate this task to seemingly automatic, impersonal processes and developments 
such as the ‘invisible hand of the market’. 
 
First indications that the impact on social work of changes in the economic process are 
indeed still mediated by the state and by politics can be derived from the observation that 
while there are common definite shifts in the nature of social service delivery in all European 
countries, there are marked differences in those shifts, differences that are very much in line 
with the political cultures of the respective countries (Esping-Andersen 2002). In addition, 
changes that appear identical in direction can in fact have very different effects and 
connotations. For instance, social work methodology across Europe seems to be infused with 
concepts of ‘activation’ and ‘empowerment’ which can be regarded as positive or negative 
developments. In fact the decision over the merits of these interventive principles, which are 
by no means completely new anyway in the history of methodological discourses in social 
work (Kessl and Otto 2003), cannot be made at the methodological level alone; instead 
everything depends on the political context in which they are being applied, as Torfing 
demonstrated with the example of ‘activation’ in the Danish context (Torfing 1999). What 
can be identified in all welfare systems, however, is the greater polarisation between parts of 
the social service delivery systems that provide ‘care’ and those responsible for ever more 
restricted areas of ‘control’, the latter lying chiefly in the hands of public agents whereas the 
former are increasingly being ‘contracted out’ to the non-statutory sector (White 2003). This 
growing polarisation is evidence of the weakening of the various compromises that had been 
part of the nation state project in the form of the respective welfare regimes, so that the 
elements that constituted those compromises assume greater independence and become 
increasingly detached from an overall concept of social solidarity. 
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From these preliminary observations concerning the importance of social work’s continuous 
and inescapable embeddedness in history and politics follows also that the changes 
confronted by social work today do not mark a total rupture, a discontinuity, a sign of social 
work having also arrived in the land of postmodernity, poststructuralism, where the end of 
history has been proclaimed and may even have to be celebrated. On the contrary, they are 
meant to highlight just how important it is to examine any changes that have occurred within 
an historical context and not outside it. This has not the aim of establishing continuities 
within the apparent discontinuity as a means of demonstrating the unchanging sameness and 
status of the profession, but to utilise the political and at the same time the methodological 
potential that derives from recognising those historical connections not as incidental to social 
work but as its very medium through which it operates its special version of professionalism. 
This is the point where a wider European perspective on social work is particularly 
instructive not only academically but for the actualisation of practice perspectives in the face 
of the different historical and political meanings of the similarities and dissimilarities we can 
observe. Rather than retreating into abstract universals that are supposed to describe social 
work ‘in essence’ or ‘social work as it really was meant to be’, but also rather than meeting 
this diversity with postmodern indifference and celebrating the de-construction of a once 
ambitious though potentially powerful narrative, these observations are meant to lead back to 
detailed historical reflections. Social work remains a historically contingent profession, 
perhaps more than any other professions, and to abandon the sensitivity to history, to recast 
social work as an activity that determines its own parameters with no reference to any 
political or historical context, is to abandon its social dimension, to declare the social, in the 
words of Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehér, as a mere artefact (Heller and Fehér 1988). 
 
As shown in the introductory chapter, the history of social work in Europe is intricately 
bound up with the history of the European nation states. They in turn owe their existence 
partly to the accumulation of military power in the hands of a new political elite, and partly 
to an arrangement with the emerging principles of capitalism and to the careful harnessing of 
its power (Flora 2000). The fervour of national movements that swept across Europe in the 
19th century found its realisation predominantly in those political units, that commanded over 
an economically viable territory, with the exception perhaps of those curiously smaller units 
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like Luxembourg, Lichtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Andorra. Nationalist sentiments 
without a viable economic basis did not come to fruition. To what extent capitalism itself 
needed an arrangement with the nation state is a difficult historical and economic question 
and this is not the place to enter into the highly controversial debate about the origins of 
capitalism (see Frank and Gills 1993). Suffice it to say that capitalism, since the formation of 
its core principle of the commodification of goods and labour power beginning with the 
adventurous enterprises of mercantile families in the Renaissance and culminating in the 
industrial revolution (Wallerstein 1993), had on the one hand a very strong international and, 
for the standards of the respective transport and communication means of the time, global 
dimension. On the other hand it always needed an arrangement with political power centres 
to secure the ‘fair’ and unimpeded operation of the market as the place for commodity 
exchanges and hence latched on to the nascent nation states to form national economies. It 
needed this alliance for two basic reasons: for the protection of the liberal principles on 
which it is founded, the legal and, if necessary military enforcement of contracts between 
private individuals, and, in its industrial form, for the reproduction and educational 
preparation of a civilised labour force. The emerging social protection systems of the nation 
state, covering gradually all aspects from compulsory education to health care and social 
insurance, are therefore a direct response to the exigencies of capitalism. At the same time, 
the commodity principle of capitalism necessarily meant that the costs of social integration 
and protection were being ‘externalised’, did not feature in the profit calculations of the 
market and became the burden of nation states or of civil society from whose confines and 
obligations capitalism sought to set itself free to pursue profit maximisation across 
boundaries.  
 
This particular arrangement between the nation states and capitalism, in which organised 
welfare in whatever mix between governmental and non-governmental agencies and later 
explicit social policies featured quite prominently, in turn contributed to the formation of a 
series of social and political compromises that became characteristic of the nation state as a 
welfare state. These therefore required compromises, and these compromises were the 
framework within which social work forged its own characteristic methodological and 
organisational compromises within the specific political cultures of the different versions of 
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nation and welfare states in Europe which gave it its diverse professional forms and 
traditions that seem so incompatible. Granted this perspective of welfare and social work as a 
series of arrangements with capitalism mediated by the nation state, what we are witnessing 
today is the breaking apart of those compromises centred on the nation state, and this 
paradoxically as a result of the stability and success which welfare policy measures had 
produced for the market economy (Rieger and Leibfried 2001). In the contemporary scenario 
social work’s own compromises are coming under pressure as the nature of its association 
with the state changes, and this regardless whether social services in a particular European 
country are being delivered predominantly through governmental or through non-
governmental agencies.  
 
The following is therefore an attempt to make evident the divisive effects on social work  
training and practice of the dissolving of the compromises contained within the nation state 
construct and hence within traditional functions of social work, with the intention of 
underlining the impossibility of divorcing social work practice from social policy 
considerations and competences.  
 
Of the numerous compromises that were forged in the formation of this modern, ambiguous, 
effective and yet inherently unstable entity of the nation state, which set a pattern for nations 
world-wide eventually, the following are worth highlighting as of special relevance for social 
work, and this not in any particular order of priority, since they have to be seen as cyclically 
interconnected : 
 
1. At the political level the most prominent compromise was between the ideas of liberalism 
and the various forms of communalism as the two legs on which, according to Bauman, 
modernity was founded (Bauman 1995b). In a sense both these principles were a threat to 
the stability and the legitimacy of the state unless they were brought aboard and formed 
part of the crew of political ideas steering the nation state project. The former wanted to 
limit the state’s functions to an absolute minimum, to those of a custodian of rights, while 
communalism, particularly in its socialist form, sought to merge the contractual functions 
of the state with those of ‘brotherhood’ and hence of bonds which made the state 
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ultimately ‘superfluous’. Communalism emphasised the existence of a common cause, if 
not the existence of a common ‘essence’, in a broad spectrum of social categories from 
ethnicity to gender and class position, that constituted a sense of belonging beyond any 
contractual arrangements as envisaged under liberalism. It manifested itself under 
internationalist guises such as the labour or the women’s movement on the one hand, both 
of which were accused as being lacking in commitment to the nation, and as nationalism 
on the other, which also presupposed a common ‘substance’, derived from historical, 
ethnic and biological-racialist arguments, as the basis of a sense of belonging which also 
in a sense obviated the state as a political instrument. The nation states managed more or 
less to tie both tendencies down to a commitment to a national project in which 
democratic principles played a central though feebly developed role side by side with the 
fostering of emotional attachments and a sense of obligation to the national unit mainly 
through the education system and social institutions. The two world wars that erupted in 
and devastated Europe and large parts of the world during the 20th century bear witness to 
the inherent instability of this compromise. 
 
Implied in this nation state solution was therefore also the class compromise, and this in a 
dual sense: The nation state based its politics quite explicitly on class differences in as 
much as the liberal construct of the autonomous individual came to benefit particularly by 
the bourgeois elite which subsequently used it as the key principle of moral education and 
commercial conduct, while communalism, in a tamed and carefully controlled form, was 
applied to the masses, in an oppressive form once the sting of internationalism and self-
determination had been removed (Bauman 1995a). These politics thereby simultaneously 
acknowledged and denied the existence and relevance of class, holding out the promise 
for the masses of individuals capable of leaving the confines of communal bonds, 
securities and constraints and distinguishing themselves economically and socially as 
individual ‘climbers’ who benefited individually from the mechanisms of the market 
while relying on the fact that this system would allow only a few to succeed whereas ‘the 
anonymous masses’ would remain excluded from such opportunities of personal 
improvement.  
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Further implied in this political nation state construct was a compromise in the notion of 
citizenship, as outlined in previous chapters. The republican ideals had created a 
catalogue of rights which came to be a vehicle of political agitation from both the 
bourgeois liberal and the working class collectivist side, as demonstrated in the 
continental European revolutions of 1848 and the Chartist movement in Britain. Where 
these demands were conceded by the ruling bourgeois elite it happened at the price of a 
renewed emphasis on duties, not just as the contractual equivalent of civil and political 
rights, but as a pre-condition for obtaining rights in the first place. The civil notion of 
citizenship which ensued requires more than mere existence within the geographical 
confines of a state, more than simply being born in the territory of a nation state for 
somebody to qualify for rights – these rights have to be ‘earned’ first and extend therefore 
only to the ‘deserving’ who behave in a manner that qualifies them as ‘true’ holders of 
national characteristics.  
 
 
2. This particular political settlement was backed by developments at the cultural level 
which probably more than anything else gave the nation states their particular character. 
Nation states are distinctly modern phenomena, not just in the sense that they are mostly 
of quite recent origin, having emerged in the latter part of the 19th and the early parts of 
the 20th centuries, but also in the sense that they mark a break with traditional societies 
and the political and social principles that had constituted them, which Durkheim summed 
up as ‘mechanical solidarity’. Their basis is that of a society characterised by the division 
of labour and hence of a differentiation of roles that strive ever more evidently towards 
rational assumptions as enshrined in commerce, bureaucracy and the democratic 
formation of the general will of the people derived from an enlightened set of freedoms. 
And yet culturally, the social bonds that constitute and symbolise these modern creations 
are, in the European context, not grounded only on rational, universal and hence abstract 
principles but are invariably also being portrayed as ancient, as mythical in origin, as 
based on a collective yearning for cultural unity and homogeneity (Delanty 1996). This of 
course marks the compromise of nationalism, in its emancipatory and at the same time its 
oppressive form. National identity, promoted through a uniform national education 
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system and a standardised national language, became the carrier of not just ‘traditional’ 
social values, but of their re-cast modern version tailored not least to the requirements of 
industry and the free market economy (Gellner 1983). Through the device of this 
ambiguity identities could be manipulated, could be made operational for particular 
political purposes, particularly in the romantic version of a national identity which re-
worked the process of incorporation into a national cultural identity as the release from 
serfdom (Giesen and Junge 1991).  
 
Chief among these applications was the work ethic, which aimed at bringing the 
traditional notion of pride in one’s work across the threshold of the division of labour. 
The work ethic, detached from its artisan context, upheld pre-modern principles and 
conditions as the ethical basis for identity and self-worth while allowing none of the 
traditional contents to be preserved on which personal pride and identification with a 
product could come about. ‘The moral crusade recorded as the battle for the introduction 
of the work ethic … was in fact an attempt to resuscitate basically pre-industrial work 
attitudes under new conditions which no longer made them meaningful’ (Bauman 1998b, 
p.7).  
The other compromise between pre-modern and modern social claims and conditions, 
based on the same mechanisms, was the creation of a hierarchy of standards of moral 
conduct generally by treating personal/cultural and collective/national identities as 
products of quasi-biological mechanisms of evolution and cultural development. This 
extension of Darwinian principles from the biological to the social and cultural domain 
gave rise to racist constructs of national superiority which in effect formed tautologies of 
community bonds immune to critical argument (see chapter 2). As Giesen and Junge 
observe, ‘Gerade die Unmöglichkeit einer sinnvollen Gegenrede erlaubt die Inszenierung 
von Gemeinschaftlichkeit, die in der modernen Gesellschaftsstruktur keine unmittelbare 
Deckung mehr finden kann’ (The very impossibility of meaningful objections allows for 
the staging of communalism which cannot find any immediate backing in modern 
structures of society), (Giesen and Junge 1991 p.  297). With this device, claimed and 
applied by different European nationalities simultaneously, nationalism was exported 
globally in the form of colonialism, legitimating a hierarchical, exploitative world order 
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on the grounds of a spurious replacement of subjective cultural criteria with seemingly 
objective, scientific indicators. 
 
3. This latter achievement was based on a third level of compromises, the organisation of 
the scientific enterprise of enquiry, learning and application within the national 
framework. The liberation of scientific curiosity from dogma which had been initiated by 
the renaissance movement and had given the project of  the Enlightenment its 
characteristic stance steered science on a universalising course which saw no sense and 
justification in national boundaries and irrational cultural traditions. Yet Enlightenment 
has its dialectically mediated negative side, as Horkheimer and Adorno point out in their 
pioneering analysis.  
‘Wir hegen keinen Zweifel … dass die Freiheit in der Gesellschaft vom 
aufklärenden Denken untrennbar ist. Jedoch glauben wir ebenso, dass der 
Begriff eben dieses Denkens, nicht weniger als die konkreten historischen 
Formen, die Institutionen der Gesellschaft, in die es verflochten ist, schon 
den Keim zu jenem Rückschritt enthalten, der heute überall sich ereignet’ 
(We have no doubt that societal liberty is inseparably connected to the 
process of thinking that promotes entlightenment. However, we also believe, 
that the very concept of this way of thinking, no less than the concrete 
historical forms, the institutions of society, into which it is interwoven, 
contain the germinal point of this regression which is happening all around 
us today) (Horkeimer and Adorno 1947, p. 7f). 
Foucault’s perspective (Foucault 1992) on the development of modern science indicates 
similarly that this enterprise, though being geared at the liberation from the arbitrary 
power of traditional institutions, brought with it tremendous accumulations of power 
which were eagerly taken up by new regimes of governance harnessed among others in 
the form of the nation states. Science became committed to the national cause, or at least 
its organisation in universities and its application in technology constantly created this 
pull once universities became national institutions. As Bollenbeck states in relation to 
developments in 19th century Germany: 
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‘Der Kaiser, hohe Ministerialbeamte und Universitätsprofessoren betreiben, 
nicht ohne Widersprüche und Widerstände, eine Umschichtung innerhalb 
des “Bildungssystems” zugunsten des “Realismus”. Dabei beruft man sich 
nicht nur auf die Erfolge der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik, sondern 
auch auf die neue Situation wachsender Weltmarktkonkurrenz und 
imperialer Ansprüche. So heisst es in den Leitlinien einer hochkarätig 
besetzten Schulkonferenz von 1890, „die den alten Sprachen im Lehrplan 
gewidmete Stundenzahl“ sei einzuschränken, um den „durch die neue 
Weltstellung Deutschlands gesteigerten Anforderungen auch anderer 
Wissensgebiete gerecht zu werden’ (The emperor, high ministry officials 
and university professors promote, not without contradictions and 
resistance, a reorganisation of the system of formation in favour of 
„realism“. This is grounded not just in the success of natural sciences and 
technology, but also in the new situation of growing competition in world 
markets and imperial claims. The guidelines produced by a high level 
conference on school curricula of 1890 state “the number of hours in the 
curriculum devoted to ancient languages has to be restricted in order to do 
justice to the growing demands of other areas of knowledge created by the 
new world position of Germany’) (Bollenbeck 1996, p 227). 
 
The interests of the nation state combined the national scientific enterprise with the 
emerging national economies to create the competitive race of steamboats, of patented 
inventions and of warfare technology. While the autonomy of professors and of scientific 
research was safeguarded by the state in a system defined most explicitly by Humboldt, 
this safeguard depended on the usefulness of the universities for the national cause and 
remained therefore a fickle compromise, and not only in the natural sciences, but also in 
the Arts, where for instance the German concept of ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ implied a 
Hegelian universalism of ‘Geist’ which in reality manifested itself most clearly in the 
national cultural enterprises (Lohmann 1998).  
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All these different levels of compromises have in common that they stabilised a particular 
relationship between universalism and particularism at the level of the nation state. The 
nation state made the universal particular, it nationalised universal features in the economy, 
in culture and in science, while at the same time making the particular universal, declaring its 
own values, standards and identities as superior to all others with the implicit or explicit 
claim that sooner or later other nations would have to recognise the hierarchy it set up as 
valid and binding and hence submit to the dominance of one nation state. 
 
In the context of these arrangements social work also forged its own compromises in close 
affinity to the political developments of the nation state. These parallel compromises could 
be roughly summarised in the following way: 
 
1.  Politically, while couching its politics initially in quite unashamedly spiritual and 
moralistic terms, early social work in the form of organised charity in the emerging 
industrial slums in Britain saw its mission as rescuing individuals from becoming 
absorbed or going under in the ‘mass’. This mass was regarded as incapable of being 
integrated into the ‘body’ of the nation and hence constituted a perpetual source of danger 
and instability. While not subscribing to the Malthusian principle of non-interference with 
the self-limiting process of poverty and starvation a limited form of intervention was 
conceded as long as it was deemed ‘systematic’ (and that meant politically thought-
through right from the beginning) and not ‘indiscriminate’, guided by sentimentality. On 
account of their bourgeois background the pioneers of what was as yet rather unreflected 
practice regarded squalor, destitution, depravity, quite rightly, as mass phenomena, signs 
of ‘another world’ or indeed of ‘another nation’, a nation of the excluded, from which it 
was possible and necessary to escape into a promised land of dignity but only through 
particular individual efforts (Bommes and Scherr 2000). The effect of the rescue mission 
was both a pronounced form of individualism in the ‘proto-methodology’  of early charity 
work which premised human dignity on the willingness of the client to conform to a 
‘higher’, seemingly abstract form of the collective and a re-definition of the prevailing 
structural causes for exclusion as personal self-exclusion (Jones 1983). Parallel to that 
existed a form of social work delivery that arose from or allied itself to the existing and 
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emerging collectivities of the working class or the non-bourgeois women’s movement. 
However, its official recognition as social work would have been unthinkable because it 
would have jarred with the wider political agenda of ‘social adjustment’ with which social 
work became almost synonymous (and hence the title ‘social work’ remained suspect to 
community activists to this day, (Jones and Nowak 2000)). Nevertheless, this other type 
of social work did indeed happen, the numerous projects and initiatives in ‘bottom up’ 
community education, rights campaigning and self-help that emerged in that context were 
and continue to be witness to that, albeit under different occupational labels. These 
activists excluded themselves, for good political reasons, from the mainstreaming that 
occurred within the ambit of the nation state and within the parameters of its 
arrangements with the market economy that required the distinction between individual 
entrepreneurs and the masses. Overall the orientation of social work remained individual 
and this was no mere methodical choice but had deep political significance. Nevertheless, 
the door to much more collectivist approaches in social work remained always open and 
‘client self-determination’ was always a central principle in the development of social 
work methods and ethics.  
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political level 
 
nation state liberalism  communalism 
  class compromise: 
only the elite can 
afford 
individualism; 
workers become  
‘the masses’; 
political citizenship 
conceded selectively 
 
social work Malthusianism 
(poverty relief 
counter-productive) 
 settlement 
movement 
(bottom-up renewal 
of society) 
  rescue of individuals 
from faceless squalor 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  At the cultural level, social work’s individualism underwent a series of transformations, 
in line with the prevailing political trends highlighted above and the advancement of a 
scientific paradigm, which will need to be dealt with in the next section. Charitable 
assistance was an expression of and aimed at creating distinct cultural identities and 
allegiances and was being provided from within the confines of religious or humanist 
organisations. The cultural differences among theses were however gradually mediated 
through two factors, the underlying rationale for providing assistance in the first instance 
which constituted a rational act, despite the different ethical justifications, and the shared 
reference to the national cause, the building of an integrated, stable nation. In this way for 
instance the ‘difference’ constituted by the middle class women’s movement to other 
cultural positions and associations in society was mediated by its aspiring patriotism. 
Charity Workers offered their own identity to clients as examples to be imitated, at least 
in part, an identity re-cast, however, as a universal identity that would absorb differences 
of origin and of material means. The emerging profession provided a kind of ‘national 
curriculum’ of values equivalent to that which standardised the school system but 
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adjusted to the various cultural deficits it identified in the objects of their attention 
(Kunstreich 1997). This massive exercise in assimilation to, or rather in the construction 
of a national identity provided the fine-tuning of symbolic solidarity on which the 
unstable political entities of nation states so utterly depended. The mechanisms of 
inclusion and exclusion which the social welfare systems created came to be harnessed as 
sources of legitimation for the state once their rationale could be explained and 
exemplified. The nascent social policies could not achieve this end if ‘the wrong kind of 
people’ were either excluded or included. In every European country the criteria 
governing the distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor were made up 
of a mix of economic factors (the work ethic) and appeals to national pride. Notably, this 
assimilation programme was not delivered by state officials primarily on account of the 
rigidity of institutions in delivering exclusion and segregation ‘on principle’, but by 
organisations of civil society which were committed to national integration as a cultural 
project. Their way of delivery always made reference not so much to coercion, but to the 
voluntary, self-generated efforts by clients in determining their own destiny. 
 
 
 
cultural level 
 
 
nation state  modern rationality; 
freedom of expression; 
universal meanings 
 mythical past; 
ethnic superiority; 
cultural diversity;  
small universes of 
meaning 
  nationalism;  
cultural homogeneity; 
standardisation of 
manners - work ethic  
 
social work enlightened humanist 
detachment 
 leading by (superior) 
personal example 
   
 
national (= universal) 
standards of decency 
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3.  The emphasis on identity and its moral quality was lessened, or rather transformed, in the 
wake of the reflections on the sheer inefficiency of the moral approach as a method during 
the early historical period of social work. Leading by example or appealing to reason was 
just as likely to widen the gulf, to highlight the actual differences in the constitution of 
different types of ‘self’, to demonstrate or even mobilise the irrational nature of human 
behaviour as to overcome those deficits. Into this breach, resulting in constant 
disappointment and frustration, entered the promise of a scientific re-working of the 
social work enterprise (Scherr 2000). The introduction of academic discourses on 
methods of intervention fostered the affirmation of value neutrality combined with 
scientific explanations of previously inexplicable behaviour at the personal and societal 
level to open for the profession the door to recognisable and recognised psychological, 
sociological and pedagogical explanations and methods of intervention. Particularly those 
methods gained prominence in which the ‘self’ of the worker remained central and in 
which individual solutions prevailed. But this ‘self’ was now also recast in terms of an 
abstract willingness to listen, to be non-judgemental, to leave the solution to the client. It 
was in this context that the claim to scientific detachment of the social work profession 
gradually gained the upper hand over, for instance, the affirmation of female qualities of 
motherliness, which had served the German pioneer of social work education, Alice 
Salomon, as a central reference point for her pedagogical programme. This stance made 
the profession acceptable to modern sensitivities, even though the status of an 
‘independent profession’ was ultimately denied (Giesen and Junge 1991), but it made it 
no less attractive to the nation state project. It was in the guise of this very neutrality that 
social work went on to provide its detached diagnostic services for the racist welfare 
policies of the Nazi regime, fitting seamlessly into this epitome and final depravity of 
nationalist ideology, of a regime of power that had appropriated, exploited and 
harmonised all agents of civil society. By that time social workers were well on the way 
to establishing themselves as part of the bureau-professional, scientifically grounded elite 
that made the Holocaust proceed like a perfectly rational factory system (Bauman 1989). 
‘It was the spirit of instrumental rationality, and its modern, bureaucratic form of 
institutionalisation, which made the Holocaust-style solutions not only possible, but 
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eminently “reasonable” - and increased the probability of their choice’ (Bauman 1989: 
18). ‘Seeing people as people’ from a scientifically detached point of view was not a 
strong enough defence against this exploitation, if this was done in a manner detached 
from the critical analysis of the political consequences of such a method and of a political 
system that only regarded certain types of people as full citizens and indeed as full human 
beings. The compromise between scientific neutrality and professional commitment and 
“partiality” for human beings as such eventually paralysed the profession and contributed 
to its political instrumentalisation. 
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scientific level 
 
nation state enlightenment; 
autonomy; freedom 
from dogma 
 ideological 
instrumentalisation of 
knowledge;  
accumulation of power 
  national universities;  
national technological 
and cultural enterprise;  
scientific racism 
 
social work scientific detachment 
and neutrality; grand 
discourses (sociology, 
psychology, pedagogy) 
 subjective approaches; 
personal relationships 
and modes of solidarity 
  social diagnosis;  
case work; 
universalising of 
common sense 
 
 
 
 
 
These highly ambivalent and initially quite fluid arrangements consolidated themselves in 
the decades after WWII when the European nation states really came into their own. As 
Rieger and Leibfried, among many others, note, ‘The welfare state marks a high point in 
exclusive nation-statism…The welfare state represents the primacy of domestic social and 
economic policy vis-à-vis the world market and international politics. This constellation is a 
result of the social as well as political integration of the working class into the nation-state’ 
(1998: 367). It was during that period that the ‘bureau-professional’ breakthrough for social 
work (Harris 2003) was prepared in quite a number of countries, albeit with significant 
variations. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, arrangements varied according to the 
type of welfare regime that became established. A universal regime, such as it prevailed in 
Nordic countries, emphasised very much the entitlements of all citizens to state welfare 
services and lessened the degree to which stigma resulted from intervention. This model 
implied a high degree of state control over the economy, but also a high degree of 
homogeneity among service users, which made it difficult to articulate issues of identity and 
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difference. The corporatist model, prevalent in the Bismarckian tradition of Germany but 
also in the Netherlands and Austria, delegated welfare services to agencies of civil society. 
This entailed a higher degree of differentiation and the articulation of cultural difference, but 
the effects were kept within bounds by their commitment to preserving a framework of 
national identity. It is interesting to note that in those countries the state made a much greater 
effort at negotiating and fostering the social responsibilities of capital and industry. The 
brand of ‘pluralism’ in social service provisions it promoted through the principle of 
subsidiarity would have been too susceptible to deep social and economic divisions 
threatening the stability of the whole construct. Social workers in corporatist welfare regimes 
are not placed at the forefront of social divisions and of conflicts between the private and the 
public sphere as they are in residual models, because the dividing line between the spheres is 
much more diffuse and multi-layered. But this is certainly one of the implications of social 
work in a residual welfare regime such as in the UK, that it magnifies the significance of the 
border between the private and the public sphere as an immensely political issue because of 
the divided role of welfare it promotes. The state deliberately uses social services as a 
defence against the de-stabilising effects of a pronounced polarisation between capital and 
labour, which is why in the UK  ‘bureau-professional hierarchies were as much a basis for 
the power exercised by social workers as the basis for the exercise of power over social 
workers’ (Hugman 1991: 62). Welfare is divided between those who have to rely on state 
services and those who have the means to ‘care for themselves’, or at least out of other 
private means. This system has stigma and conflict built into it, no matter how careful social 
workers are in playing this down with the help of sensitive working methods.  
 
These historical reflections are meant to highlight the importance of considering the political 
context of methods in evaluating and developing them and at the same time of becoming 
aware of their political significance and impact. For instance, the pedagogical paradigm, 
largely unknown in the UK or at least not recognised as being constitutive of social work 
interventions, has the potential of lessening the praxis emphasis on deficits which is always a 
danger with psychological and applied social science paradigms. Instead it underlines the 
innate potential of every human being and hence the potential for growth and development in 
given social and political contexts. It also has a greater potential to articulate cultural 
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identity, or rather, it contains in its epistemology the tensions and conflicts that shaped its 
implementation in the nation state: socialisation and adjustment within pedagogy can be 
more easily read in both directions than within the other two paradigms, in the direction of 
fitting individuals into a cultural given or in that of organising a cultural milieu to correspond 
with the needs articulated by a self-directed individual or group. Indeed, the major schools of 
social pedagogy differ precisely in this regard.  
 
As these European differences between social work traditions and delivery systems become 
more widely known in the wake of European exchange and co-operation programmes, in 
which social work courses are very active participants, the question is, what to do with this 
diversity. What does the diversity signify? Is the diversity an issue at all, is the failure to 
achieve harmonisation a failure of social work? Is there a convergence discernible within the 
current changes or are they driving the different strands of social work even further apart 
from each other? And, most important of all, can these tensions and discrepancies be 
harnessed constructively as a means of confronting the contemporary social policy 
developments with their seemingly irreconcilable contradiction between equality and 
diversity? 
 
These questions point towards unresolved conflicts in the compromises contained within 
different national social work discourses. They can only be resolved and the changes in 
social work which we are witnessing can only be understood in their full significance in the 
context of the changing role and function of the nation state, and the changing role of the 
nation state in turn needs to be related back to a changing relationship with a capitalist 
economy. What we are witnessing at the level of the nation state is a moving apart of the 
compromise arrangements which had characterised and consolidated a particular model of 
the nation state. Capitalism is entering a new stage, is making itself independent from the 
nation state and is beginning to determine a new relationship between time and space on 
account of the digital technology it dominates, as explored in previous chapters. This 
development described as globalisation, which had always been latently present in 
capitalism, sets up a new set of dynamics between state and capital.  
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The disaggregation of factors, of conflicts and contradictions that had been bundled and 
contained within the politics of the nation state, sets free a whole range of forces which in 
turn affect also the nature of social work. What can be observed on the whole is that the 
mediating function of the state is weakening and that social services are therefore exposed 
more directly to economic influences than they were during the heydays of the welfare 
consensus. The changes witnessed in social services can only be understood against the 
background of the changing relationship between state and capitalism. 
 
At the level of the nation state the following separations and polarisations have set in: 
 
1.  Politically, the balance between liberalism and communalism has broken down, releasing 
both tendencies into their fields of gravity that are independent of the nation state concept. 
The increasing liberalisation of the capitalist market economy gave rise to a revival of 
ideological positions picking up on selected ideas of classical liberalism but mixed with 
extreme forms of individualism and a calculated disregard for anything primarily ‘social’ 
as this was never part of classical liberalism as such. At the same time and on the opposite 
end of this scale, communalism also re-emerges, but in fragmented form. It is perhaps 
indicative, that communitarianism for instance, while continuing a theme that can be 
traced back through the collective movements of the 19th century to pre-modern notions 
of community, makes little reference to the state either. Where it does, it regards the state 
likewise as a metaphor of a bigger community, but communities can equally be non-
geographic interest groups, and indeed the politics of single issue social movements have 
become a strong national and particularly international force, cutting across the party 
alliances that had been formative for the nation state period. Communalism also becomes 
the receptacle of resentment which aims at re-constituting the nation state as a one-sided 
interest community of tribalism and xenophobia. 
But as a consequence, the organisation of class relations mediated by the nation state 
between both poles also breaks down. This has the effect that individualism in the form of 
a bootstrap ideology, reaches much further into areas formerly protected by the bonds of 
collective class solidarity forged in the classical industrial confrontations. Elite and mass, 
entrepreneurs and collectivists, capital and labour no longer confront each other within an 
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awareness of their interdependence but have become split off from one another. To those 
striving to realise the choices that an unencumbered market capitalism suggests (no matter 
what their ‘classical’ class position is) the rest, those left with no choice, simply do not 
matter any longer, not as a reserve pool of labour, not even as a serious social threat of 
instability. Perhaps they interest remotely as consumers of leisure of which they have 
acquired an endless but unusable supply, but their consumer potential is always 
financially limited. They need to be contained and controlled and for that purpose private 
security businesses are moving into the market - state policing has long become narrowed 
down to more specialised tasks. The uncoupling of the political process from the 
mediation of the nation state makes the creation of solidarity and cohesion a commercial 
matter. ‘Earning’ the status of citizenship refers no longer to a merely moral quality but 
has assumed a highly material ring - only to transform itself to yet another criterion, that 
of ‘consuming’ one’s citizenship within the new interest communities, regardless of how 
and whether one actually earned the required cash.  
2.  Equally, the ruptures in the construction of cultural identity are all too obvious. Usually 
this phenomenon gets discussed from the perspective of the increases in immigration 
which have affected Europe. This view makes it easy to blame the immigrants for having 
caused the allegedly homogeneous national cultures to become heterogeneous and the 
ordinary citizen to be plunged into an identity crisis. This view fails to recognise that it 
was a new arrangement between the nation state and capitalism which necessitated labour 
mobility on a global scale and which made the maintenance of the myth of a 
homogeneous national culture untenable. The alleged crisis of identity is a crisis of the 
construct of a national identity. It is the dictate of a globalising economy which 
compounds this crisis by giving consumers of life-styleattributes, which replace cultural 
referents, a conflicting message: that they should be part of a unified world culture, and 
that they should also create their own individual style.  
3.  Scientific and educational agendas are also changing in line with the altered role of the 
state vis-à-vis the economy. Many academics who find themselves exposed to the winds 
of competitive research tendering in subject areas that never had anything to do with 
commercial considerations wake up to the realisations as to just how cosy the 
arrangements with the nation state had been. But it is not just the organisational 
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framework of research and knowledge creation that is affected by the loss of a national 
horizon, the boundaries of discourses themselves begin to disappear and admit a sense of 
relativity and subjectivity, particularly in the arts, that seeks a reference in postmodernism 
and post-structuralism, which provides however little in the way of an explanation. The 
trend is exemplified by the growth of ‘cultural studies’ as the new umbrella discipline that 
incorporates hitherto disparate disciplines, avoiding the claims to universality once 
expressed by the concept of the Geisteswissenschaften (cf. Oesterle 1991)but setting new 
standards for a ‘universal relativity’ of equally valid positions. True, the deconstruction of 
national certainties, the exposure of regimes of power that masqueraded as truths was 
long overdue and clears the way for new approaches, but these are a long way off yet. 
What has set in in the meantime is a great deal of cynicism and disillusionment.  
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DISAGGREGATION OF NATION-STATE COMPROMISES 
 
political level cultural level academic level 
liberalism / communalism homogenised national identity “national universalism” 
  
 
 
 
neo-liberalism communitarianism 
tribalism 
life-style 
individualism 
global 
homogeneity 
pragmatism of 
‘universally 
useful 
knowledge’ 
(cynical) cultural 
subjectivism 
individualised 
consumerism 
excluded 
‘superfluous ‘ class 
localisation 
resulting from 
resentment 
postmodern 
indifference 
to difference 
knowledge as 
commodity 
knowledge as 
power instrument 
      
 
 
 
Now the contemporary changes in social work can be explained as a product of all these 
changes. A brief review of impressions gleaned from different parts of Europe may illustrate 
this and open a way of seeing what dangers and possibilities they may entail.  
 
1.  The political changes potentially open up new possibilities for social work to move out of 
the individualism - communalism axis which it had always experienced as far too 
constraining. With the re-arrangement of social policies towards more efficiency and 
social control on the one hand the focus of case work narrows even further to the 
perspective of case management, and this in several European countries. Case or care 
management can imply that only certain functions of a person, not even the individual 
person as a whole, is of concern. People are seen from this perspective as individual 
collections of need in relation to resources. On the other hand with the changing 
perspective from ‘clients’ to ‘consumers of services’ new forms of collective action open 
up, particularly in the field of welfare rights, lobbying by user groups and community 
action. Nevertheless, the overall integrating effect of the state’s influence on the social 
work mandate is being replaced or at least being equally affected by economic 
considerations, budgetary constraints, cost-benefit considerations, purchaser mentalities. 
State agencies set up quasi-market conditions which inevitably alter the nature of the 
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relationship with service users towards a purchaser/provider axis, even where those terms 
are not being used. However, nowhere has the influence of the state disappeared entirely 
and nowhere has social work become a free commercial service agent - on the contrary, 
the state has increased its interest in and control over social work in certain fields, notably 
child protection. But it is precisely in the differential effects of these changes that a 
fundamental transformation becomes apparent: the mandate of social work is shifting 
away from at least potentially democratic controls mediated or guaranteed by the state 
towards the force field of commercially negotiated ultimately private transactions which 
bypass democratic mediation. While the drift is in a similar direction in all countries, the 
effects of these changes are much more pronounced in a residual welfare system like the 
UK (Aldridge 1996). Both the universalist and the corporatist welfare regimes seem to 
reflect a greater willingness by society to accompany this ‘marketisation’ with democratic 
controls. The changes are subjected to much more intensive public debate and scrutiny 
than seems to be the case in the UK. In those countries this offsets to an extent the 
commodifying effect of contracting out and of managerialism that has become a strong 
feature of social work for instance in the Netherlands where service providers have to bid 
for contracts annually on very clearly defined efficiency criteria (Laan 1998).  
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care management; 
accountability; 
social control  
consumer rights; 
participation 
 
commodification of personal 
relationships; 
selectivity of target areas 
off-loading of ‘care’ 
responsibilities to  'civil 
society' 
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2.  The new ‘cultural’ emphasis on identity meets social work largely unprepared.  The 
‘colour-blind approach’ to social work methods as a sign of its scientific orientation was 
very firmly established in all countries. The break-up of the universalism on which it was 
based was spearheaded by the women’s movement and had a salutary but also dangerous 
effect. As noted in other chapters, the historical link of social work’s approaches with the 
universalism of a national culture were often overlooked or taken for granted as the actual 
frame of reference for issues of equality and solidarity across gender, ethnic and cultural 
divisions. With the fading of this national reference point issues of ‘difference’ and also 
of equality have to be grounded differently and this exposes a ‘weak spot’ in social 
work’s linking of methodological and ethical questions. The uncertainty over how to 
establish criteria for identity apart from the national factor invited false reassurances in 
the form of essentialism.  Where before national identity had been assumed to have been 
simply given, so the re-discovered differences were now frequently treated as simply 
given. Concern over identity in social work was relegated to specialised areas, such as 
work with immigrants and refugees, and the attempt at bringing anti-racism on the agenda 
run into a barrage of opposition rallying under the banner of equality, and this not just in 
Britain. But the project of the articulation of diversity, whenever it becomes detached 
from an historical and political context, is bound to lead to new contradictions. In the 
present context this means above all that a concern with identity alone in social work 
could further promote the privatisation of welfare.  
 
 
 
cultural level 
 
 
 
 
 
life-style choices as mere cognitive 
skills  
 
nostalgic emphasis on community 
‘cultural sectarianism’ 
top-down empowerment as 
activation (‘prescribed self-help’) 
identity as essentialism;  
experience-based approaches 
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3.  Scientifically and professionally, the disappearance of grand narratives in social work, 
when read against the disaggregation of nation state compromises, also leads to new 
conclusions. Yes, the end of a gladiatorial approach to methods comes as a relief, and 
postmodern deconstruction, the laying bare of the hidden power agendas at the core of 
theory models, are suited to reactivating social work’s emancipatory claims (Howe 1994). 
But one of the dangers with this project of post-modern reconstruction is the replacement 
of methods with procedures: different situations require different forms of intervention 
and the choice is either arbitrary or fixed on procedural, legal or managerial grounds. 
There are signs of the competence road being taken by social work courses in quite a 
number of European countries, i.e. the identification of discrete competences as the 
guarantee of quality in training qualifications. This shifts the emphasis in training and 
education from ‘input’ (the package of course elements and subject areas) to ‘output’ (the 
ability to perform to agreed standards and requirements). There are clear indications that 
this trend matches the general re-definition of social issues as risks, with all the 
concomitant implications of the instrumentalistion of professional - client relationships. In 
some instances however, the competence discourse is more pronounced, as for instance in 
the UK where it dominates the qualifications and exam system in social work. As 
Dominelli and Hoogvelt (1996) have shown, the technocratisation of UK social work 
follows a political agenda, which in turn is a response to a new arrangement between the 
state and capital. The political dimension of methodological considerations is becoming 
ever more apparent and requires  close attention in the profession. The retreat to pure 
scientific methods is not solution to the uncertainties created at the methodological level. 
The fundamental re-examination of the foundations of methods can clear a way towards 
the re-affirmation of a commitment to ethical principles.  
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academic level 
 
 
 
 
 
instrumentalisation of methods, 
competence technocracy; 
 
postmodern methods indifference 
fixation on calculable risks relativity of ethical positions 
 
 
These effects of disaggregation triggered by the weakening of the nation state and with it of 
the welfare state in the wake of globalisation call for a new orientation in the social work 
methods discourses in Europe. The hope of constructing a ‘Social Europe’ hinges centrally 
on the ability of the European Union to integrate the divergent tendencies through its own 
social policy initiatives. In this sense a model of ‘European Social Work’ is required that 
would contribute this process, not just at the political level but also through the re-orientation 
of its methods towards the realisation of various dimensions of European citizenship 
(Meehan 1993). This will be the subject of later investigations.  
 
What requires attention is therefore not just the differences in theory frameworks in social 
work but their significance within a particular political agenda. In every intervention of 
social work the entirety of social relationships gets negotiated and this is particularly acute in 
a period of considerable re-organisation in European welfare regimes, as will be discussed in 
the following chapter.  
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9. Negotiating the new social policy scenarios – chances for the 
reconstruction of the social dimension  
 
 
 
Issues of cultural difference discussed in the previous chapter not only show their relevance 
in relation to the attention drawn by the diversity of clients’ backgrounds, but also in relation 
to the differences in political cultures prevailing in different countries. As discussed in the 
opening chapters, social work is bounded very closely by social policy matters and needs to 
take position towards the developments at a social policy level if it is to remain true to its 
social mandate. This is particularly acute in the contemporary European context, and the 
following considerations are aimed at underscoring once more the practical importance of a 
social work epistemology and methodology that comes to terms with diversity and negotiates 
cultural differences communicatively while engaging critically in social policy 
developments. 
 
There is an increasing awareness among social work practitioners in all European countries 
that international comparisons of developments in welfare are not just a matter for social 
policy analysts, but are a matter of direct relevance to practice (Payne 1998). Globalisation is 
more than just a fashionable talking point relating to economic and cultural transformations 
affecting our lives, it manifests itself more and more directly in social service work practices. 
Whether the actual changes in welfare systems which characterise contemporary social 
policy developments all over Europe are directly linked to the mechanisms of economic 
globalisation is a moot question, but there is no denying that policy trends, particularly those 
of the neo-liberal ilk, have traversed national boundaries with astonishing ease (Penna et al. 
1999). The last decades of the 20th century have brought about decisive shifts in the 
orientation of welfare systems away from states playing (or at least aspiring to play) a 
prominent role in the provision or regulation of welfare services towards delegation, de-
regulation, privatisation and political targeting of specific groups of receivers. There is, 
however, no actual convergence discernible in these trends and this is not only hampering 
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the development of a consistent social policy approach at the level of the European Union 
but shows also that the nation states have retained a good deal of their autonomy and are 
likely to hold on to this for the foreseeable future (Rieger and Leibfried 1998). Welfare is 
still far too important a source of legitimation, precisely at a time when autonomy and 
thereby the visibility of ‘governance’ is being curtailed at the economic level, to be 
sacrificed to trans-national bodies and to be dissolved into broad, fate-like international 
trends. On the contrary, welfare measures and programmes, in an intriguing parallel to their 
origins during the height of industrialisation, are resuming their value as a means of reaching 
citizens directly and largely individually with a moral appeal to their responsibility that 
emphasises obligations rather than rights. In distinction from those early welfare 
programmes however, which heralded the development of ever more comprehensive  social 
policies, these measures are having the effect of furthering social fragmentation rather than 
integration as the entire relationship between capitalism and the state changes with 
globalisation and digitalisation (Böhnisch and Schröer 2002). Welfare programmes are no 
longer carriers of the promise of social justice and equality but tools for the re-distribution of 
opportunities according to principles of justice which are based on the willingness by 
subjects to adjust to the demands of the new economy for totally flexible workers and indeed 
for the trouble-free exclusion of ‘no-hopers’. The selective use of welfare measures which 
often no longer amount to a comprehensive social policy, corresponds closely to the 
changing role of the state overall or, more precisely, to – in Balibar’s words – the 
‘privatisation’ of the state: ‘The “state” as an institution of power-concentration, to which 
responsibilities for policy-making can be attributed and which mediates publicly between 
interests and social forces, this kind of state has a tendency to vanish in Europe’ (Balibar 
1993, p. 153). This context is bound to have profound implications for social work methods 
which had been linked to a specific role of the state in relation to society, directly and 
indirectly.  
 
This chapter explores the extent to which social work across different European countries 
has been caught up in these shifts and to what extent it can regain more autonomy in defining 
its scope and role by recognising the contingent and thereby political nature of these shifts 
and responding to them critically and autonomously. The aim cannot be to be giving a 
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complete overview of the state of social work in European countries nor to be tracing the 
nuances of the transformations in social policy that have occurred. The emphasis lies instead 
on the fact that there are indeed differences between social service delivery systems in 
different European countries, differences which depend partly on the nature and tradition of 
the respective ‘welfare regimes’ and partly on the extent to which social work methodology, 
in relation to these regimes, has itself contributed to the shaping of a ‘welfare culture’. It is 
hypothesised that these professional responses are expressions of a highly differentiated 
array of academic discourses, which often threaten the unitary appearance of the professional 
field and indeed its very professionalism when the groups’ close links to ‘volunteering’ and 
its rootedness in social movements is taken into account. But this diversity can be regarded 
in many ways as a unique reservoir of creativity, resistance and ultimately autonomy 
precisely under the impact of ever more powerful political and monetary sanctions (Lorenz 
2001).  
 
In order to launch this discussion it is necessary to briefly summarise and analyse the main 
features of recent developments of welfare policies in European countries. There was a 
pervasive erosion of the importance of the state’s active role as a provider or at least 
guarantor of welfare, a role which had characterised all European welfare regimes in the 
decades after the Second World War (Esping-Andersen 1996). The changes across different 
European ‘welfare regimes’ gave rise to the expectation that neo-liberal doctrines would 
sooner or later prevail and that the state would eventually cede its welfare functions to the 
market wherever possible. The main thrust of these changes affected the perception of the 
concept of ‘the social’ itself which looked as if it was losing all significance, to be replaced 
by rampant individualism, tempered only by the emphasis neo-liberalism placed on family 
solidarity and mutual support.  
 
In most European countries the re-structuring of the welfare state according to neo-liberal  
principles had first been promoted by centre-right governments during the 1980s, although in 
no country were the changes as pronounced and as ideologically symbolic as in the United 
Kingdom. The coalition government in Germany for instance, consisting of Christian-
Democrats and Liberals, that ruled during the same period of the ‘Thatcher years’, departed 
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very little from the course it had charted with the creation of a ‘social state’ in the immediate 
post-Nazi era, which itself rested on Bismarckian corporatist principles of a balanced inter-
play between state and civil society with national social solidarity remaining a solid aim.  
However, there was a brief period in the mid-1990s when the majority of the countries of the 
European Union had elected social-democratic governments and there were considerable 
expectations that these governments would re-dress neo-liberal welfare politics. By March 
2001 the following countries of the EU could be said to have centre-left governments: Apart 
from the UK, only Greece, Portugal and Sweden were governed by social-democratic parties 
without the need to form coalitions, although in electoral systems of proportional 
representation these parties achieved only between 36.4 and 44.6 per cent of the popular 
vote. In Denmark a coalition between Social-Democrats and Liberals held power whereas 
the German Social-Democrats governed in coalition with the Green Party. Complex coalition 
arrangements applied in Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands where centre-left parties 
had at best marginal leads over other coalition partners. Ireland had a coalition government 
between the ‘republican party’ Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats, a former break-
away party who give the coalition a right-of-centre direction although this would not 
necessarily be the political home of the major partner. Only Austria, Belgium and Spain 
were governed by declared Conservative or Right Wing parties, although the close ties 
between Blair of the UK’s New Labour and Aznar as Head of the conservative Spanish 
Partido Popular and subsequently also with Berlusconi of Italy’s Forza Italia signify further 
fluidity of the left-right spectrum in Europe. As Dahrendorf (1999) points out in his critique 
of the ‘authoritarian streak in Europe’s new centre’, ‘twenty years ago these parties had 
twice their current support in Europe. Social democrats are distinctly minority parties in 
most European countries’ (1999, p 14). In purely electoral terms, the swing away from 
conservatism in Europe has not been decisive and from this perspective alone a fundamental 
re-balancing of welfare policies was unlikely to feature, as was born out in subsequent 
swings back to centre-right governments. 
 
What is of interest here is therefore not the effect on social policy developments of  
traditional ideological positions oscillating between ‘left’ and ‘right’ but the attempt by some 
politicians to collectively characterise or mould alternatives to the ‘classical’ positions in 
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relation to welfare around the notion of The Third Way. Anthony Giddens, himself one of 
the chief intellectual architects of this project, traces what he sees as an emergent consensus 
back to the ‘new progressivism’ with which the American Democrats sought to give their 
social policies profile and appeal (Giddens 2000). Its emphasis on ‘equal opportunity, 
personal responsibility and the moblizing of citizens and communities’ (Giddens 2000, p 2) 
had a decisive influence on Blair’s New Labour concepts and led to a transatlantic dialogue 
on what then came to be termed ‘third way politics’ in which originally Clinton and Blair as 
well as Schröder of Germany, Kok of the Netherlands and d’Alema of Italy were involved. 
The decisive European impetus for the attempted launch of a ‘Third Way’ platform for 
Social Democrats was to have come however from a joint paper between Blair and Schröder 
published in 1999 under the title ‘Europe – The Third Way – die Neue Mitte’ (Blair-
Schröder 1999). In it the two leaders reaffirm what they consider to be core principles of 
social-democratic policies such as fairness, social justice, freedom, equality of opportunity, 
solidarity and responsibility for others. However, they re-define the social-democratic 
understanding of the role of the state as supporting and not hindering the market economy 
with the catch-phrase ‘the state should not row, but steer: not so much control, as challenge’ 
(Giddens 2000 p. 6). The welfare state is to be modernised, not abolished. The old principles 
therefore call for a new interpretation commensurate with the conditions of a changed global 
environment so that social justice must no longer be geared towards ‘equality of outcome’. 
Instead, rights need to be balanced by responsibilities, aspirations for a secure, life-long 
workplace need to give way to an affirmation of flexible markets. The state’s role is to invest 
in ‘social and human capital’ (Blair-Schröder 1999), which means motivating and supporting 
citizens in vocational training and re-training, in life-long learning, and foster solidarity not 
just towards the recipients of benefits but also towards those who pay for them. As concrete 
social policy measures the paper mentions the fight against poverty and exclusion, against 
criminality and for urban renewal through the strengthening of the community spirit. The 
paper explicitly calls for a commitment by social democratic governments ‘to examine all 
recipients of social benefits, including people of working age … as to their ability to earn a 
living and to reform state institutions to render them capable of supporting those able to 
work in finding suitable jobs’ (ibid.).    
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Although this initiative was designed as an appeal to all social democratic parties of Europe 
to join this project none of the other centre-left parties in Europe felt comfortable enough 
with the proposal to rally around this Third Way or Middle Ground notion of welfare. Prime 
Minister Jospin of France and his social-democratic Parti Socialiste explicitly distanced 
themselves from the proposals (Chambers 2000). This is not to say that their policies did not 
in effect amount to very similar measures. Both the divergence and the similarities highlight 
a noteworthy aspect of current processes of social policy making: on the one hand there is 
pressure on all governments to ‘service’ the market more explicitly and more indirectly with 
social services in the broadest sense which produces a kind of convergence of policies. On 
the other hand there are distinct welfare traditions at both the cultural and the political level 
which offer sufficient resistance against whole-sale and unimpeded changes being imposed. 
This observation adumbrates the margin of social work’s autonomy in relation to social 
policies and also possibly the arena in which allies in a more active shaping of social policies 
‘from the bottom up’ can be enlisted. This is the arena in which critical cultural politics and 
the recognition of identities matters directly to social work practice.  
 
The evaluation of more specific social work responses to the ‘New Left’ policies in 
European countries needs to start therefore from a brief re-statement of the fundamental and, 
to some extent irksome fact that social work practice in no country managed to overcome 
completely its dependency on the prevailing welfare regime, no matter how strong 
professional aspirations tried to elevate their practitioners to a level of greater autonomy. As 
demonstrated in the introduction, the way social work practice comes across to service users 
does not depend solely on the professional methods applied but on a complex set of 
expectations and relationships between citizens and society, mediated by the state, which 
make instrumental use of social professionals. Research has shown that responses by 
practitioners from different countries to a ‘given’ social case such as suspected child abuse 
are only partly the result of a scientifically based and professionally conducted analysis of 
‘the problem’ (e.g. Hetherington et al. 1997; Baistow and Hetherington 1998).  For the most 
part social professionals enact and represent the type of citizenship that characterises the 
political culture of a country generally. Using Esping Andersen’s typology as a guide 
(Esping-Andersen 1990) and to put the main options of regimes traditionally available in 
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Europe sharply into relief one could summarise that the residual welfare regime of the UK 
was the expression of a highly class-divided society in which the state remains ultimately an 
alien, threatening power exercised by an elite from which private individuals seek to protect 
themselves; they thereby assert their citizenship status largely within that private realm 
whilst otherwise being treated by the state and its civil servants as subjects. By contrast a 
Scandinavian understanding of citizenship is premised on the assumption of a ‘good’ state 
that has the interests of all its citizens at heart and which therefore has to be trusted to act in 
the interest of all. A corporatist reading of citizenship finally, characteristic of countries like 
Austria, France, Germany and the Netherlands is founded on a balance between strong, 
confident and articulate organisations of civil society and a benevolent, paternalistic state 
that remains conscious of its limited power and authority, particularly in matters of private 
welfare (Lorenz 1994).  
 
However, the extent to which nation states are characterised by their own brand of social 
policy and are capable of maintaining their autonomy to do so has become severely curtailed. 
In the context of Europe two interlocking factors are responsible for this in the form of 
globalisation and the process of European integration. The former manifests itself in the 
intensification of competition between market players formerly bounded by national 
economic interests and now strong enough to dictate their own terms to governments. A 
coalition of interests in turn provides an incentive for national governments to lower social 
costs of employers and to abandon the aspiration of creating full employment while putting 
more pressure on employees and on the unemployed to seek employment. Neo-liberal 
ideologies fully exploit and further contribute to this economically driven phenomenon 
which in turn triggers the sets of political expectations mentioned above. 
 
Europe as the economic, political and social project of the European Union with the western 
European member states and the line-up of countries of Central and Eastern Europe who 
have now joined stands at the intersection of the forces of globalisation and those re-
affirming the importance of state-centred governance, albeit at collective and probably 
federalist level. ‘European integration is a process that facilitates and accelerates a process of 
economic internationalisation while inhibiting … a parallel process of regulatory 
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transnationalisation or the “spontaneous” appearance of a transnational European governing 
capacity’ (Offe 2000, p 25). It therefore provides both a vehicle for a globalising economy 
and a supra-national defence against its unregulated impact which the nation states are no 
longer able to mount effectively themselves. While the EU member states are anxious to 
retain a degree of autonomy in devising and pursuing social policies and the European Union 
as such limits its own social policy proposals largely to the area of employment protection 
and the fight against exclusion, this national autonomy is clearly prescribed by economic 
market principles aimed at ‘liberating’ the famous ‘invisible hand’ of the market from state 
influences to allow it to self-regulate the encounter of commercial and consumer interests. 
Steek describes the effects as growing ‘voluntarism’: ‘National politics are increasingly 
finding themselves forced to … move away from hard obligations to soft incentives, from 
regulation to voluntarism, and from social-interventionism to liberal democracy’ (Steek 1995 
p 58).  
 
A wider diversity of actors in politics and of levels of policy making, ranging from the 
regional to the supra-national, therefore comes into operation inevitably, especially in 
matters of creating social cohesion through welfare. This widening of operators enhances the 
ambiguity of social policies generally as highlighted in the European social policy project. 
The inter-play between traditional national and emergent European social policies as well as 
the shifts in social policy resulting from changes in governments after elections therefore 
produce widely differing effects, not so much perhaps in the appearance of individual 
measures but above all in the sub-texts of social contracts as they are being re-drawn. It is 
not just that the categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’ become fragmented in themselves and 
meaningless as far as the comparison between whole sets of policies are concerned (Spicker 
2000), this disaggregation also corresponds to the emergence of much more localised, 
pragmatic and temporal groupings of mutual support at all levels, ranging from families, 
business partnerships and political parties to international alliances. Social work can no 
longer occupy a secure and taken-for-granted space in these scenarios and the study of the 
differential effects of these changes and the dynamics behind them becomes essential for the 
re-orientation of social work practice.  
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From all these background considerations it follows that it is impossible to identify the direct 
causal relationship between Third Way or New Labour policies and new directions of 
welfare. Nevertheless the trajectories of changes observable in different countries amount to 
a certain pattern.  
 
In the case of Germany the welfare consensus that had prevailed in the post-World War II 
era under both Christian Democrat and Social Democrat governments had shown remarkable 
continuity with both the Weimar and the Bismarckian model of social provisions. The 
German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) declares (article 20 (1)), ‘The Federal Republic of 
Germany is a democratic and social federal state’. However, the combined effects of 
globalisation, demographic shifts, European Integration and German Unification issued in 
the following principles as guidelines for a ‘re-structured social state’ (Umbau des 
Sozialstaats) (Offe 2000), which become even more apparent at the start of the second term 
of office of the centre-left coalition government in Germany under Schröder: reduction of 
costs of public social security to protect jobs and prevent further unemployment; relaxation 
of controls over wages, particularly at the lower end to bring in more people from 
unemployment; cutting of tax-financed social costs such as long-term unemployment and 
social security payments. After many years of merely technical changes in social policy the 
effects of these reference points in the debate amount a serious tampering with the finely 
balanced interplay of interests on which the corporatist system depended and a fragmentation 
of established collective actors into new, short-term and opportunist alliances of interests. 
Organisationally this means that the dominant position held by the major non-governmental 
welfare organisations as the main players in the provision of social services under the 
principle of subsidiarity and social responsibility is no longer secure. Although the German 
government is slow to dismantle the undoubted privileges these organisations enjoyed as it 
could (and should) by way of implementing the EU principle of ‘freedom of movement of 
services’ between European countries and the liberalisation of service providers there is 
nevertheless more emphasis on efficiency and competitiveness between the services which 
some analysts interpret as a shift away from subsidiarity towards the implementation of 
market conditions (Münder 1998). In terms of the mode of service delivery it means that 
social policy ‘assumes increasingly the character of a supportive infrastructure assisting 
 193
service users in the management of individual biographical transitions, ruptures and crises 
for broad sectors of the population (Lebenslaufpolitik, ‘life trajectory politics’)’ (Olk 2000 
p107). This comes close to the ‘life politics’ concept proposed by Giddens (1994) and calls 
for an ‘activating’ dimension of welfare provisions, summed up in a much used metaphor of 
the welfare state not providing a safety net but a trampoline which catapults recipients back 
to a level of independent functioning (Butterwegge 1999).  
 
These new politics do not work ‘automatically’ and their in-built ambiguities allow for a 
considerable margin of discretion in their implementation. Their operationalisation depends 
on the whole range of social professionals playing their part in the practical realisation of 
these new departures and adjusting their methodologies accordingly. Chamberlayne and 
Rustin (1999) found a close correspondence between British and German social policy 
approaches under New Labour in terms of their emphasis on making the receipt of certain 
types of welfare payments conditional on clients receiving individualised casework. In the 
case of Germany they showed that the methodological focus on ‘activation’ did not take 
account sufficiently of the actual biographical trajectories of the recipients of such casework 
attention, and this despite the avowed attention to individual life and career concepts. 
Implementing this policy fully would have required a much more open acknowledgement of 
the lack of correspondence between the stated policy objectives on the one hand and the 
actual structural restrictions with the concomitant ‘habitualised but now inappropriate 
patterns of orientation’ displayed by recipients on the other (Chamberlayne and Rustin 1999, 
p 116). This leads to a growing discrepancy contained within the principle of subsidiarity, so 
central to German social policy, the discrepancy between a ‘liberal’ interpretation which 
emphasises the self-organisational potential of civil society and indeed the individual, and a 
‘paternalistic’ version in which the state maintains nevertheless tight control over the 
conduct of its subjects. In this tradition social work does not need to change paradigm to 
comply with the requirements of an ‘activating state’ (Kessl and Otto 2003) and the 
profession in Germany has hence put up much less resistance against the new social policy 
pressures than for instance in the UK.  
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The Dutch welfare model was originally based on a slightly different interpretation of 
corporatism from that prevailing in Germany. Here civil society was expected to be 
organised and represented in the provision of welfare (as in other public services) through 
clearly defined organisations reflecting the main ideological ‘blocks’ of society, such as the 
churches and humanist and labour organisations, in a form of ‘institutionalised pluralism’ 
(Spicker 2000). It was therefore all the more astonishing that in a ‘Copernican Revolution’ 
(Voogt and Wiertsema quoted in van der Laan 2000, p 89) the influence of these ‘pillars’ 
declined steadily and quite radically during the 1980s to give way to a much more 
unencumbered quasi-market re-grouping of interests (on the side of the providers and of the 
users) than in the German case. Clients have been re-constructed as customers to such an 
extent that the category of ‘needs’ has been replaced by that of ‘demand’, expressed in their 
‘purchasing power’, to which agencies have to respond by delivering and managing 
packages of service products (van der Laan 2000). Welfare services and in particular social 
workers were deployed more directly and more unambiguously to implement the principle of 
the ‘activating welfare state’. This principle is not only geared towards motivating more 
clients to take up paid employment (instead of relying on welfare benefits and social 
assistance) but also towards motivating welfare providers to produce measurable results and 
to stick to targets that form the basis of a contractual agreement with funding authorities (van 
der Laan 1998). There are no longer any ‘privileged’ service providers as agencies get 
selected for funding on a competitive, product- and efficiency-oriented basis (Bekkers 1999).  
 
Central to social policy in France have always been the family and the ‘constant refusal of 
the French state to create a large public welfare institution’ (Bouget 1998 p 156), having 
been modelled on Bismarckian principles. Nevertheless it regarded the family not as a 
private institution but as the mediator of citizenship. Its employment-based contributory 
reliance was bound to lead to serious fiscal difficulties as France experienced mass 
unemployment and a steep increase in poverty levels during the 1980s. Thus the 1988 
reforms of the centre-left government of Rocard created the guaranteed minimum income 
scheme RMI (Revenue Minimum d’Insertion) as a family policy while it in fact benefited 
mostly isolated individuals without family support (Levy 1999). Juppé’s plan for reform of 
the entire social welfare system was an attempt to even out the inconsistencies of the system 
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without unifying it under one universal principle and it therefore earned approval and 
critique on both the political right and the left. The Jospin reforms in the late 1990s 
symbolised a state of French social-democratic thinking on welfare which was concerned 
with social integration but tried to avoid both unifying centralisation and rampant 
marketisation. It further strengthened the family orientation of French social policy by 
restoring universal family allowances while at the same time shifting the financing of social 
welfare from contributory to tax-financed income transfers (Bouget 1998). The fundamental 
link of social policies with citizenship rights in France is not least illustrated by the public 
impact of demonstrations and protests that spontaneously accompany policy changes and 
that are a vivid reminder to French politicians that social cohesion cannot be a matter of 
rhetoric but requires a solid political basis. This is also reflected in social work responses to 
the reformed welfare scenario. It was evident in Chamberlayne’s and Rustin’s research on 
the biographical meaning of ‘exclusion’ that while the French programme of ‘social 
insertion’ might appear as the re-affirmation of an individualised casework approach, it 
balances individual action with a focus on the assembling of a comprehensive range of 
relevant services which together constitute the manifestation of a social citizenship status in 
Marshall’s sense (Chamberlayne and Rustin 1999).   
 
The principle of ‘activation’ also became particularly important in the transformation of one 
of the Scandinavian welfare models in the case of Denmark where ‘the social-democratic 
coalition government, which came into power in 1993, has certainly produced a “miracle” as 
unemployment has diminished while the inflation rate remains low’ (Torfing 1999, p 6). On 
the face of it this success was accompanied by ‘workfare’ measures similar to those 
characterising social benefit conditions in the UK and the USA. But while the ‘welfare 
reforms’ of the 1980s in Denmark under the conservative Prime Minister Schlütter had 
aimed mainly at the reduction of public spending, the new activation policies rely heavily on 
individualised social work support for welfare recipients in their intended transition from 
economic exclusion to labour participation. The Danish approach does not leave it to the 
‘didactics’ of market consequences (making people ‘learn’ from the threat of their benefits 
being cut off) but invests heavily in raising skills levels and in designing specific counselling 
programmes that enhance the effectiveness of the measures. It also remains within the ambit 
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of the Nordic welfare state tradition which values positively the central role of the state 
despite the arrival of neo-corporatist elements of regional and privatised devolution. The 
image of the state as a guarantor of equality and social integration accounts in no small 
measure for the acceptance such activation policies receive in Denmark among the 
population, including those most directly affected by them (Torfing 1999), in contrast to the 
resistance they evoke in liberal, residual welfare regimes where service users perceive the 
role of the state as surveillance and infringements of liberty (King 1995).   
 
This impression is confirmed by developments in other Nordic countries. Sweden embarked 
on a wide-reaching reform of its ‘institutional’ welfare state during the late 1980s and 90s, 
largely under the impact of mass unemployment which undermined the entire basis of a 
system built on full employment being the first responsibility of the state. Despite the central 
role played by the state it would be wrong to regard the Swedish welfare system as 
monolithic even before the advent of ‘New Public Management’ and its emphasis on 
decentralisation and ‘out-contracting’ since the welfare state itself was the product of strong 
popular movements in Swedish civil society (Sunesson et al. 1998). Nevertheless, the recent 
changes in social policy introduced many quasi- and actual market conditions into the social 
service delivery system while still attributing to the state the overall responsibility for the 
setting of standards. Selectivity increases by design and by default with many service users 
seeking alternative sources of support, a sign that the strong welfare state in Sweden had by 
no means generated a paralysing dependency for recipients. Citizens are concerned about the 
ensuing inequalities but their concern will be negotiated at both the political and the market 
level (Lundström and Wijkström 1997). Comparative studies again emphasise the absence of 
highly polarised antagonism in the Swedish case of ‘marketisation’ which is so typical of the 
UK’s residual legacy (Bryntse 2000). However, social workers in Sweden also see little 
option but to ‘arrange’ themselves within the new welfare environment although their role in 
‘activation’ is less directly defined than in Denmark. Inevitably, their range of methods and 
activities is diversifying and they encounter greater competition from members of other 
social professions.  
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This is also the case in Finland where the economic crisis in the mid-90s had been much 
more pronounced and de-centralisation of welfare responsibilities to municipal level has 
been introduced pervasively. On both the political right and the political left notions of 
‘active citizenship’ in conjunction with a renewed emphasis on the merits of a strong civil 
society gained prominence (Anttonen 1998). But the programme of delegation of services 
and the introduction of quasi-markets did not obliterate the strong social policy orientation in 
social work, despite the simultaneous increase in attention on problems requiring 
‘therapeutic’ interventions (Hämäläinen and Niemelä 2000). The profession’s commitment 
to finding a synthesis between both traditions rather than being driven into polarisation 
reflects the wider social policy context in which the differentiation of services is nevertheless 
carried by a broad consensus on social citizenship and equality which the country strives 
hard to defend in the face of pressures of globalisation demanding a weakening of these 
principles. In contrast to its reputation as leading to dependency and inertia there is evidence 
that ‘welfare statism has meant a thorough democratisation of Finnish society’ (Anttonen 
1998 p. 363) and all parts of society in Finland realise that welfare, democracy and social 
integration need to remain connected, no matter what forms the delivery of services is going 
to take.  
 
Post-WWII Italy had largely been governed by centre-right coalitions under the dominant 
influence of the Christian Democrats. With constantly unstable majorities and consequently 
frequent elections a highly ‘polarised, particularistic-clientelistic welfare state’ (Ferrera 
1996) became established which offered generous protection to privileged groups while 
leaving excluded those without political access and clout. Fundamental changes in the 1990s 
gradually took shape under the threat of Italy’s failure to qualify for EU monetary union and 
in the course of the exposure of widespread corruption in all sectors of the political system. 
Explicit neo-liberalism made a brief appearance during the short life of the fist right-wing 
Berlusconi government in 1994 while subsequent coalition governments, formed mainly by 
re-constituted parties on the left, pursued a course not just of reform but of the establishment 
of a coherent social policy approach in the first place. This represents ultimately an attempt 
at a changed relationship between citizens and the state that is no longer mediated almost 
exclusively through intermediary institutions of civil society.  While social policy is only 
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beginning to matter in this relationship and the emphasis is on the reduction of unwarranted 
privileges, these reforms ‘have done little to address the gaps in coverage or upgrade the 
benefits of Italy’s most disadvantaged citizens’ (Levy 1999 p 257). This illustrates the 
continued importance of the relationship between political and social participation in all 
welfare systems, a relationship with which the second Berlusconi government, in power 
since 2001, appears unable to come to terms on account of the contradictory political 
interests contained in this coalition. However, regardless of the political orientation of 
governments in Italy the political and social significance of the social professions is being 
discovered and shaped much more explicitly in Italy today (Fasol 2000) in an attempt to 
establish and strengthen this link at the basis, promoted by regional governments. This is 
reflected not only in the ‘academisation’ of social work training which now is being offered 
at university level in parallel with that of teachers and nursery staff, but also in the 
development of new professional branches of ‘social pedagogy’ and ‘animation’ geared 
towards providing a critical counter-weight to the deficit-oriented casework approaches of 
the ‘social work’ paradigm. Within the emerging welfare structure of Italian policies the 
social professions have an opportunity to develop imaginative self-directed learning 
initiatives which give users not only access to services and resources but access to the 
policy-making process at local, regional and national level.  
 
Given the wide discrepancies between the different routes charted by social policy reforms in 
countries across Europe it is difficult to identify common features and definite trends in 
social work under changing social policy conditions. The dissolving of the contours of 
distinct welfare regimes, initiated largely but not exclusively by centre-right governments, 
continues unabated under New Labour and social-democratic governments. However, their 
policies tend to affirm that social cohesion cannot be achieved as a by-product of the market 
oriented behaviour of individuals but requires explicit political measures on behalf of society 
as a whole constituency. This insight seems to prevail also under the more recent swing back 
to centre-right governments in Europe which appear to tamper in practice their avowed neo-
liberalism considerably, particularly in the area of social policy. At the same time the 
relationship between economic and political activity generally has become highly 
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contentious and the translation of new policies into social action requires the active 
participation of a whole stratum of social professionals.    
 
The New Left everywhere in Europe faces a dilemma. It is conscious that the specific 
character and value of its policies is always going to be judged by its social policies and its 
commitment to social justice and equality, but also that the views of international capital on 
a government’s economic principles, policies and performance have become an equally if 
not more important source of legitimation. As Offe remarks in relation to his analysis of the 
current state of welfare in Germany,  
‘leading office holders of the new Social Democratic administration 
have stressed, perfectly in line with “Third Way” and “New Labour” 
doctrines of how to mobilize, activate and make more “self-reliant” the 
labour force, the need for technical as well as institutional “innovation”. 
Unburdening employers from some of the costs of security and 
protection is an imperative that unions and Social Democrats no longer 
seriously resist.’ (Offe 2000 p22) 
 
 
Neo-liberal welfare policies in most European countries aimed at the individualisation of 
risks and the privatisation of social solidarity (Pierson 2001). The increased inequality and 
social instability that resulted from this have mobilised the electorate into reminding 
governments that ‘the social’ cannot be cancelled with impunity. Social workers, despite the 
sporadic resistance shown to neo-liberal changes, were ultimately in danger of themselves 
becoming victims of the abolition of ‘the social’ or at least of seeing their jobs being passed 
on to other actors in the field ready to provide what the new welfare markets demanded. 
They had resigned themselves to making the most of the changes for themselves personally 
and professionally either by concentrating more on counselling and therapeutic skills which 
suited a privatised market much more readily or by equipping themselves with managerial 
competences and qualifications to become active players and winners in the production of 
service packages. The lack of a constituency to support their actual professional interests 
among service users, politicians or the general public left them little alternative.   
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Overall the transition from neo-liberal to New Labour and social-democratic influences on 
European welfare systems appear to have heightened the pressure on and the fundamental 
dilemma for social work. Neo-liberalism had sought to reduce the function and contribution 
of this professional group largely to a residual role in the sense that its interventions would 
be confined to the margins of society, only to where extreme circumstances call for the 
control and containment of ‘deviants’. In relation to the labour market this ideology had 
accepted that the most useful deployment of social work would be for the control and 
containment of the ‘superfluous and the “unintegrateable”, in other words not for the 
achievement of social inclusion but the management of exclusion (Scherr 1999 p 21). Neo-
liberalism sought to transform ‘mainstream’ users of social services into consumers who 
would seek to cut out the mediation provided by social workers and demand a new, direct 
market in services or resort to pre-professional voluntary and self-help efforts. New Labour 
has recognised that there are advantages in ‘bringing the state back’ into the mix of 
organisational and conceptual arrangements for social service provisions. It therefore needs 
social workers much more centrally again as the transmitters of the ‘message’ contained in 
its welfare concepts. It requires the social professions as public educators. Their tasks and 
therefore their professional scope are tightly prescribed by an agenda that seeks to ‘activate’ 
people threatened or already affected by poverty to becoming re-connected into a flexible 
market (and thereby into society) and to maximise the efficiency of services by managerial 
and quantitative criteria. Potentially this offers the social professions once more a position of 
importance and higher status which a whole generation of social workers had not known or 
which had never been achieved in the first place in particular countries.  
 
On the other hand playing this prescribed new role effectively requires a fundamental 
readjustment of the profession’s methodological and political orientation from a concern 
with an ideal-typical state of well-being defined within the – often hazy - parameters of the 
profession’s own history of criteria (coping, maturity, adjustment) towards largely externally 
prescribed goals (integration, economic usefulness, conformity with contractual conditions 
of welfare payments, but also risk elimination and procedural correctness). The value of the 
interventions of these re-cast professionals will be measured by criteria of efficiency and 
effectiveness within given parameters, parameters which are a crucial link between 
 201
economic and explicitly political principles under New Labour. The changes in the political 
context also give new connotations to professional and methodological core principles such 
as ‘empowerment’, a concept which had stood for a person-centred emancipatory 
programme and which now carries more functional notions of consumers being enabled to 
make ‘sensible’ choices. While this is reminiscent of the ‘colonisation’ of terms like 
‘community’ through the neo-liberal attack on notions of society and ‘the social’ and had 
always been a feature of a controlling ‘incorporation’ of critical concepts into hegemonic 
discourses, this latest shift seems to grip social professionals much more inescapably. Social 
workers are all too conscious that their very future as a profession might depend on their 
willingness to deliver on the terms set by the new agendas – the market might otherwise 
favour different or newly emerging service providers. 
 
The fundamental device of the New Labour incorporation of social work into ‘New Welfare’ 
regimes is reminiscent of the constellation of factors which gave rise to early social work 
professionalisation in the first place. In most European countries social work was lifted out 
of its pre-professional, voluntary and marginal existence and established as a stabilising 
contribution to modernisation, industrialisation and nation-state formation by the 
combination of an ultimately moral mandate with scientific, rational methods (Lorenz 1994). 
‘Social diagnosis’, in whatever theoretical framework it came to be rooted of psychology, 
social pedagogy or applied social science, made social work universally respectable and 
accountable in more than just the particularist reference points of the moral constituencies of 
the churches or philanthropy. And yet it still contained the moral message of adjustment and 
integration on which the stability of class-divided industrialised nation states depended.  
 
The contemporary fascination with case management is reminiscent of these origins of 
professionalisation, which had also modelled itself on an already established profession in 
the form of medicine, whose equivalent today is the concept of management. What is more, 
New Labour and social-democratic governments across Europe and particularly in Britain 
tend to legitimate their programmes with strong moral references, expecting social 
professionals to be capable of becoming the carriers of this moral mandate without having to 
appear moralistic themselves. Despite its appearance as a combination of rational economics 
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and therapy the ‘activation of citizens’ for social-democratic governments is more than a 
functional task – it is a moral crusade. Whether there is substance in the message that it is 
worth engaging oneself as a citizen in a social collectivity is the crucial factor that still 
divides different welfare regimes in Europe and that accounts for the failure of the Third 
Way proposals to gain wider approval. In those countries where the state is ultimately 
perceived by citizens to be an alien, threatening power the controlling element of 
interventions will always trigger suspicion and resistance by recipients of such programmes, 
and this despite all efforts by social workers to overcome the legacy of welfare and class 
divisiveness in their methodology.  
 
Despite the continued emphasis on de-regulation, privatisation and the Third Sector, welfare 
measures reflect a clear set of political interests by the state for whose implementation social 
work services are crucial. Concretely this calls for a conscious and decisive re-politicisation 
of social work practice in recognition of and in response to the fact that the very opposite is 
expected of social professionals because the agenda behind the re-structuring of welfare is 
highly political. The political nature of social work practice is borne out not so much in 
political campaigning, appropriate though this might be particularly in the context of 
renewed and invigorated community action programmes (Popple and Redmond 2000), but in 
giving direct, personal interactions with service users a ‘citizenship dimension’ so that they 
become an element in the re-creating of social solidarity as inter-locking networks of rights 
and obligations. This differs fundamentally from the conservative and communitarian 
evocation of ‘community’ into which individuals have to be integrated in as much as it does 
not pre-suppose the existence of such given communities but emphasises the necessity to 
create communal structures with sets of mutual responsibilities within binding frameworks 
of rights and entitlements. It also goes beyond a concept of individualised ‘life politics’ as a 
viable framework for post-traditional social work methodology although such politics of 
‘personal mastery’ (Ferguson 2001) can form an important element within the construction 
of citizenship. The challenge of New Labour’s ‘use’ for social work is to be taken up 
professionally and critically via the construction not only of individual success but of the 
conditions for collective social solidarity. 
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The quantitative growth of the professional field at a time when party politics appeal to 
voters with the promise of constant fiscal reductions in public and particularly social 
spending bears witness to the profession’s political significance. Yet this very importance 
limits the profession’s scope in defining its own priorities as responses to the needs and 
requirements of service users. The autonomy of the social work profession was never 
defined or definable in absolute terms. Its enmeshment with the state is not a relict that stops 
social work from realising its actual potential, but it prescribes the essential parameters for 
the development of its competences. The contemporary situation of social work in Europe 
and particularly the lack of preparation for the rapid changes that confront the profession on 
all fronts reflect the relative underdevelopment of its political analysis and action 
competence. There appears to be ample scope within the ‘activation’ agenda set for social 
work by social-democratic governments to formulate a differentiated and sophisticated 
response which takes on the challenges of accountability in terms of effectiveness posed and 
yet constructs its independent set of value criteria. To achieve this aim cross-national 
comparisons need to go beyond a focus on ‘context’ and get down to a thorough discussion 
of methodological traditions. The educational role expected of social work has long been 
conceptualised in some of the continental European traditions of social pedagogy, and a 
critical pedagogical framework would appear to be a suitable forum for the re-orientation of 
the social professions confronting the consequences of globalisation.  
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10. Outlook 
 
The above analysis of the importance of the recognition of cultural diversity and the social 
construction of identity for social processes generally and for social work in particular had 
several objectives. Firstly, it sought to demonstrate that achieving social cohesion and 
integration is not a matter of finding inherent or innate similarities between members of a 
community and establishing them as the social bond, as was the tendency in many European 
nation state developments. Rather, social bonds under the conditions of modernity can only 
come about as a result of elaborate communicative processes aimed at reaching consensus 
over the scope and the terms of social integration. Diversity of any kind, cultural, ethnic or in 
terms of interests and abilities, is therefore not a hindrance to social integration but 
constitutes the very material out of which social entities derive their strength and vibrancy to 
form cohesive bonds. These communicative processes are an arduous task and it is therefore 
always tempting to short-cut the process either by manipulation or by force. Paying attention 
to diversity brings with it the danger of marginalisation and exclusion, and it is therefore not 
enough to pursue communicative consensus-seeking idealistically and without reference to 
institutions and structure. On the contrary, the processes of communication, in the private as 
much as in the public arena, need to be secured by rules and enforceable rights. This brings 
into play public and social institutions which were designed to facilitate the process of 
forging social cohesion in modern societies, among them the institutions of social policy and 
of social services.  
 
The second aim was therefore to trace the historical origins of these institutions in recent 
European history and to demonstrate the intricate links between the state-building and the 
solidarity-creation projects. Within these specific dynamics, social work and social services 
found their role and mandate and it would be inappropriate for the social professions to 
renege on this mandate and to withdraw into a kind of abstract professionalism that seeks its 
mandate solely in private contracts between service users and service suppliers.  
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Thirdly, it is precisely this intricate engagement with political, historical and cultural 
processes which gives the social professions their particular character, and it is therefore not 
surprising that this professional group, in Europe as a whole as well as within every 
European country, is distinguished by a rich but also utterly confusing variety of profiles, 
titles, training traditions and tasks. This disunity has often been regarded as a source of 
weakness and a sign of the ‘backward’ status of the professional group, whereas in fact it 
needs to be regarded as its distinguishing hallmark. Together with this realisation comes, 
however, the task of shaping this diversity systematically in the sense that it does not 
represent an arbitrary collection of traditions and positions but that the links with the 
surrounding cultural and political processes and institutions are exposed.  
 
The fourth scope of this study was therefore to link these historical contingencies that led to 
the variety of professional manifestations with a systematic reflection on social work 
methodology. In this context, communication once more becomes central both in terms of it 
being the central methodological tool uniting all the different forms of social work practice 
and as a means of grounding an ethical framework for action which transcends the politically 
given tasks and instructions.  
 
Fifthly, it has been demonstrated that this fundamental reflection on the importance of the 
grounding of ethics in communication has been largely neglected in social work research in 
place of a positivist orientation geared towards scientific objectivity which rendered the 
professional field more vulnerable to political interference and misuse. Professional 
autonomy, where this can count as an appropriate goal at all, cannot be achieved by a 
withdrawal from the very processes that constitute the social professions sociologically and 
politically, but only by fully, consciously and critically engaging with them. This withdrawal 
is not only a constant source of instability and self-doubt, it also directs the social 
professions towards a state of disempowerment at the point where new welfare agendas are 
being implemented which require functional, managerial solutions for problems whose social 
dimension is being increasingly denied.  
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The sixth objective was therefore the analysis of these trends in social policies in Europe and 
beyond under the impact of globalisation. It has been shown that the processes of 
globalisation bring with them a restructuring of the functions of the state which has 
particularly far-reaching consequences for social policy. This restructuring seems to take the 
form of a weakening of the state, but at the same time it places renewed emphasis on certain 
functions of the state, notably the social control and moral imperative functions. It is 
important therefore not to regard globalisation as a quasi-natural development which evolves 
automatically and leaves only the option of adjustment and conformity, but to recognise the 
precise interplay between economic and political processes and the undiminished relevance 
of political steering processes. Hence it was relevant to distinguish general shifts in social 
policy which show their impact on political parties and governments of the whole spectrum 
of ideological positions from movements at the level of political culture which show a 
certain resilience against attempts at levelling their importance. Communicative competence 
is required precisely in this context because every act of communication defines the social 
relationship of the partners in interaction and therefore affords the opportunity of shaping 
social relations at the micro-level with clearer reference to the macro-level.  
 
The core suggestion emerging from this study is that social work practice, communicatively 
conceptualised, needs to become the practice of social citizenship, which means that every 
intervention needs to be aimed not just at the resolution of a specific problem encountered at 
the individual level, but also at the re-examination of the sets of rights and obligations that 
make up the social sphere and which constitute the substance of social integration. This is a 
crucial dimension of every social problem encountered. The biggest threat of globalisation is 
that it seems to create a vacuum at the level of political governance and that consequently the 
boundaries of social solidarity, and with that also the boundaries of identity, become 
uncertain. Population movements are but one indication of this new uncertainty, cultural 
politics and the world-wide struggles for recognition have an even more pervasive effect and 
threaten to weaken contractually negotiated social bonds further. One main indication of this 
is the so-called crisis of the welfare state where fundamentally new principles emerge in the 
politics of integration. In this context a critical approach to social work methodology has 
much to contribute. The outlines of this approach can be derived from the reflection on the 
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fundamental characteristics of successful communication, communication that recognises the 
existence of ‘difference’ and hence is always fundamentally intercultural communication. 
But beyond that recognition of difference lies a commitment to solidarity, to the creation of a 
stable social entity that ensures fairness and equality and safeguards the well-being not only 
of a power elite but of all members of a political community. Nothing less is at stake in every 
‘case’ of social work intervention, nothing less is at stake in the attempts at creating a Social 
Europe that harnesses the rich cultural diversity of the continent and has the enhancement of 
the quality of life of all European citizens as its central concern. 
 
‘Europe’s special quality is the emancipation of the individual, liberation 
from the compelling authority of religious-ideological modes of thought 
which were deemed obligatory. Rule that is ideological, nationalist, 
communist, fundamentalist, theocratic – in a word, rule governed by ideas 
discriminates on the basis of loyalty to the ideas themselves, and does not 
ensure equal rights for citizens. A society that is enlightened, realistic, 
worldly, pluralist, and willing to negotiate is the result of a long process: it 
is a slow-growing plant. The reliability of the civilized citizen denotes an 
inner value system for whose survival fear of punishment is insufficient. 
Europe was united by community of reflection (my emphasis).’ (Konrád 
2001, p. 370) 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Studie setzt sich zum Ziel, die Bedeutung der Vielfalt von Theorien, 
Handlungsformen und Organisationsstrukturen der Sozialen Arbeit im 
europäischen Zusammenblick aufzuspüren, um aus dieser Einsicht die 
Grundlage für ein multikulturelles europäisches Modell der Sozialen Arbeit zu 
entwickeln. Ihre Hauptthese ist, dass dieses Modell nicht aus der Quersumme 
der Methodenansätze entwickelt werden kann, sondern auf einem kritischen, 
politischen Verständnis von citizenship beruhen muss, das im jeweiligen 
Kontext kommunikativ erarbeitet werden muss und daher professionelle 
Interventionen auf gemeinschaftlicher und persönlicher Ebene zu „angewandter 
Sozialpolitik“ werden lässt. Jede detaillierte Beschäftigung mit der 
verfremdenden Uneinheitlichkeit, mit der sich die sozialen Professionen in 
Europa präsentieren und sich sowohl gegen das Entstehen eines professionellen 
Gesamtprofils auf nationaler Ebene, als auch gegen Harmonisierung auf 
europäischer Ebene sperren, schliesst unmittelbar eine eindimensionale 
Erklärungsweise aus und alle Versuche, grössere Kompatibilität und gar 
Vereinheitlichung epistemologisch und organisatorisch herbeizuführen, können 
als gescheitert gelten, wie vor allem die intensiven Kooperations- und 
Austauschprogramme der EU, an denen Studiengänge der Sozialen Arbeit sehr 
aktiv beteiligt waren, gezeigt haben. Dennoch hat sich gerade dieser Austausch 
als ungeheuer ertragreich erwiesen und eine erneute Dynamik erzeugt, die die 
Umrisse einer „Europäischen Sozialen Arbeit“ erkennen lässt, und zwar gerade 
in der Dialektik zwischen im transnationalen Kontakt und Vergleich stärker 
hervortretenden gemeinsamen Aufgaben und Anliegen, die nicht auf das 
Nationale reduziert werden können, und unauflösbaren kulturellen und 
historischen Einbindungen in spezifische Kontexte, die mit 
Verallgemeinerungen nicht zu überwinden sind, ohne dass der eigentliche 
Auftrag der Sozialen Arbeit damit verzerrt würde. 
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Die vorliegende Arbeit entstand im Zusammenhang des unmittelbaren 
praktischen Bemühens um eine Systematisierung der historisch kontingent 
erscheinenden Unterschiede in Praxis und Ausbildung der sozialen 
Professionen in Europa vor allem im Hinblick auf die aus der Wende von 1989 
entstehenden Aufgaben für diese Professionen. Sie macht es sich zur Aufgabe, 
die genannte Dialektik im Hinblick auf ihr Potential sowohl für eine 
umfassendere und konsistentere theoretische Fundierung, als auch für eine den 
Fragen der Identität und den Aufgaben der Sozialpolitik besser gewachsene 
Praxis zu ergründen. Dabei soll vor allem der potentielle Beitrag der Sozialen 
Arbeit zu einer besonderen Art der internationalen Integration umrissen werden, 
wie sie im Schlagwort des „Sozialen Europa“ programmatisch angerissen ist. 
Die Gestaltung eines Sozialen Europas muss sich dabei kritisch mit den 
Gestaltungsformen des Sozialen in der Geschichte der Europäischen 
Nationalstaaten auseinandersetzen und sich von den aus dieser Geschichte 
immer wieder resultierenden Verengungen absetzen, um in der konkreten 
Aushandlung der Spannung zwischen Prinzipien des Rechts auf Identität und 
des Rechts auf Gleichheit ein neues, spezifisch europäisches, aber international 
vertretbares und verhandelbares sozialpolitisches Modell vorzubereiten. Dieser 
politische Prozess geschieht nicht nur auf der Ebene struktureller 
sozialpolitischer Debatten und Entscheidungen, sondern parallel dazu in den 
persönlichen Interaktionen um die Lösung sozialer Probleme und Konflikte, bei 
denen immer die Tragfähigkeit der „organischen Solidarität“ im Sinne 
Durkheims auf dem Spiel steht. In dieser Doppelvision erhält das Konzept der 
Bürgerschaft im Sinne von „citizenship“ paradigmatische Bedeutung, da sich 
mit ihm Anknüpfungen an eine in der Moderne noch nicht realisierte, aber 
dennoch konkret schon in vieler Hinsicht wirksame Programmatik 
bewerkstelligen lassen. 
 
Zu diesem Zweck analysiert das erste Kapitel dieser Studie die Variablen, die 
im europäischen Vergleich für die verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen der 
Sozialen Arbeit als eine für die Moderne typische soziale Praxis verantwortlich 
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sind und zwar in Bezug auf die Berufsbezeichnungen, Studiengänge und 
grundsätzlichen Praxisorientierungen. Dabei wird postuliert, dass drei 
Perspektiven besonderen heuristischen Wert haben für das historische 
Verständnis dieser Vielfalt, und zwar eine lebensweltliche, auf die 
Eigendynamik der Zivilgesellschaft bezogene, eine systembezogene, die den 
vorherrschenden sozialpolitischen Modellen entspricht, und eine 
theoriegeleitete, die von einer zu den beiden anderen Ebenen auf Distanz 
tretenden akademischen Diskursbildung ausgeht. Es wird anerkannt, dass diese 
Variablen nicht unabhängig voneinander operieren, sondern dass auch zwischen 
diesen drei Perspektiven wiederum Wechselbeziehungen bestehen, die in 
späteren Detailuntersuchungen noch näher ausgeführt werden. Ausgegangen 
wird zunächst einmal von den nicht nur bei den Anfängen professioneller 
Ausdifferenzierung problematischen fliessenden Übergängen zwischen 
spontan-ehrenamtlicher und organisierter, auf theoretische Einsichten 
bezogener sozialarbeiterischer Tätigkeit. Diese Spannung begegnet gegenwärtig 
mit erneuter Aktualität im Kontext sozialer Bewegungen wie der 
Frauenbewegung und der Selbsthilfebewegung, die die persönliche und 
lebensweltliche Erfahrung als kritischen Massstab für den Nutzen theoretischer 
Modelle geltend machen. Auf der Ebene des Systems ist Europa durch drei 
grundsätzlich verschiedene Konzepte der organischen Solidarität 
gekennzeichnet, die wiederum das Verhältnis zwischen Lebenswelt und System 
und damit zwischen Eigenverantwortung und kollektiver Verantwortung für 
soziales Wohlergehen jeweils anders bearbeiten. Auch diese, in den 
Sozialstaaten der Nachkriegszeit in verschiedenen Proportionen angewandt, 
treten heutzutage in stärkerer Differenzierung wieder zutage, zumindest was die 
Achse Liberalismus (mit Betonung der individuellen Autonomie) und 
Konservatismus (in der Form des Komunitarismus) betrifft, wobei der 
Universalismus als Gleichheitsideal des Sozialismus nach 1989 eher als 
Gegenfolie fungiert. Statt einer Harmonisierung der Theoriediskurse und einem 
Zusammenwachsen der Methodenansätze, wie es noch in den 70-er Jahren des 
letzten Jahrhunderts möglich schien, lässt sich auch in diesem Bereich eine 
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grössere Differenzierung konstatieren, die scheinbar einer Eigendynamik zu 
folgen scheint, bei genauerer Analyse allerdings sich in ihrer Affinität zu den 
sozialpolitischen Anforderungen des Systems zeigt, während gleichzeitig die 
lebensweltlichen Herausforderungen eine gewisse Gegendynamik entwickeln. 
  
 
Das zweite Kapitel verfolgt genauer die historischen Wege dieser 
unauflösbaren Verflechtung von Sozialer Arbeit und Sozialpolitik von ihren 
Ursprüngen, um damit gleichzeitig Möglichkeiten der Neugestaltung dieses 
Verhältnisses zu prüfen. Es wird demonstriert, wie die europäischen 
Nationalstaaten den Nutzen der Sozialen Arbeit für die Stabilisierung sozialer 
Spannungen und gleichzeitig für die Schaffung einer einheitlichen nationalen 
Identität erkannten, parallel zur Entwicklung eines nationalen 
Erziehungswesens, aber mit anderen Mitteln. Gleichzeitig erkannte die Soziale 
Arbeit in dieser Aufgabe eine Chance, sich professionell zu etablieren und 
gestaltete daher in ihrer Methodik ein sozialpolitisches Instrument, ohne aber 
diese Verbindung in den meisten Fällen explizit zu thematisieren. Durch eine 
bestimmte Art der auf wissenschaftliche Paradigmen gestützten 
Professionalisierung verschwand das Bewusstsein des tatsächlichen Grads der 
Verklammerung aus den akademischen Reflexionen und erzeugte somit einen 
„blinden Fleck“ was Fragen der Identität betrifft in Bezug sowohl auf die 
Nutzer von sozialen Diensten, als auch auf die Professionellen selbst. Der damit 
postulierte wissenschaftliche Universalismus konnte nicht nur seine tatsächliche 
kulturelle Subjektivität nicht mehr wahrnehmen, sondern war zudem noch 
unfähig, die Relativität und Diversität nationaler sozialpolitischer Normen und 
Ziele kritisch zu beleuchten und Prozesse der Bildung verschiedener Identitäten 
unter Nutzern sozialer Dienste damit in Verbindung zu bringen. Symptomatisch 
für diesen Prozess sind auf politischer Ebene die kontrastierenden Positionen 
zum Verhältnis zwischen Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft wie sie sich nach 
Brubaker und Hobsbawm in der neueren europäischen Geschichte 
manifestierten, der nationalistischen, die eine einheitliche kulturelle (und 
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zuweilen ethnifizierte) Identität zur Voraussetzung für Bürgerschaft als 
citizenship macht, und der republikanischen, die citizenship als reine 
Vertragsangelegenheit von einer vorgegebenen Identität unabhängig macht. 
Auch hier etablierte die nationalistische Version eine Dominanz, ohne dass 
damit das emanzipatorische Potential der nationalstaatlichen Ideale völlig 
erschöpft wäre. Mit dem Wandel in der Bedeutung des Nationalstaats im 
Kontext der Globalisierung tritt diese Polarität allerdings wieder verstärkt 
zutage und verbindet sich unmittelbar mit der Frage nach den Grenzen der 
sozialen Solidarität, die daher im Rahmen der sozialarbeiterischen 
Interventionen jeweils mit definiert werden. Hieraus lässt sich ein erster 
Hinweis darauf ableiten, dass sozialpolitische Veränderungen eine direkte 
Auswirkung auf die Methodik der Sozialen Arbeit haben und diese im 
Gegenzug einer kritischen Reflexion an der Gestaltung der Sozialpolitik 
teilnehmen muss. Auf dem Hintergrund dieser Analyse ist die Abwehr des 
Rassismus als einer perversen und pervertierenden Form der Solidarität, auf die 
in der Geschichte des Nationalstaats immer wieder zurückgegriffen wurde,  
eine zentrale Aufgabe der Sozialen Arbeit geworden, die noch in Kapitel 5 
ausführlich behandelt werden wird.  
 
Nach diesem diachronischen Überblick zielt das 3. Kapitel eher ab auf den 
synchronischen Vergleich der Auswirkungen verschiedener „welfare regimes“ 
nach Esping-Andersen und Leibfried auf die Praxis der Sozialen Arbeit in 
Europa. Diese zeigen sich nicht so sehr in der unterschiedlichen Einbindung 
sozialer Dienste in öffentliche und nicht-staatliche Organisationsformen, 
sondern in den unterschiedlichen Versionen von sozialer Solidarität, die den 
Bedeutungskontext für Interventionen definieren und der wiederum von 
bestimmten Methoden mit konstruiert wird. Der welfare state ist nach Esping-
Andersen ein aktiver Teil des Systems der Stratifizierung einer Gesellschaft, 
und daran nimmt die Soziale Arbeit teil. So fördert der skandinavische 
Universalismus das Integrationspotential der Sozialen Arbeit, da soziale 
Dienste als ein allen Teilen der Bevölkerung zustehendes Recht erachtet werden 
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und daher die Gefahr der Stigmatisierung reduziert wird. Im Gegensatz dazu 
haftet den Interventionen in residual konstruierten Systemen immer ein 
gewisser Grad der Stigmatisierung an, da das klassenspezifische 
sozialpolitische System suggeriert, dass verantwortliche Bürger „eigentlich“ 
ohne soziale Hilfe auskommen sollten. Gerade dieses klassentrennende Element 
personenbezogener sozialer Dienste wird wiederum im Korporatismus 
Bismarckscher Prägung durch das Prinzip der Subsidiarität entschärft, was 
einerseits grössere Kreativität in der Methodenentfaltung fördert, andererseits 
die Macht staatlicher Kontrolle unversehens in weite Bereiche des Privaten 
ausdehnt. Die Frage der Mitgestaltung nicht nur sozialer Dienste, sondern des 
Charakters der Sozialpolitik durch die Soziale Arbeit stellt sich nun vor allem in 
den post-kommunistischen Ländern, wo diese, um dieser Aufgabe gerecht zu 
werden, gerade nicht einen Methodenuniversalismus vertreten kann, sondern 
sich bemüht, an schon bestehenden Traditionen der sozialen Solidarität kritisch 
anzuknüpfen und so zu einer zivilgesellschaftlichen Verankerung 
sozialpolitischer Gestaltungsprozesse beizutragen. In allen Teilen Europas stellt 
aber die Auswirkung der wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung auf die Sozialpolitik 
eine entscheidende Herausforderung für die Soziale Arbeit dar, bei der gerade 
die Verwirklichung des sozialpolitischen Mandats auf dem Spiel steht und 
durch die Privatisierung und Kommerzialisierung sozialer Beziehungen 
unterlaufen wird. Erst auf dem Hintergrund dieser analytischen Perspektive 
lässt sich die tatsächliche Auswirkung etwa der Tendenz zur Dezentralisierung 
sozialer Dienste einschätzen, die trotz der dabei zur Anwendung kommenden 
universellen Rhetorik zu keiner sozialpolitischen Konvergenz geführt hat. 
 
 
Die sozialpolitische Kompetenz der sozialpädagogischen Methodik wird gerade 
durch die Aktualisierung des Ringens um kulturelle Identitäten in politischen 
und sozialen Kontexten hart auf die Probe gestellt, und das 4. Kapitel geht 
daher dem spezifischen Verhältnis zwischen Nationalstaat, kultureller Identität 
und Methodik nach. Historisch lässt sich mit Therborn nachweisen, dass die 
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Frage nach der Bewältigung zunehmender kultureller Vielfalt in den 
europäischen Nationalstaaten falsch gestellt ist, da in der Unfähigkeit, 
Nationalstaaten als multikulturelle konstituiert zu denken und zu erfassen 
zunächst einmal das Ergebnis eines Eliminierungsprozesses von Vielfalt 
erkannt werden muss. Das eigentliche Problem, so die Hypothese dieses 
Kapitels, ist das Konstrukt der Homogenität, wie es im Sieg der 
nationalistischen über die republikanische Version des europäischen 
Nationalstaats zum Ausdruck kam, zu dem die Soziale Arbeit immer wieder 
ihren Beitrag leistete, der in der „Re-Ethnifizierung“ sozialer Beziehung und 
politischer Repräsentationsprozesse nach 1989 wieder auf dem Spiel steht. Eine 
auf psychologische und pädagogische Ziele hin verengte Methodik verkennt 
diesen Zusammenhang und verspielt daher ein entscheidendes Potential der 
aktuellen Konfliktlösung. Daher wird in diesem Kapitel zunächst einmal der 
Zusammenhang zwischen der Entwicklung nationaler kultureller Identitäten in 
der europäischen Geschichte und der einer kollektiven europäischen Identität, 
wie sie gegenwärtig im Zusammenhang mit der Globalisierung konstruiert 
wird, untersucht. Bezeichnend ist dabei die Behandlung der Migration im 
jeweiligen historischen Kontext als Symbol und als Mechanismus zur 
Regulierung der kulturellen Homogenität, bei der in Wirklichkeit die Grenzen 
der Solidarität geregelt werden. Ein heuristisches Instrument zur Erfassung 
dieser Prozesse ist die von Giddens und Bauman diagnostizierte Spaltung von 
Raum und Zeit in der Moderne, die in der Globalisierung ihren Höhepunkt 
findet aufgrund der nunmehr gegebenen technischen Möglichkeiten. Die 
Soziale Arbeit hat in der Umverteilung von Raum und Zeit keine unbedeutende 
Rolle, und zwar gerade nicht vorrangig in der direkten Arbeit mit Migrantinnen, 
sondern in der einseitigen Umsetzung von allgemeinen Bedingungen der 
Sozialhilfe, die über die Inanspruchnahme von sozialer Solidarität entscheiden, 
etwa unter dem Motto der Aktivierung. Dadurch werden Mechanismen der 
Exklusion in Gang gesetzt, nicht nur im räumlichen Sinn der territorialen 
Kontrolle, sondern auch im temporalen der Zuordnung von Gruppen zu 
bestimmten Zeitdimensionen als „heutig“ oder „gestrig“. Der unkritische 
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diagnostische Umgang mit „Unterschieden“ der Identitäten bei Klienten, deren 
Inhalte nicht verhandelbar sind, sondern als „gegeben“ vorausgesetzt werden, 
„ethnifiziert“ soziale Beziehungen und Interaktionen, die letztlich nur noch 
verwaltet und kontrolliert werden können, aber für eigentliche kommunikative 
Prozesse keine Verwendung mehr haben. Stattdessen gibt Giddens’ Vorschlag 
einer „generativen Gleichheit“, die Bedingungen der Zugehörigkeit zur 
Diskussion stellt, einen Hinweis auf das Grundprinzip einer alternativen 
Methodik der Sozialen Arbeit, die mit dem Verhältnis von Gleichheit und 
Identität anders und durch die Rückbesinnung auf die Grundprinzipien 
kommunikativen Handelns zurecht zu kommen versucht. 
 
Die Bedeutung kultureller und individueller Identitäten für die Methodik der 
Sozialen Arbeit wird im 5. Kapitel ebenfalls wieder historisch rekonstruierend 
untersucht. Angesichts des im Professionalisierungsprozess angestrebten 
Universalismus einer verbindlichen Methode und der darin bekundeten Abkehr 
von der Kulturgebundenheit vorprofessioneller Praxis wirkt es zunächst einmal 
befremdend, dass Methoden häufig wieder kulturspezifisch artikuliert werden, 
etwa in Formen feministischer oder ethnisch geprägter Methoden („black social 
work“). Damit scheint zudem noch das Gleichheitsideal des in der 
Nachkriegszeit errungenen sozialpolitischen Konsenses bedroht, der einer 
„Politik der Anerkennung“ im Sinne Taylors zu weichen beginnt. Die 
Ambivalenz, mit der der Methodendiskurs in der Sozialen Arbeit in Europa auf 
diese Tendenzen reagiert, weist darauf hin, dass der Universalismus der 
hauptsächlichen Professionalisierungsschübe im eigentlichen Sinn 
klassengebunden und nationgebunden geblieben war. Sowohl das Paradigma 
der „angewandten Sozialwissenschaft“, die den britischen Diskurs einer 
anfänglichen akademischen Disziplin „Sozialarbeit“ bestimmte, als auch das 
Paradigma der Pädagogik in der deutschen Tradition weist diese Doppeltendenz 
auf: einerseits gehören sie zum Projekt der Gestaltung bestimmter kultureller 
(nationaler) Eigenarten, andererseits verobjektivieren sie den kulturellen Inhalt 
zu einer universalen Eigenschaft. Dieser Doppelcharakter einer bestimmten 
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Wissenschaftlichkeit wurde dann besonders in rassistischen Ideologien wie 
denen des Hitlerregimes voll ausgenützt, wobei allerdings der antifaschistische 
Gegenzug der universalistischen Troika von casework, groupwork und 
community work als weltweites Einheitsmodell der Nachkriegszeit die 
Ambivalenz ebenfalls verkannte. Angesichts der Auflehnung vor allem von 
Seiten des Feminismus und der ethnischen Emanzipationsbewegungen gegen 
die repressiven Folgen dieses neuen Universalismus muss das Verhältnis 
zwischen Wissenschaftlichkeit und Identitätsbezogenheit in den 
Methodendiskursen der Sozialen Arbeit neu gestellt werden. Dem bisherigen 
Bemühen um universale Gültigkeit und damit um Gleichheit in der Behandlung 
„anderer“ fehlte der Bezug auf die praktische Verwirklichung von 
Menschenrechten die, wie Laclau nachwies, das Universale stets auf das 
Partikulare beziehen muss.  
 
Eine an diesen Prinzipien ausgerichtete Praxis zentriert sich auf kommunikative 
Kompetenzen, deren genauere Erfassung, wie das 6. Kapitel nachweist, 
unmittelbar auf die Auseinandersetzung mit ethischen Grundprinzipien und 
deren Aushandlung in konkreten Interventionssituationen führt. Gerade durch 
die Rückbesinnung auf die Grundbedingungen des Kommunizierens eröffnet 
sich ein Weg für die ethisch fundierte und politisch verantwortliche 
Weiterentwicklung der sozialpädagogischen Methodik als interkultureller 
Methodik, die weder positivistischer Arroganz, noch der Gleichgültigkeit 
postmoderner Relativität verfällt. Richtungweisend dafür sind Elemente der 
Habermasschen Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, die die Möglichkeit 
des Verstehens überhaupt, auf Batesons Werk aufbauend, in der auf einer Meta-
Ebene Regeln schaffenden Eigenart der Sprache selbst sieht und diese 
pragmatisch aus verschiedenen Sprechakten rekonstruiert. Dieses Verstehen 
kann nur gelingen, wenn dabei das Selbst das Gegenüber nicht zu einem Objekt 
reduziert, sondern im Gegenteil dieses in seiner Eigenart zur Geltung gebracht 
wird, gerade wo es sich in zunächst einmal unverständlichem und letztlich auch 
rechtlich und moralisch unakzeptablem Handeln äussert. 
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Assimilationsstrategien kommen nicht nur in oppressiven Methoden zur 
„Eingliederung“ von Ausländern zur Anwendung, sie äussern sich auch in 
professionellem Expertentum, das vorgibt, Risiken kontrollierbar und 
eliminierbar zu machen und das dabei Klienten zu Objekten degradiert. 
 
Diese besondere Art der Vergewisserung professionellen Handelns, die sich aus 
dem Ansatz interkultureller Kommunikation ableitet, erfordert daher eine sehr 
präzise Reflexion auf die entsprechende Art der Forschungsmethoden. Kapitel 7 
stellt die positivistischen deb hermeneutischen Forschungsansätzen gegenüber, 
wie sie in verschiedenen europäischen Traditionen der Sozialen Arbeit 
Ausdruck fanden, um sie in ihrem jeweiligen historischen Kontext und nach 
den sie leitenden Interessen zu evaluieren. Auch daran zeigt sich die historische 
Eigenart der Sozialen Arbeit, die einerseits bestrebt ist, sich eine universal 
gültige wissenschaftliche Grundlage zu verschaffen, andererseits der 
Komplexität ihres jeweiligen Gegenstands und ihres Handlungsmandats 
verpflichtet bleibt und dies nur schwer mit gängigen, prestigeträchtigen 
positivistischen Forschungsmethoden in Einklang bringen kann. Untersucht 
werden die verschiedenen epistemologischen Entwürfe, die in der Geschichte 
der Sozialen Arbeit besondere Bedeutung erlangten, wie etwa die Fallstudie, die 
Soziale Diagnose und die psychosoziale Einzelfallhilfe. Es wird gezeigt, dass 
die eigentlichen Spaltungen nicht zwischen diesen Modellen, sondern innerhalb 
dieser Modelle auftreten in der Form von objektivierenden und 
konstruktivistisch-hermeneutischen Interpretationen. So müssen einerseits auch 
die gegenwärtigen Herausforderungen, erzeugt durch den Ruf nach unmittelbar 
für die Praxis relevanten Forschungsvorhaben, im Lichte der darin zum 
Ausdruck kommenden politischen Interessen  hinterfragt werden, vor allem 
wenn es sich dabei um die Verbesserung der Kosteneffizienz nach schon zuvor 
formulierten Kriterien handelt. Andererseits ist auch der Ruf nach 
identitätsspezifischer Wissensorientierung, wie er die Forschung von 
feministischer Seite und vor Seiten bestimmter Behindertenkreise artikuliert 
wird, nicht unproblematisch, da er die Gefahr einer Essenzialisierung und 
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Fragmentierung dieser Wissensbereiche enthält. Gerade die Fragmentierung der 
Wissensbereiche unter postmodernen Vorzeichen könnte eine 
verantwortungsbewusste Praxis noch weiter erschweren, während die Reflexion 
auf die besondere Stellung der Sozialen Arbeit an Berührungspunkten zwischen 
System und Lebenswelt das kommunikative, interkulturelle Paradigma auch im 
Forschungsbereich zur Geltung bringen könnte, wie gerade der Ansatz von 
Beresford zeigt.  
 
Der Rückbezug auf zeitgenössische Praxis erfordert eine explizite 
Auseinandersetzung mit den sozialpolitischen Rahmenbedingungen unter den 
Vorzeichen der Globalisierung, der das 8. Kapitel gewidmet ist. Da der 
Nationalstaat seine zentrale Vermittlungsfunktion zwischen Arbeit und Kapital 
verliert, wird nach Böhnisch auch die Frage nach dem Sitz neuer 
sozialpolitischer Steuerungszentren akut. Die Konstruktion des Nationalstaats 
hatte die Widersprüchlichkeit verschiedener Handlungssysteme eingebunden, 
die nun durch die Schwächung dieses Integrationsmoments offen zutage tritt. 
Auch die Soziale Arbeit, die  in diese Kompromisse mit eingebunden war und 
durch ihre Mitarbeit an ihrer Gestaltung ihren gesellschaftlichen Platz und ihre 
politische Legitimation erhielt, sieht sich mit der Notwendigkeit konfrontiert, 
ihre politische, gesellschaftlich-kulturelle und wissenschaftliche Rolle neu zu 
definieren. Im britischen Kontext waren auf der politischen Ebene die ersten ‚de 
facto’ sozialpolitischen Initiativen durch den Kompromiss zwischen 
Liberalismus und einem konservativen Vertrauen auf Hilfeorganisationen der 
Zivilgesellschaft gekennzeichnet, der in der „Rettungsorientierung“ des frühen 
sozialarbeiterischen Methodenansatzes seine Entsprechung fand. Hier wurde 
die malthusianische Scheu vor organisierten Sozialmassnahmen mit der die 
empowerment vorbereitenden Orientierung des „settlement movement“ 
kombiniert. Auf kultureller Ebene entsprach die Generalisierung der 
erfolgreichen mittelständischen Lebensprinzipien als Rationalitätskriterium in 
der Sozialen Arbeit dem Pragmatismus des Nationalstaats, der Rückgriffe auf 
archetypische Identitäten mit modernem Machtkalkül verband, um daraus einen 
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verallgemeinerbaren Nationalcharakter zu konstruieren. 
Wissenschaftstheoretisch wirkte die Fallarbeit mit Einzelfalldiagnose als 
Kompromiss zwischen positivistischen Wissensmodellen und der Nutzung 
höchst subjektiver Lebenserfahrungen als Grundlage für professionelles 
Handeln, äquivalent zu der nationalen Ausrichtung der gesamten 
Universitätsbetriebe. Sowohl auf der gesamtpolitischen, als auch auf der 
sozialarbeiterischen Ebene lässt sich heute feststellen, dass diese Kompromisse 
in ihre Komponenten auseinander treten. Auf der Ebene der 
Wissenschaftlichkeit klaffen heute in der Sozialen Arbeit die postmoderne 
Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber der Wertung bestimmter Methodenansätze und die 
zweckrationale Operationalisierung von Methoden nach dem Grad ihrer 
Effizienz auseinander. Ebenso spalten sich als empowerment ausgegebene 
Initiativen der sozialpolitischen Aktivierung von essenzialistischen Ansätzen im 
Umgang mit kulturellen Unterschieden, die beide die Verantwortung für die 
Befähigung zur Gestaltung von verschiedenartigen Identitäten vernachlässigen. 
Sozialpolitisch gipfelt diese durchgängig aufbrechende Diskrepanz einerseits in 
Konzepten des care und case management, die eigentlich von den Bedürfnissen 
der Nutzer sozialer Dienste ausgehen müssten, dies aber angesichts der 
zurückgestutzten finanziellen Möglichkeiten gar nicht tun können, andererseits 
in der Betonung von Partizipation von Klienten, die nunmehr als Konsumenten 
an der Produktion sozialer Dienste beteiligt werden sollen. Diese 
Disaggregationserscheinungen  verweisen unmittelbar auf ein grundsätzlich 
verändertes sozialpolitisches Szenario, das allerdings der Sozialen Arbeit nicht 
schicksalhaft vorgegeben ist, sondern vielmehr diese zur Teilnahme an seiner 
aktiven Gestaltung sozialpolitischer Praxis im Interesse der Nutzer sozialer 
Dienste herausfordert. 
 
Möglichkeiten dieser Art der aktiven Teilnahme an sozialpolitischen Prozessen 
und Handlungsmöglichkeiten werden in Kapitel 9 untersucht. In Bezug auf 
Giddens Formulierung sozialpolitischer Konzepte des „Dritten Wegs“, wie sie 
vor allem im sogenannten „Blair-Schröder Papier“ zum Ausdruck kommen, hat 
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die Soziale Arbeit wieder offiziell Konjunktur, im Gegensatz zu den Versuchen 
der Thatcher Ära, ihre Irrelevanz oder gar ihre Gefährlichkeit für die 
Gesellschaft zu demonstrieren. Zu fragen ist allerdings, welche sozial- und 
gesellschaftspolitische Rolle der Sozialen Arbeit im Rahmen der neu 
formulierten sozialpolitischen Ziele zukommen soll und ob diese 
Aufgabenstellung auch mit den ethischen und wissenschaftlichen 
Grundprinzipien der Sozialen Arbeit übereinstimmen kann. Zur politischen 
Debatte im Rahmen der Rückbesinnung auf einen „Dritten Weg“ steht nunmehr 
nicht mehr die Abschaffung des welfare state, was sich angesichts seiner 
Bedeutung für den Kapitalismus und des Widerstands der Bevölkerung ohnehin 
als unmöglich erwiesen hätte, sondern seine Modernisierung und das heisst, 
dass nicht nur neue Prioritäten gesetzt werden, sondern dass auch eine neue, 
durchgängige Rationalität ins Spiel gebracht werden soll. Diese Rationalität 
konstruiert Individuen, die zunächst einmal in ihrem eigenen Interesse handeln 
und über aktives Marktverhalten zur Bestimmung von Prioritäten mündig 
teilnehmen. Sie dazu in den Bereichen zu befähigen, bei denen es nicht 
unmittelbar um den Austausch von materiellen, kommerziellen Gütern und 
Leistungen geht, wird nunmehr die Aufgabe der Sozialen Arbeit. Damit werden 
Rahmenbedingungen neu definiert, die wohl Kernprinzipien des professionellen 
Handelns wie etwa des empowerment Raum und Anerkennung geben, die aber 
gleichzeitig ein viel höheres Potential an sozialer Kontrolle beinhalten. 
Insgesamt wird den Sozialen Professionen abverlangt, dass sie nicht nur ihre 
Dienstleistungen an marktwirtschaftliche Bedingungen anpassen, sondern dass 
sie Anpassungen an Marktverhalten auch bei den Adressatinnen vermitteln. 
Wie zu den Zeiten der ersten sozialen Konsolidierungsversuche der 
Nationalstaaten mittels sozialpolitischer Massnahmen entdeckt der globalisierte 
Nationalstaat die Bedeutung von Personal, das soziale Integration als 
pädagogische Aufgabe übernehmen kann, und zwar nach politisch 
vorgegebenen aber professionell verbrämten Zielen. Darin besteht nun die 
Chance der Sozialen Arbeit, die Notwendigkeit ihrer Mitarbeit am 
Funktionieren der Sozialpolitik kritisch zu nützen, und zwar in tatsächlicher 
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enger Kooperation mit den Nutzern sozialer Dienste. Die Rückbesinnung auf 
die Verschiedenartigkeit der professionellen und methodologischen Traditionen 
in Europa ist ein wesentliches Element in der Gestaltung dieser Autonomie, in 
Anerkennung des engen Bezugs dieser Methodenansätze zum Prozess der 
kulturellen Differenzierung, die sich immer gegen eine reine Funktionalisierung 
durch politische Interessen sperrt.  
 
Diese Untersuchung verfolgt also insgesamt die folgenden Ziele. Erstens soll 
sie zeigen, dass in der Geschichte der europäischen Nationalstaaten soziale 
Solidarität nicht auf vorhandene Loyalitäten und Bindungen gebaut werden 
konnte, sondern dass die Schaffung zwangsfreier Integration auf die 
kompetente Gestaltung öffentlicher und privater Kommunikationsprozesse 
angewiesen ist. Soziale Arbeit kann also nie eine private Tätigkeit sein, sondern 
involviert öffentliche Institutionen und den Bezug auf Rechte und Gesetze. 
Daher ist zweitens die Beziehung zwischen der historischen Entwicklung dieser 
sozialpolitischen Institutionen und den jeweiligen Methodendiskursen der 
Sozialen Arbeit wichtig, denn dieser weist die professionellen Besonderheiten 
dieser Tätigkeit auf, die nicht auf ein Regelnbefolgen oder auf die Logik des 
Management reduziert werden kann. Drittens soll damit die Variationsbreite der 
organisatorischen und disziplinären Erscheinungsformen der Sozialen Arbeit in 
Europa als ein positiver Wert erkannt werden, der mit allen Versuchen der 
Harmonisierung verloren gehen würde. Viertens bedeutet das aber überhaupt 
nicht, dass alle methodischen Ansätze grundsätzlich gleich gültig wären. 
Vielmehr kann die Verpflichtung auf kommunikative Kompetenzen auch dazu 
dienen, dass die Spannung zwischen Kriterien der universalen Gültigkeit (und 
damit auch der Wissenschaftlichkeit) und der Berücksichtigung individueller 
und kultureller Besonderheiten bewusst zum Ausdruck gebracht und diskursiv 
immer neu bearbeitet wird. Dies wird fünftens vor allem im Bereich der 
Forschung auf die Probe gestellt, wo sich die Abtrennung von positivistisch-
wissenschaftlichen von ethischen Kriterien als besonders gefährlich erweist, 
weil damit der politischen Beeinflussung und Manipulation das Feld geräumt 
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wird.  Sechstens, um  die Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten der Sozialpolitik durch 
Soziale  Arbeit erkennen zu können unter dem Globalisierungsdruck, der alle 
welfare state Systeme gleichermassen zu betreffen scheint, ist eine genaue 
Analyse der unterschiedlichen Ausprägungen gegenwärtiger sozialpolitischer 
Veränderungen erforderlich. Diese analytischen Fähigkeiten gehören mehr denn 
je zum Katalog der grundsätzlichen Praxiskompetenzen der Sozialen Arbeit, 
neben den kommunikativen Kompetenzen, die in einer europäisch orientierten 
Praxis notwendigerweise auch von interkulturellen Prinzipien geleitet sein 
müssen.   
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